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ABSTRACT 
 
Global Iconic Events:  




 This dissertation examines how a news event may become a global social myth. 
In order to track this voyage from the particular to the universal, I developed a theoretical 
concept of “global iconic events.” I define global iconic events as news events that are 
covered extensively and remembered ritually by international media. I suggest five 
narrative aspects to consider in connection with them: (1) their narrative prerequisites; (2) 
their elevated and interpretative story; (3) their condensation into a simple phrase, a short 
narrative, and a recognizable visual scene; (4) their competing stories; and (5) their 
ability to travel across multiple media platforms and changing social and political 
contexts.  
 I perform textual analysis on media representations from four distinct national 
contexts (West German, East German, Hungarian, and American) to examine two case 
studies. With the help of the central case study, the “fall of the Berlin Wall,” I exhibit the 
successful social construction of a global iconic event. The second case study, the 1956 
Hungarian revolution, illuminates some factors, in particular local counter-narration, 
incoherent and contextual international representation, forgetting, and marginality of the 
event’s location, as instrumental in the failure of an event to become a global iconic 
event.  
 While the East German border opening on November 9, 1989 was unintentional, 
confusing, and messy, its global message is not about “luck” or “accident” in history. 
Incarnated as a global iconic event, the fall of the Berlin Wall has come to communicate 
the momentary power that the otherwise hopelessly vulnerable individual can have. The 
event’s elevated and interpretative story, condensed into a simple phrase, a short narrative 
and a recognizable visual scene, provides global civil society with a contemporary social 
myth. Through recycling, reenactment, possession, memorialization and other 
embodiments, the event’s simple and universal story continues to travel successfully 
through time, space, and media, inspiring people in various parts of the world.    
 In conclusion, I emphasize that when we examine the social construction of 
global iconic events, the stakes are high. I hope that this piece of academic writing will 
help us understand how powerful stories of events might shape the lives of those 
generations who come after us all over the world. Because in the end, after common 
currencies, military alliances, and international courts have failed, stories may well be all 
we have left to bring hope and unity. 
	  
	   i	  
 
 




Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework: From Media Events to Global Iconic Events ............ 8 
 
PART I: Constructing Global Iconic Events: The Case of the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
Chapter 2. Narrative Prerequisites of the Story of the Fall of the Berlin Wall................. 38 
Chapter 3. “The Gates of the Wall Are Wide Open”: The Elevated and Interpretative 
West German Story of the Fall of the Berlin Wall ........................................................... 72 
Chapter 4. “Wall and Barbed Wire Do Not Divide Anymore”: Condensation into a 
Simple Phrase, a Short Narrative and a Recognizable Visual Scene................................ 96 
Chapter 5. Passport, Visa, and Stamp: The East German Story of November 9, 1989 .. 115 
Chapter 6. The Berlin Twitter Wall: How the Story of the Fall of the Berlin Wall Travels 
Through Time, Space, and Media................................................................................... 127 
 
PART II: Deconstructing Global Iconic Events: The Case of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution 
Chapter 7. Narrative Prerequisites of the Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution ...... 165 
Chapter 8. The “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” as Man of the Year: Condensation into a 
Simple Phrase, a Short Narrative and a Recognizable Visual Scene.............................. 171 
Chapter 9. “We Greet You In the Name of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters”: The 
American Elevated and Interpretative Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution........... 177 
Chapter 10. Why Did the Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Not Travel Through 
Time, Space, and Media?................................................................................................ 196 
Chapter 11. “Counterrevolutionaries”: The Hungarian Counter-narrative of the 1956 
Revolution....................................................................................................................... 201 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 218 
Research Design: My Travel Through Time, Space, and Media.................................... 229 




	   ii	  
	  
	  
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: One of the two remaining command posts in Berlin, located at Kieler Eck, surrounded 
by pink and white residential buildings. 
 
Figure 2: Brunnenstrasse and Bernauer Strasse corner in Berlin Mitte.  
 
Figure 3: Sculpture at Brunnenstrasse 142 Berlin by Michael Bauer, Florian Bauer and Edward 
Anders. 
 
Figure 4: “Kampfgruppen am Brandenburger Tor 1961.”  
 
Figure 5: “GDR border guards remove the body of Peter Fechter (1944 - 1962) after he was shot 
trying to cross the Berlin Wall to West Germany, 18th August 1962.” 
 
Figure 6: Window of Remembrance at the Berlin Wall Memorial. 
 
Figure 7: “Dismantling of the Iron Curtain in Hungary.” 
 
Figure 8: “East-German refugees show their passports to news reporters as they leave Prague on 
October 4, 1989.” 
 
Figure 9: “International Press Center at Mohrenstrasse, East Berlin, November 9, 1989.” 
 
Figure 10: “Robin Lautenbach with passers-by at Invalidenstrasse,” Tagesthemen, November 9, 
1989 (NDR) 
 
Figure 11: “The SED Opens Borders to the West: Nobody Will Be Prevented from Departure,” 
front page of Die Welt, November 10, 1989. 
 
Figure 12a: “The German People Are the Happiest in the World,” front page of Die Welt, 
November 11, 1989 [left side].  
 
Figure 12b: “The German People Are the Happiest in the World,” front page of Die Welt, 
November 11, 1989 [right side].  
 
Figure 13: “The GDR Opens Its Borders to the Federal Republic,” front page of Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, November 10, 1989.  
 
Figure 14: “Wall and Barbed Wire Do Not Divide Anymore,” front page of Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, November 11, 1989. 
 
Figure 15: “The GDR Cracks the Wall,” front page of Süddeutsche Zeitung on November 11, 
1989.  
 
Figure 16: “Done! The Wall Is Open,” front page of Bild, November 10, 1989.  
 
Figure 17: Front page image of Bild, November 11, 1989. 
	  
	   iii	  
 
Figure 18: Hanns Joachim Friedrichs in Tagesthemen (NDR), November 10, 1989.  
 
Figure 19: Volker Jelaffle in Heute (ZDF), November 10, 1989. 
 
Figure 20: “Crossing the border with a Trabi: Manuela and Klaus left everything behind – today 
it’s possible to return,” Bild, November 10, 1989. 
 
Figure 21: “Two members of the People’s Police motionlessly observe the happenings: West 
Berliner crowds greet the visitors from East Berlin creating a thick corridor and waving the 
German flag,” Bild, November 11, 1989. 
 
Figure 22: “The mule says to the Trabi: if you are a car, I am a horse,” Thomas Mauz, Bild, 
November 11, 1989, p. 8. 
 
Figure 23: “Sarah – The Open Wall Baby,” Bild, November 13, 1989, p. 3.  
 
Figure 24: “Long Lines in Front of Banks – Money Became Scarce,” Bild, November 13, 1989, 
p. 5. 
 
Figure 25a: “Reformer Modrow announces dialogue about the opening of the Brandenburg 
Gate,” front page of Berliner Morgenpost, November 14, 1989.  
 
Figure 25b: “Berlin Revives: The Entire City Awaits – When Does the Gate Open?” Berliner 
Morgenpost, November 14, 1989, p. 5. 
 
Figure 26: “Images That Move the United States: NBC Correspondent Garrick Utley Reports 
Directly from the Brandenburg Gate,” Die Welt, November 14, 1989, p. 3.  
 
Figure 27: “Brandenburg Gate – The Most Interesting Spot On Our Planet,” Bild, November 17, 
1989, p. 3.  
 
Figure 28: “Berlin Waited for the Opening of the Brandenburg Gate,” front page of Berliner 
Morgenpost, November 15, 1989.  
 
Figure 29: “Brandenburg Gate – Opens Today? Berliners Waited Entire Night,” front page of 
Bild, November 15, 1989. 
 
Figure 30: “The Brandenburg Gate: Landmark of Berlin and Highly Symbolic Monument For 
Two Hundred Years of German History,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 16, 1989, p. 13. 
 
Figure 31: “Rejoicing on the day after. Willy Brandt next to Mayor Walter Momper, in front of 
the Brandenburg Gate,” Die Zeit, November 17, 1989, p. 6. 
 
Figure 32: “Berlin’s Nicest Gift. The Brandenburg Gate on the East Side Just Before 3PM 
Yesterday Afternoon: Thousands Awaited the Moment of Opening,” Berliner Morgenpost, 
December 23, 1989, p. 3. 
 
Figure 33: “The Brandenburg Gate is Open. Entire Berlin Celebrates. Kohl: We Want Peace, We 
Want Freedom. Modrow Also Commemorates the Victims of the Wall,” front page of Die Welt, 
December 23, 1989. 
	  
	   iv	  
 
Figure 34: “Kennedy with Brandt in Berlin,” front page of Berliner Morgenpost, November 29, 
1989. 
 
Figure 35: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 18, 1989, p. 2. 
 
Figure 36: “Neue Reiseregelung” [“new travel regulation”], Aktuelle Kamera, November 10, 
1989. 
 
Figure 37: “DDR-Reiseregelung begrüsst” [“GDR travel regulation welcomed,”] Aktuelle 
Kamera, November 10, 1989. 
 
Figure 38: “DDR-Regierungssprecher zu neuen Reiseregelungen” [GDR government spokesman 
about the new travel regulations], front page of Neues Deutschland, November 10, 1989.  
 
Figure 39: “Hunderttausende DDR-Bürger schauten sich West Berlin an” [“Hundred thousands 
of GDR citizens went sightseeing to West Berlin,”] front page of Berliner Zeitung, November 11, 
1989.  
 
Figure 40: “The Brandenburg Gate is open – symbol of deep changes in the center of Europe. 
It got so far on Friday evening. The Brandenburg Gate will be freed for visitor traffic. Hans 
Modrow, Helmut Kohl, Erhard Krack and Walter Momper together carry out this act,” front page 
of Neues Deutschland, December 23-24, 1989.  
 
Figure 41: “Brandenburg Gate Opened for Citizens of East and West: Tens of thousands there / 
Historic handshake between Hans Modrow and Helmut Kohl,” front page of Berliner Zeitung, 
December 23-24, 1989.  
 
Figure 42: “Mauerfall” [“Fall of the Berlin Wall”] in Legoland Discovery Centre Berlin  
 
Figure 43: Close-up of the “Fall of the Berlin Wall” in Legoland Discovery Centre Berlin. 
 
Figure 44: Online monument for the “Berlin Twitter Wall.” 
 
Figure 45: “Berlin/L.A. Wall, 2009.” 
 
Figure 46: “Mauerfall” [“Fall of the Wall.”] 
Figure 47: “On the road to Bethlehem, a very symbolic tag on the wall made on the Palestinian 
side.” 
 
Figure 48: “Palestinians Mark the Fall of the Berlin Wall by Taking Down the Wall on Their 
Land.” 
 
Figure 49: Original segment of the Berlin Wall in front of Westin Grand Berlin; the sign warns 
that “damages to the wall are not permitted.” 
 
Figure 50: Street performer dressed as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in front of the Brandenburg 
 Gate in Berlin. 
 
Figure 51: Berlin Wall segment with Honecker quote as souvenir. 
	  
	   v	  
 
Figure 52: Postcards with pieces of the Berlin Wall. 
 
Figure 53: Condensation in souvenir stores: the Brandenburg Gate, the Trabi, and the Berlin 
Wall as one colorful souvenir. 
 
Figure 54: Repainted Berlin Wall segments in the Maltese Charity Service’s garden in Budapest, 
Hungary.  
 
Figure 55: “Heute vor einem Jahr: Das Ende der Mauer” [“Today a year ago: The end of the 
Wall”], front page of Berliner Morgenpost, November 9, 1990.  
 
Figure 56: “Berlin feiert den Jahrestag des Mauerfalls” [“Berlin celebrates the anniversary of the 
Wall’s fall”], front page of Berliner Morgenpost, November 9, 1999. 
 
Figure 57: “Revolution für die Freiheit” [“Revolution for freedom,”] front page of Berliner 
Morgenpost, November 9, 2009. 
 
Figure 58: Viewing platform at the Berlin Wall Memorial overlooking a reconstructed “death 
strip.” 
 
Figure 59: Original segments of the Berlin Wall at the Berlin Wall Memorial, moved by pastor 
Hildebrandt of the Sophien Parish in his hunt for imaginary mass graves of WWII bombing 
victims. 
 
Figure 60: A sculpture titled “Fathers of Unity,” representing Bush, Kohl and Gorbachev in front 
of the Axel Springer AG’s headquarters in Berlin-Kreuzberg. 
 
Figure 61: “Balancing act” by Stephan Balkenhol (2009) commemorates the 50th anniversary of 
the laying of the foundation stone of the Axel Springer building. 
 
Figure 62: Playing soccer on the Berlin Wall Memorial’s “death strip.” 
 
Figure 63: The cover of Time magazine’s Man of the Year issue, January 7, 1957. 
 
Figure 64: “Hungarian Freedom Fighter, Age 11” (Time, January 7, 1957, p. 18). 
 
Figure 65: “SOVIET ARMORED VEHICLES PROWL STREETS OF BUDAPEST: A tank and a smaller 
vehicle moving yesterday along Kossuth Street in the embattled Hungarian capital. This picture 
was taken by a Western traveler, just before he left the city for Vienna. It was sent here by radio. 
The fighting that had started on Tuesday still continued” (NYT, October 27, 1956, p. 1).  
 
Figure 66: “Scenes in Budapest as Hungarians Fight Against Soviet Domination” (NYT, October 
28, 1956, p. 1.) 
 
Figure 67: “Uprisings: As Open Revolt Against Communism in Hungary Threatens Soviet 
Mastery of Eastern Europe” (NYT, October 28, 1956, p. 181.) 
 
Figure 68: “Hungarian Refugees and Vice President,” Life cover January 7, 1957. 
 
	  
	   vi	  
Figure 69: “Guns pointed toward embattled Budapest streets, line of Russian tanks rambles 
ahead to attack the Hungarian ant-communist rebels” (November 5, 1956, p. 37, excerpted in 
Life). 
 
Figure 70: “DEFYING POLICE, Hungarian students with guns and flags encourage the crowds in 
Budapest streets” (Life, November 5, 1956, p. 38). 
 
Figure 71: “BODY OF A YOUNG GIRL SLAIN IN RIOTS LIES ON RUG IN BUDAPEST BUILDING” (Life, 
November 5, 1956, p. 39). 
 
Figure 72: “Scornful vengeance is vented by woman who spits at the mangled corpse of a secret 
police colonel hung head down in Budapest Square of the Republic. Viewing former tormentors’ 
corpses, Hungarians said, ‘they shot our children’” (Life, November 12, 1956, p. 43). 
 
Figure 73: “ON A MAN’S MISSION. Pal Pruck, 15, was one of the many brave teen-agers who 
fought in the rebellion. He is standing in a rubble-strewn Budapest street” (Life, November 12, 
1956, p. 36). 
 
Figure 74: “ENJOYING TURKEY at a Thanksgiving dinner in Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 
shelter in New York, a little boy tackles a big leg. Few except the old refugees remembered 
having had turkey.” 
 
Figure 75: “Tears of relief dim at refugee’s eyes as he gives thanks in a Milwaukee church” 
(Life, December 3, 1956, p. 41). 
 
Figure 76: “HONORING THE DEAD, one woman takes her baby along in parade through city. 
Women began marching in the morning and kept going until dark” (Life, December 17, 1956, p. 
28). 
 
Figure 77: “GRAVES OF HUNGARIAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS LIE IN THE SAME CEMETERY WITH 
RUSSIAN DEAD BUT ARE COVERED WITH OFFERINGS OF FLOWERS AND WREATHS” (Life, 
December 17, 1956, p. 32). 
 
Figure 78: “Getting a Job. Pal (center) meets John Clark of Roselyn Bakeries as Uncle Singer 
(right) interprets. ‘We need bakers,’ said Clark (upper left) to his superintendent. ‘Let’s try him.’ 
Bill Hickel, who introduced Pal, stands at right” (Life, January 7, 1957, p. 26). 
 
Figure 79: “Coming home from his first night on the job, Pal, who works in bakery from 
midnight to 9 a.m. and sometimes until 11 a.m., during rush periods, greets Rose and little Josef 
who came out to meet him at doorway of their new home” (Life, January 7, 1957, p. 26.) 
 
Figure 80: The Hungarian Official Story of the Counterrevolution and the Western Elevated and 
Interpretative Story of the Revolution. 
 
Figure 81: Two photographs from John Sadovy’s photo series on the events on Republic Square, 
October 30, 1956. In the first photograph Lajos Somogyi Berta is on the left and József Farkas K. 
is on the right. Originally published by Life magazine (“Hungarian Patriots Strike Ferocious 
Blows at Tyranny,” November 12, 1956, p. 34), reproduced by Népszabadság as illustration for 
the article “Those Who Returned from the Grave Accuse” (February 19, 1957, p. 9). 
 
	  
	   vii	  
Figure 82: “Greeting friends trapped on the other side. West Berliners using a stepladder to wave 
to the east.” 
 
Figure 83: Icons of Revolution seminar participants at Freie Universität Berlin (June 2012).  
 
Figure 84: The newspaper archive division of the State Library of Berlin [Zeitungsabteilung, 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin] where I researched the West and East German press coverage and 
remembrance of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
 
Due to copyright considerations, figures 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25a, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 36, 37, 38, 41, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 
82 are not included in the dissertation’s online copy. 
	  





 I would like to thank the Columbia Communications PhD Program for providing 
me with five years of happiness. I loved stopping by at faculty offices and enjoyed our 
discussions on the mailing list and in other public spheres. Our PhD program is James W. 
Carey’s “conversationalist” program, dedicated to the ideals of friendliness, intellectual 
curiosity, and mutual respect. You may say I am a dreamer, but in this program, I am not 
the only one. 
 With his gentle, elegant manners and persistent standards, Michael Schudson has 
been and hopefully remains my guide, my Virgil through all intellectual and professional 
mysteries. By now I know many (if not most) books on his bookshelf by heart and have 
seen the tree in front of his office in all seasons: with green and red leaves, without leaves 
and under snow. We spoke about the Goldberg Variations, baseball, Daniel Bell, the 
importance of empirical research, and about immortality by way of footnotes. He made 
my investment in “How to write your dissertation” books the worst investment ever: most 
books were non-applicable to our working process. Did they ever mention that if I submit 
a new chapter, I receive a Robert Frost poem (in addition to a long list of revisions)? No, 
they did not. These books spoke about a bureaucratic process -- not about the lovely 
travel into the universe of ideas I took with Michael.  
 My American academic career would not have happened without Monroe E. 
Price. At a Central European University conference in 2004, a few hours after my 
Hungarian mentor, Péter György, introduced us, he suddenly suggested me to apply to 
	  
	   ix	  
Yale Law School. Péter György, Monroe Price and Aimee Brown Price have changed my 
life and continue to do so in such profound ways that are hard to express in words.  
 Few PhD students are blessed to have not only one, but two intellectual homes. 
Jeffrey C. Alexander generously provided me with a second home in the Yale Center for 
Cultural Sociology. All our meetings have been beautiful intellectual journeys without 
the sense of passing time. I am deeply thankful for our memorable conversations and the 
many student friends I have at his center.  
 I regard the chair of our department, Todd Gitlin as my most important American 
Studies professor. What I understand of this great country, which is my home now, is 
strongly influenced by his writings and the many conversations we have had. While the 
term “tenured radical” is ironic, I think our department lives up to the ideals Todd 
represented in 1968. 
 I am thankful to Jack M. Balkin, Director of the Information Society Project at 
Yale Law School, for his friendship and intellectual mentorship. Conversations with Jack 
strongly shaped my academic career and my understanding of the Constitution of the 
United States, critical legal studies and Chinese philosophy. He often provided me with 
Godfather-style academic advice “I could not refuse.”  
 Barbie Zelizer has always been inspirational to me. As a female scholar with 
creative, interdisciplinary work and a strong presence at ICA she shapes not only the 
present, but also the future of our discipline.   
 I read Media Events at a seminar of Andie Tucher that also introduced me to 
many other favorites, like Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s Railway Journey and James W. 
	  
	   x	  
Carey’s Communication as Culture. I am deeply thankful for Andie’s firm dedication to 
all Columbia PhD students, and for her relentless modesty in the ego jungle of academia. 
 I am thankful to the Harriman Institute for their continuous support and interest in 
my work, especially to István Deák, John Micgiel, and my Harriman advisor, Alan 
Timberlake. Generous funding from Pepsi Corporation by the way of the Harriman 
Institute enabled me to focus on my dissertation in the last two years.  
 A special warm thank you goes to my dear friends, colleagues and editors, Ri 
Pierce-Grove and Steve R. White, with whom we co-founded the Riverside School for 
Iconicity and Social Thought, while living on 549 Riverside Drive in New York. I 
explored all sides of graduate school with Ri. We drank hundreds of cups of coffee and 
tea, developed impossible dissertation topics, audited courses in art history and visual 
studies, and smiled and cried over ramen, as only best friends do.  
 The edits of another dear friend and colleague, Lynn Berger, enhanced the style of 
my dissertation. This is a dissertation that is mostly about a German event, written by a 
Hungarian, edited by a Dutch, and presented to an American committee.  
Many professors and intellectuals shaped my way of thinking about my 
dissertation and academic life, especially C. W. Anderson, Béla Bacsó, Zsófia Bán, 
Gergely Baics, Rodney Benson, Jonathan Crary, István Deák, Ron Eyerman, Paul Frosh, 
Herbert Gans, Bernhard Giesen, Lucas Graves, Ron Jacobs, Elihu Katz, Peter Kondor, 
Katalin Kovács, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Katalin Orbán, Ruthie Palmer, Benjamin Peters, 
John Durham Peters, Sándor Radnóti, Paddy Scannell, Gábor Vermes, and numerous 
Budapest public intellectuals, artists and academics I cannot all list. I also greatly 
	  
	   xi	  
benefited from discussions at David Stark’s CODES seminar at the Center on 
Organizational Innovation at Columbia University. 
In connection with the Hungarian revolution-related chapters I am thankful for the 
advice of Tibor Glant, Csaba Békés, István Deák, Péter György, Oren Meyers, András 
Mink, Péter Pásztor, János Rainer M., András Rényi and the editors of Journalism 
Studies. I enjoyed the institutional support of the 1956 Institute and the Open Society 
Archives in Budapest. In connection with the chapters on the fall of the Berlin Wall, I 
have especially benefited from the advice of Richard R. John, Rüdiger Steinmetz, 
Margreth Lüneborg, Volker Berghahn, Annika Bach, and the archivists in the 
Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, in the Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv in 
Potsdam and in the NDR Archiv in Hamburg. 
 Fellow doctoral students and friends also provided me with plenty of ideas and 
encouragement, including Colin Agur, Burcu Baykurt, Jonah Bossewitch, Katherine 
Brown, Kate Fink, Katie Montalbano, Travis Mushett, Sarah Stonbely and Matt Powers. 
My brothers, Lőrinc and Balázs Sonnevend, and my sister-in-law, Zsófia Brett were 
sweet and encouraging both in person and on video Skype. The Brandis family in Berlin 
and the Morcsányi family in Budapest supported and encouraged me continuously. I 
would also like to record my gratitude to my former husband, László Darvasi. His 
beautiful magical-realist novels, short stories and plays taught me a great deal about the 
power of narratives.  
This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Peter Sonnevend, and to the memory 
of my mother, Mari Belohorszky (1944-2005), who are the beloved icons of my life. 
They whole-heartedly supported all my and my brothers’ intellectual and personal 
	  
	   xii	  
journeys and have been partners in conversations about literature, psychology, history, art 
and the meaning of life. I will always remember my mother’s encouraging words:  “you 
belong to the first generation of Hungarian women who can fulfill their professional 
dreams without political constraints.” She did not have the chance to get to know her 
grandchildren. It is now my task to tell my beloved nieces, Panni and Kamilla 




	   xiii	  
	  
	  









On 12 November 1989, I took a walk on my own to Potsdamer Platz amid the general feeling that 
no one really knew what was right and what was allowed – particularly the border soldiers. 
Strictly speaking, the German president can’t really just walk around as he likes and take on the 
role of a reconnaissance patrol in an uncertain political situation.  But I just wanted to go out. So I 
walked from the western side of Potsdamer Platz over the broad, empty space towards the east. I 
saw how I was being watched by the border guards through binoculars. Then a senior officer came 
towards me with meticulous military demeanour and said: “Mr. President, no unusual occurrences 
to report.” I felt that probably no other words could have been in starker contrast to the 
remarkable events of this time.	  
  
Richard von Weizsäcker on the fall of the Berlin Wall (Hertle, 2011, p. 208) 
  
  
There is no impossibility that cannot be overcome (survived?), naturally, and further down the 
road, I now know, happiness lies in wait for me like an inevitable trap. Even back there, in the 
shadow of the chimneys, in the breaks between pain, there was something resembling happiness. 
Everybody will ask me about the deprivations, the “terrors of the camps,” but for me, the 
happiness there will always be the most memorable experience, perhaps. Yes, that’s what I’ll tell 
them the next time they ask me: about the happiness in those camps. 
If they ever do ask. 
And if I don’t forget. 
  









There was no Berlin Wall and it never fell. It is the aim of this dissertation to show that 
these claims are not in any way radical. This dissertation is neither about conspiracy 
theories, nor about the fragile nature of truth; instead, it considers the ways in which we 
recount and remember news stories of historic significance. It also considers how we, quite 
understandably, desire events that are larger than life. History, like life, is a process – in 
which events are intertwined with one another in a dense mesh we often call “context.” At 
the same time, history is often incredibly repetitious. Still, some events distinguish 
themselves in our minds. They split off from the regular rhythms of daily life and stand out 
in memory as unique, marked as uplifting or traumatic. We isolate these occurrences from 
whatever came before and after, strip off their contradictions and complexities, and discard 
their webs of causes. In the stories we tell, such events become standalone items, 
compressions of time and space, elevated above the repetitive flow of time.   
Consider, for example, the fall of the Berlin Wall. This event enjoyed extensive 
international media coverage, and its anniversaries are ritually remembered around the 
world. The special status of the fall of the Berlin Wall seems obvious; its significance is 
uncontested – a no-brainer. Who would deny its power? Who would say the event was 
“banal” or even a “colossal misunderstanding”? Well, almost nobody, at least nobody 
living many years later. But both descriptions – “banal” and a “colossal misunderstanding” 
– come from journals written right there in 1989. “Banal” is how Alonso Alvarez de 





News From a Country That Has Never Existed (1992). The second label, “colossal 
misunderstanding,” comes from the American historian Robert Darnton, who happened to 
be in West Berlin at the time, and who collected his memories in Berlin Journal 1989-
1990 (1991). Both authors wondered about the banality, awkwardness and accidental 
nature of what may well have been the most significant historic event they had ever 
personally experienced.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall was not the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 
1989. What we now know as the fall of the Berlin Wall was constructed out of complex 
and confusing events that took place on a cold November night in Berlin. Of course the 
storytellers did not entirely invent the fall of the Berlin Wall, either. No one crossing the 
border that night, or watching other people crossing the border on television, will ever 
forget that day. Families were reunited; strangers hugged each other with a sense of trust 
they had never before experienced, and that they never would again; and political leaders, 
once powerful, became speechless. But a short night, no matter how emotional, can be 
forgotten if we do not fix it with powerful words. And even among powerful words, we 
need to select the right ones. We have to strike a delicate balance between the “experience” 
of that night and its “story” – for one cannot work without the other. 
 The question that propels this dissertation is how storytellers – and in this case I 
will focus on journalists – build up certain events so that people in distinct parts of the 
world can and will remember them for long periods of time. How do stories of particular 





forgetting, and other factors that are hard to pin down? In other words, what is the social 
construction process of global iconic events?  
I define global iconic events as news events that are covered extensively and 
remembered ritually by international media. Global iconic events, while complex and 
confusing at first, get condensed over time into a simple phrase through repeated acts of 
storytelling – into a short narrative and a recognizable visual scene. Global iconic events 
have historic significance and meaning in more than one country and in more than one 
region; while they cannot resonate with everyone around the globe, they become reference 
points in multiple countries and regions.  
 The term iconic is overused – we apply it casually to just about anything, from soft 
drinks to designer bags. But global iconic events are rare birds. International news events 
enter a strongly fragmented political and journalistic space, which makes it hard for them 
to get sufficiently unequivocal international recognition. While 9/11 was a deeply 
traumatic historic event for the West, in many other countries its meaning is more nebulous 
and contested. While the Srebrenica massacre constituted the largest mass murder in 
Europe since the Holocaust, Serbia still finds it hard to accept the event’s significance and 
the responsibility of its perpetrators. Even the Holocaust, the moral of which seems 
universal to most of us, does not have the same moral for everybody. No historic event 
gets universal celebration or mourning. Global iconic events are always contested or 
ignored in some place.  
 That said, too much contestation can threaten the event’s long-term resonance. If 





significance, then state-organized ceremonies will not articulate the meaning of the event 
and the national and international media will have no significant commemorative rituals to 
cover. There will be few or no occasions on local soil for international collective 
remembrance. While the event may still be remembered outside of its own country, that 
remembrance will lack the convincing powers bestowed by a place of origin.  
 Powerful state-influenced counter-narratives can also destabilize the meaning of a 
potential iconic event in a lasting way – just consider the conflicting international 
interpretations of the Armenian genocide, or the international disagreement about the 
recent uprisings in Syria. Yet such counter-narratives may also vitalize or revitalize the 
construction of an iconic event; they can provide the narrators with new incentives and 
passion to elevate the event’s interpretation.   
 These complex and fascinating questions around the viability and longevity of 
international news events are the focus of my dissertation. I start the dissertation with a 
theoretical chapter that examines the single most influential piece of media and 
communications research on events: Daniel Dayan’s and Elihu Katz’s Media Events: The 
Live Broadcasting of History (1992). After reviewing Media Events and other relevant 
international media research on events, I draw the contours of a new theory of global 
iconic events. This theory examines the dynamic in which global iconic events are formed. 
It suggests that there are five narrative aspects of global iconic events: (1) their narrative 
prerequisites; (2) their elevated and interpretative story; (3) their condensation into a 
simple phrase, a short narrative, and a recognizable visual scene; (4) their competing 





and political contexts. I end the theoretical chapter by positioning my theory within the 
field of globalization studies.  
 After the theoretical introduction, the dissertation consists of two parts. In the first 
part, I present a case in which the social construction of a global iconic event was 
successful. In five chapters I systematically apply the five elements of my theory of global 
iconic events to the developments of November 9, 1989 – what came to be known as the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. First, I look at the fall of the Berlin Wall’s narrative prerequisites. 
Second, I examine the event’s initial narration in West German media and show how the 
event’s elevated and interpretative story was developed. Third, I track the condensation of 
the event’s story into a simple phrase (“fall of the Berlin Wall”) – a short narrative of 
freedom with a recognizable visual scene. Fourth, I describe the event’s alternative 
narrative, as told by the East German media. Finally, I highlight how the story of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall travels across multiple media platforms and gains currency in changing 
social and political contexts. Over all, the first part of this dissertation demonstrates how 
the fall of the Berlin Wall was constructed as a social myth for the global community.  
 In the second part of the dissertation I examine a failed process of iconization. This 
part is more a thought experiment or an intellectual excursion than a full-fledged case 
study. It invites the reader to contemplate two questions: first, what opportunities exist for 
marginal countries to originate a global iconic event; and second, how governments, aided 
by a state-controlled press, may counter-narrate a potential global iconic event. The case 
study for these questions is the coverage and remembrance of the 1956 Hungarian 





 In its analysis of the case studies, my dissertation has three methodological 
features: it is multiperspectival, comparative and diachronic. It is multiperspectival because 
of its interest in examining the stories of events in four distinct national contexts: 
American, West German, East German and Hungarian. It is comparative both internally – 
it compares two national perspectives in each case – and externally – offering a 
comparison of the German and Hungarian case studies with each other. Finally, my interest 
in the development of the events’ stories over time has led me to employ diachronic textual 
analysis. I look at the first two months of coverage for both events, and at their coverage 
on the first, tenth and twentieth anniversaries. (More precise information regarding my 
sources and methodology is gathered in the research design section at the end of the 
dissertation.)  
 In writing this dissertation I have hoped to provide the reader with an “event” as 






Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework: From Media Events to Global Iconic Events 
 
A sense that mediated ceremonies are central to 
invented traditions, that they themselves evolve and 
change (particularly in how the media present them) is 
largely absent. 
 
Paddy Scannell’s review of Dayan’s and Katz’s Media 
Events, 1995, p. 152 
 
 
1.1 Rethinking Media Events 
 
The field of communications is famous for its lack of one of a field’s defining features: a 
canon. In an attempt, ten years ago, to resolve this “crisis,” Elihu Katz, John Durham 
Peters, Tamar Liebes and Avril Orloff compiled a collection of reviews that each addressed 
a foundational essay of media research. The book had a telling title: Canonic Texts in 
Media Research. Are There Any? Should There Be? How About These? (Polity, 2003). The 
selection process had been careful: the editors picked names few would have left out, Paul 
Lazarsfeld, Robert Merton, Walter Benjamin, Marshall McLuhan, Harold Adams Innis and 
Raymond Williams among them. The book covered only schools of thought with well-
established reputations – Columbia, Frankfurt, Chicago, Toronto and British cultural 
studies. And the collection was cautious regarding time and its passage, as the selected 
essays were at least forty years old (with only two exceptions). 
 Canonic Texts in Media Research was published eleven years after Daniel Dayan’s 
and Elihu Katz’s Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (Harvard, 1992), and did 
not include it in the canon. Perhaps Media Events was too novel to qualify for canonic 





media research have received the kind of sustained attention that has been bestowed upon 
this book since its publication. Were we to guess at the contents of a similar collection of 
canonic texts to be published in 2030, Media Events would be an exceptionally strong 
candidate for inclusion.  
The possible reasons for the broad appeal and hard-to-resist charm of Media 
Events, which dealt with the kinds of staged, scripted TV-ceremonies that take on the 
character and function of national, or even international rituals, are manifold.	   Eric W. 
Rothenbuhler has argued that the book benefited from bringing together a social scientist 
of the American tradition and a humanist of the French tradition (Rothenbuhler, 2010, p. 
62). Indeed, perhaps the best way to read Media Events is to picture Elihu Katz and Daniel 
Dayan in an endless dinner table conversation – or brainstorm – about those televised 
events that interested them the most. Sometimes, while reading the book, one can almost 
hear the authors’ distinct voices: certain sentences sound like Katz, others are 
unmistakably like Dayan. In the introduction to Media Events, the authors make readers 
privy to the key shifts in their decade long conversation, admitting that the contours of 
their book were anything but clear from the start:  
 It was television’s Sadat who first aroused our interest in media events. Initially, it 
 was the specifics of this rare example of media diplomacy that seemed worthy of 
 analysis. But the similarities between the Sadat journey in 1977 and the earlier 
 moon journey were irresistible, and we soon found ourselves comparing Anwar 
 el-Sadat and Menachem Begin with the astronauts. (…) And soon we were 
 comparing both the moon landing and Sadat with the journeys of the Pope  (Dayan 
 & Katz, 1992, pp. 25-26). 
 
 In addition to being charming, Media Events also performed a particularly 





moved “events” out of the critical-skeptical universe of Daniel Boorstin’s The Image 
(1964) and, inspired by the work of Durkheim, Handelman, Levi-Strauss, and Victor 
Turner, they applied the anthropology of ceremony to mass communication.1 The book 
wondered aloud whether Walter Benjamin’s “aesthetization of politics” provided the only 
possible framework for thinking about ceremonial events that attract the attention of 
political communities. The authors also highlighted the power of the singular in a field that 
had, thus far, mostly been fascinated by the statistical study of processes and effects, the 
average and the ordinary (Rothenbuhler, 2010, p. 62). Finally, taking their cue from film 
studies, Katz and Dayan pointed to the possibility of a much-needed genre theory for 
television. 
 These characteristics and achievements might explain why Media Events still 
resonates with us today. But why did it inspire so much rethinking? Why do scholars find 
it intellectually engaging to reconsider Media Events almost continuously? An obvious, if 
somewhat dull, answer would include a reference to globalization and the ever-changing 
media ecology. It would postulate that today’s world is more interconnected, and the media 
landscape more fragmented, than ever before. Therefore how could we not rethink a book 
that was born in the era of the nation state, and in the age of “aging” television?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dayan and Katz studied accounts and video recordings of several events, but the book represents their 
methodology only in a scattered and somewhat confusing way. The first chapter mentions that the sample 
included a dozen events: the funerals of President Kennedy and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the royal wedding 
of Charles and Diana, the journeys of Pope John Paul II and Anwar el-Sadat, the debates of 1960 between 
John Kennedy and Richard Nixon, the Watergate hearings, the revolutionary changes of 1989 in Eastern 
Europe, the Olympics, “and others.” (p. 4). A footnote specifies this somewhat further by mentioning that the 
authors and their colleagues did empirical research on five of these events: the first presidential debates, 
Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem, the Pope’s first visit to Poland, and the 1984 Olympics – the last one being a 






 Beyond that, two other features might also help explain why Media Events is 
continually updated and improved upon by academics: the book offered a highly restrictive 
definition of media events, and it had a pronounced worldview. Media Events came up 
with a narrow taxonomy of events – the authors themselves called their approach 
“parsimonious.” An event would qualify for inclusion only if it fulfilled eight 
requirements: it had to (1) be broadcast live, (2) constitute an interruption of everyday life 
and everyday broadcasting, (3) be preplanned and scripted, and (4) be viewed by a large 
audience. There should also be (5) a normative expectation that viewing was obligatory 
and (6) a reverent, awe-filled narration; and the event had to be (7) integrative of society 
and (8) mostly conciliatory (Dayan & Katz, 1992; Katz & Liebes, 2007). This list includes 
only the core requirements; the authors further restricted the definition throughout the 
book.  
 Media Events also presented a firm worldview, a certain taste of social optimism, 
as the authors acknowledged from the start: 
 We speak, first of all, in a neo-Durkheimian spirit that holds that “mechanical 
 solidarity” – a sense of membership, similarity, equality, familiarity – is at the 
 foundation of the “organic solidarity” of differentiated, to say nothing of 
 postmodern, politics (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. viii).  
 
That neo-Durkheimian framework served the book’s argument in a functional way; it made 
a claim for the collective and binding nature of media events in contemporary societies. 
But the framework’s employment also suggested that the authors believed television to 
have the power to contribute to national and even global social integration on exceptional 





 A narrow taxonomy and an outspoken worldview are qualities that inevitably invite 
theoretical tinkering. It is not hard to guess what direction such rethinking took: media 
scholars either opened up the definition to include more events, or they challenged or 
abandoned the worldview presented in the book – mostly, they did both things at the same 
time. Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz did not stay on the sidelines, either: both separately 
wrote essays taking precisely these approaches toward theoretical reformulation.  
 Katz was the first of the authors of Media Events to publish a major piece of 
rethinking. In a short journal article written in 2007 Katz, together with co-author Tamar 
Liebes, revised both the definition and the worldview of Media Events. Katz and Liebes 
included “dark” events in the concept, distinguishing unexpected, disruptive events from 
the carefully scripted, integrative events that had been the sole focus of Media Events. 
They also argued that disruptive events – like disaster, terror and war – have in fact 
upstaged more classical media events. Among other things, the authors blamed this shift on 
the cynicism, disenchantment and segmentation that were undermining the attention for, 
and interest in, ceremonial events, as well as on the mobility and ubiquity of television 
technology and the downgrading of scheduled programming. 
 Katz’s and Liebes’ arguments for the need to include disruptive events into the 
original concept of media events were ample and convincing; the case they made for their 
increased pessimism was far less strong. Consider for example the following paragraph, 
cherry-picking events that seem to justify a more pessimistic perspective on media events: 
 The live broadcasting of “historic” ceremonies has lost its aura. Nixon’s landslide 
 triumph is soon followed by Watergate; drug scandals and hints of corruption 
 have tainted the Olympics, not even to speak of the tragedy at Munich in 1972; 





 tainted by divorce and death; the stardom of John Kennedy, Anwar Sadat, and 
 Yitzhak Rabin all end in assassinations (Katz & Liebes, 2007, p. 159).  
 
Each of these events could have been interpreted in a more hopeful way. Perhaps 
Watergate represented a democratic ritual of renewal after Nixon’s “polluted” landslide 
triumph (Alexander, 2003); the Olympic Games still attract enormous audiences despite 
the continuous scandals; the tragic fate of Prince Charles and Princess Diana has been 
softened by the hopeful stories of their children; and charismatic figures continue to rise on 
the political scene. Moreover, since the publication of Katz’s and Liebes’ article, at least 
five major global media events have challenged the authors’ claim that disruptive events 
have upstaged integrative ones: the Beijing Olympics (2008); the first Obama inauguration 
(2009); the Michael Jackson Memorial (2009); the wedding of Prince William and Kate 
(2011); and the Queen’s Golden Jubilee (2012). The unexpected revolutionary events of 
the recent Arab Spring, too, united large international media audiences in a common 
experience of hope. The global appeal of such integrative events strongly challenges the 
pessimism of Katz’s and Liebes’ article. 
 Katz and Liebes were of course aware that hopeful revolutions might undermine 
their concept. After describing in detail the three types of disruptive events that were the 
focus of their article – namely war, disaster and terror – they briefly referred to protests: 
“[a] fourth type, which might be called Protest and that may, however also include 
Revolution, deserves attention as well, though we will not elaborate here” (Katz & Liebes, 
2007, p. 161). Revolutionary events did not fit their strict distinction between integrative 





convey a message of hope and enthusiasm, they are at the same time cast as unexpected, or 
even miraculous.  
 Dayan’s rethinking of media events took a slightly different route. In 2008, he 
challenged the worldview that he and Katz had originally espoused and opened up their 
initial definition of media events so as to make it more inclusive; but he did not offer a 
judgment regarding the relative strengths and merits of integrative versus disruptive 
events. Dayan’s chapter title already expressed his shifting worldview: the title included 
three words starting with either “dis” or “de”: Beyond Media Events: Disenchantment, 
derailment and disruption. While Dayan did not propose a hierarchy amongst integrative 
and disruptive events in the way Katz and Liebes had done, his piece was still shot through 
with disappointment:  
 War rituals multiply. Agon is back, where the dramaturgy of “contest” succeeded 
 in civilizing the brutality of conflict. Media events have stopped being “irenic.” 
 Their semantics is no longer dominated by the theme of reduction of conflict 
 through mediation and resolution of differences (Dayan, 2008, p. 395). 
 
Dayan suggested that four elements of the original media events concept be kept intact: (1) 
insistence and emphasis, (2) an explicitly “performative,” gestural dimension,2 (3) loyalty 
to the event’s self-definition, and (4) access to a shared viewing experience. 
 There have been other revisionist attempts that, in addition to those by Dayan and 
Katz, have reshaped the media events concept over the last decade. Simon Cottle (2006) 
has made an effort to incorporate “media events” into a larger category of “mediatized 
rituals.” Under the umbrella of mediatized rituals, Cottle renamed Dayan’s and Katz’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Performativity means that media events have nothing to do with balance, neutrality, or objectivity. They 






concept of media events; he called them “celebratory media events,” and distinguished 
them from moral panics (Cohen, 1972), conflicted media events (Fiske, 1994; Hunt, 1999), 
media disasters (Liebes, 1998; Blondheim & Liebes, 2002), media scandals (Lull & 
Hinerman, 1997; Thompson, 2000), and mediatized public crises (Alexander & Jacobs, 
1998).3  
 A particularly playful follow-up book focused on the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 
revisited the concept of media events through the lens of this spectacular event (Price & 
Dayan, 2008). The book’s introduction listed globalization, the establishment of a stronger 
global civil society, the technological changes that were shaping public opinion, and 
China’s special place in the geopolitical order, as reasons for placing this event at the 
center of their analysis.  
 The most substantial piece of rethinking so far has come from Europe. In 2009 
Nick Couldry, Andreas Hepp and Friedrich Krotz published a coedited volume titled 
Media Events in a Global Age (2010). While the editors found Dayan’s suggestion to hold 
on to four characteristics of the original concept useful, they intended to update the media 
events concept within an analysis of “globalized media cultures” (p. 9). They advocated a 
transnational understanding of culture and a stronger attention to practices like 
territorialization and deterritorialization. Combining Dayan’s four defining elements with a 
transnational understanding of media cultures, Couldry, Hepp and Krotz came up with a 
new definition for media events in a global age: “media events are certain situated, 
thickened, centering performances of mediated communication that are focused on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Simon Cottle’s model received harsh criticism from Nick Couldry and Eric W. Rothenbuhler for using a 






specific thematic core, cross different media products and reach a wide and diverse 
multiplicity of audiences and participants” (p. 12).  
 Globalization and “new” media have been mentioned in almost every scholarly 
piece devoted to rethinking Media Events. But as I will argue in this chapter, the 
challenges that globalization and digital media posed to Media Events were not altogether 
new. Rather, they made certain problems of the book more salient. These problems had 
also been present in 1992, but they were highlighted because of global and digital media 
research. Here, I will focus on three of them: Media Events’ present-centric view of events; 
its limited understanding of fragmented interpretational spaces; and its inattention to how 
the narratives and imageries of media events travel across multiple platforms – due to what 
we would now call “media convergence.”  
 
1.1.1 Media Events and Time 
The event that inspired Dayan’s and Katz’s thinking was Egyptian President Anwar el-
Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977. As the authors explained in their introduction, “[f]or more 
than a decade, we have boarded and reboarded Anwar el-Sadat’s plane for the flight to Ben 
Gurion Airport, trying to understand the magic of the event” (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. vii). 
The formulation was precise: Dayan and Katz imagined traveling back in time – but they 
did so without reflecting on the act of time traveling itself. Their eyes were focused on the 
event in its own historical moment; the years between the event and the moment of 





 Paddy Scannell criticized the book’s problematic attitude towards time as early as 
1995, when he argued that Media Events lacked historical depth (Scannell, 1995, p. 152). 
Scannell pointed out that many of the characteristics Dayan and Katz attributed to televised 
events could in fact also be found in the radio coverage of pre-television events. Another 
way of putting this is that the book did not consider “time” a crucial factor in its analysis: 
Media Events froze events in time, blocking out their pasts and their futures.  
 The concept of collective memory came up only sporadically in the book, as if it 
were just one more topic mentioned at the dinner table. In their introduction Dayan and 
Katz argued that they thought of media events “as holidays that spotlight some central 
value of some aspect of collective memory” (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. ix). In this case 
collective memory refers to something from the past that helps bind a particular society 
together and that is invoked in the media event itself: “[o]ften such events portray an 
idealized version of society, reminding society of what it aspires to be rather than what it 
is” (p. ix).  
 In a chapter on the effects of media events, collective memory came up in a 
different sense; here it refers to the collective memory of the media events themselves. But 
even in this case the topic was featured on two short pages only – and in a somewhat 
contradictory manner at that. The section started with the claim that “[t]he memory of 
President Kennedy will forever evoke the image of the funeral as seen on television” 
(Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 211). The next paragraph was already much more nuanced: “[t]o 





of a common past, bridges between personal and collective history” (p. 212).4 Again, a 
diachronic understanding – of how stories of media events change, endure or fade over 
time – was missing from Dayan’s and Katz’s canonic book. While Media Events examined 
events from the past, it looked at them as if they were from the present.  
 
1.1.2 Media Events and Space 
Media Events also paid little attention to the fragmented nature of interpretative spaces. 
The book employed two core concepts of space: space was either global or national. Media 
Events did acknowledge that some events attract large international audiences:  
 The live broadcasting of these television events attracts the largest audiences in 
 the history of the world. (…) Some of these ceremonies are so all-encompassing 
 that there is nobody left to serve as out-group. “We Are The World” is certainly 
 the appropriate theme song for media events (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 14).  
 
 In addition to global space, Media Events also often referred to national space; it 
emphasized that particular nations can come together in a common viewing experience. 
But only on a few occasions in Media Events did Dayan and Katz acknowledge the 
existence of any other constituencies than the nation and the world. They did so, for 
instance, in their brief discussion of the ad hoc microwave link between the broadcasting 
systems of Israel and Egypt during the Sadat visit (p. 15). And they mentioned imaginary 
spaces, where an event exists only “in” broadcast – the Kennedy-Nixon debate, during 
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and these narratives’ potential to upstage official history: “[t]hus media events and their narration are in 
competition with the writing of history in defining the contents of collective memory. Their disruptive and 
heroic character is indeed what is remembered, upstaging the efforts of historians and social scientists to 






which one candidate was in New York and the other in California, is a case in point (p. 
17).  
 The problems with this concept of space do not stem from the fact that Dayan and 
Katz failed to consider globalization; they did, after all, pay attention to what they called 
“world communication.” But they looked at both the global and the national as single and 
unified interpretative spaces. All but ignoring the fragmented nature of interpretative 
spaces, Dayan and Katz failed to consider the possibility that there might exist competing 
narratives of media events. Indeed, the question of “counter-narration” is strikingly absent 
from the book. In a chapter on the pathologies of media events, the authors considered 
cases in which organizers disagree about the meaning of the event, or in which the 
audience rejects the original script. But cases in which different national media have 
distinctively different interpretations of an event got virtually no mention at all. And, when 
the possibility of difference or variation did come up, its significance was played down:  
 There are variations: the live broadcast of Sadat’s arrival in Jerusalem was treated 
 differently by Israeli television than by the American networks, which had more 
 explaining to do (Zelizer, 1981). While we shall have occasion to point out these 
 differences, they are outweighed by the similarities (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 8).  
 
 But consider, for a moment, the moon journey that was presented as a “giant leap 
for mankind” to the American audience – its coverage was probably far less enthusiastic in 
the Soviet Union. Similarly, the fall of the Berlin Wall was narrated in decidedly different 
ways in the West and East German media. However, with Media Events’ parsimonious 
approach, an event that is not presented with reverence by broadcasters, simply does “not 
qualify according to the definition” (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 10). Still, as Paddy Scannell 





of media events (Scannell, 1995, p. 152). Well before the age of digital media and rise of 




1.1.3 Media Events and Convergence 
Already at the time of Media Events’ publication, media content traveled across multiple 
platforms; media events received coverage from television, radio, and the printed press. 
But these travels had no place in Media Events; the book paid attention to television 
ceremonies only. Media Events’ first chapter freely announced this narrow interest: “[t]his 
book is about the festive viewing of television” (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 1). If the book’s 
title was somewhat confusing in this respect – suggesting, as it did, a more general interest 
in the media coverage of historic occasions – then the subtitle, The Live Broadcasting of 
History, orientated the reader a bit more specifically.  
 No book can cover everything, and no reviewer should expect the impossible. Still, 
this focus on television had the effect of isolating the media events under discussion from 
their larger media contexts. Telling the story of an event is never the privilege of one single 
medium, even if one particular medium dominates the setting of the tone. The story of an 
event has always differed slightly from one medium to the next, and has evolved as it 
travelled between them. This feature of the media coverage of events may have become 





 In its inattention to media convergence, Media Events made itself vulnerable to the 
criticism that it was only the product of a particular time in media history. It is easy to 
argue, even if it is by no means true, that Media Events has little to offer in a post-
television age. Media Events’ television-centrism allowed it to “age” quickly. Had the 
book paid at least some attention to how the stories of events travel across television, radio 
and print, it might not have been labeled a “television book.” That label does not do the 
book justice: its main intellectual achievements are not bound to television, and it would be 
relatively easy to expand Media Events backward (to radio) or forward (to digital media) 
without compromising its basic tenets. 
 
1.2 Towards a New Sociological Theory of Global Iconic Events 
Before the events in New York and Washington could be 
grasped as history, they appeared only as chronology and 
narrative.  
 
James W. Carey on American journalism on, before, and 
after September 11, 2002, p. 85 
 
A contemporary revision of Media Events, then, should address the three gaps that I 
discussed above. A new concept has to provide a diachronic perspective on events; it has 
to acknowledge and incorporate the fact that media events enter a fragmented interpretative 
space; and it needs to pay attention to media convergence. The framework I would propose 
starts with a new name: “global iconic events.” I broadly define global iconic events as 
news events that are covered extensively and remembered ritually by international media. 
The inclusion of global in the name highlights that these events receive international 





their ability to attract large audiences. The definition is deliberately vague so as to invite, 
rather than exclude, creative empirical studies that can accommodate each of the 
definitional elements.   
 Covered extensively means that the coverage of these events is not limited to short 
news items; they get substantial media attention as they unfold. While my definition does 
not directly refer to audiences, both the name “global iconic events” and the requirement of 
“extensive coverage” indirectly suggest audiences that are substantial and actively engaged 
in their viewing- and reading experiences.  
 Remembered ritually means that international media frequently refer to the sacred 
centers of these events, and commemorate them at anniversaries. Such yearly media 
commemorations include both the media coverage of official ceremonies, and new 
journalistic pieces dealing with the memory of the event, for instance in the form of op-
eds, interviews, essays, surveys, blog posts, oral histories and documentaries.   
 History, of course, has a way of outsmarting social science. A definition of global 
iconic events has to be flexible enough to accommodate events that trick the system and 
still manage to become iconic. Of the two definitional elements of covered extensively and 
remembered ritually, the latter seems more important. Just consider the Holocaust; a major 
global iconic event that was barely covered by international media in its own time, it is 
certainly ritually remembered now (Alexander, 2009; Zelizer, 1998). Iconic events can be 
built up over time if original coverage did not signal their significance, but the reverse is 
not true: if an event received extensive media coverage initially but has since faded from 





also “rollercoaster global iconic events” that international media cover extensively and 
remember ritually for a while, but that subsequently lose their significance. To take a 
complex example, the 1956 Hungarian revolution’s significance was universally accepted 
in the West during most of the early Cold War. In 1989, the event went through a revival 
because its local official interpretation shifted. However, after 1989 its meaning became 
highly contested in the local context, and its significance faded from international memory. 
A flexible application of the definition of global iconic events is needed to consider these 
challenging cases. 
 I deliberately do not provide a definition of media. To understand why, consider the 
example of Théodore Géricault’s famous painting, the Raft of the Medusa from around 
1818-1819. The painting was inspired by a major news event of that time: the wreck of a 
French naval frigate off the coast of present-day Mauritiana. Géricault collected as many 
news stories, public documents, and eyewitness testimonies about the expedition and the 
shipwreck as possible. He read the – bestselling – accounts of two survivors, carefully 
examined all related journalistic images, commissioned the surviving carpenter of the 
Medusa to build him a model of the raft, and even had body parts delivered to his studio so 
he could ‘smell’ the event. The outcome of his careful research was the large-scale visual 
condensation of the event now known as the Raft of the Medusa. 
 The 450-square-foot painting became a successful attraction when it was exhibited 
in London, partly because a theatrical play that was being performed only a few blocks 
away about the same event provided extra publicity for Géricault’s painting. In Dublin, 





strong visual competitor – a 10,000-square-foot spectacular moving panorama, The Wreck 
of the Medusa (Crary, 2002). Even as early as the 1820s, then, there were news events that 
were covered extensively and remembered ritually by international media. By adopting a 
broad and flexible definition, I hope to open up a space for discussion about historic news 
events – and formats – that may be atypical for the general discourse on media events.  
 While a concept of global iconic events has to have historic depth, it also needs to 
pay attention to present-day changes in the news ecology. Is it possible to require extensive 
coverage and ritual remembrance of global iconic events in the fragmented and diverse 
media landscape of our time? As I argued in my review of Katz’ and Liebes’ article 
(2007), certain international news events still manage to interrupt the flow of time and gain 
the attention of many professional journalists, amateur storytellers, and large audiences. As 
leading global media researcher Daya Thussu recently argued: 
The time-space compression in the 24/7 digitized media economy, with its 
localization and multiple and multivocal flows, visible in all shapes and sizes on 
such networks as MySpace and YouTube, has ensured that witnessing global 
events is becoming a pastime for growing number of media consumers. Whether  it 
is the closing ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Mumbai terrorist attacks 
later that year, or the inauguration of Barack Obama, these media events have 
become part of a global shared experience (2011, p. 231). 
 
Has everybody watched these events? Have all journalists covered them? Have all media 
outlets paid equal attention to them? No, of course not – but that has never been the case 
with media events, not even in the heyday of “integrative” television. And while audiences 
might follow the story of an event on multiple media platforms, they are still paying 





 In addition to the definition outlined above, I propose that five narrative aspects be 
considered in connection with global iconic events. The relative significance and weight of 
each of these narrative aspects will depend upon the nature and circumstances of any 
specific event. 
 
GLOBAL ICONIC EVENTS 
1. Narrative prerequisites of the event’s story; 
2. Myth-making: construction of the event’s elevated and interpretative story;  
3. The story’s condensation into a “package” of a simple phrase, a short narrative and a 
recognizable visual scene; 
4. Competing stories of the event; 
5. Travel: The package’s travel across multiple media platforms and diverse social and 
political contexts. 
 
Below I will offer brief explanations of each element of the theory. While these elements 
might still appear rather abstract here, I hope that my case studies will bring empirical 
depth to the concept later on.  
 
1.2.1 Narrative Prerequisites of the Event’s Story  
 First we need to consider the complex process in which narrators strip an “event” down to 
its unique, exceptional, once-in-a-lifetime qualities. In the case of the Beijing Olympics, 





and complex history of organizing Olympic tournaments in a wide variety of countries. 
What makes this an “event” rather than simply “one moment in a repetitive process?” 
Monroe E. Price’s introduction to his co-edited volume with Daniel Dayan on the 2008 
Beijing Olympics addressed just this:  
 It was precisely one year before the 2008 Olympic Games would begin, and a 
 deep smog covered Beijing. The day, August 8, 2007, was filled with symbolism 
 and anticipation. An official ceremony, triggered by the magic moment marked 
 on a special clock, began the grand unveiling, with 10,000 carefully selected 
 people celebrating in Tiananmen Square. This would be the best and the biggest 
 Countdown Ceremony in Olympic history precisely because it could be no other 
 way. Everything about Beijing 2008 had to be spectacular, superlative, outsized. 
 At least such was the hope of China and the Beijing Organizing Committee for 
 the Games of XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG). Even the smog, reframed as just 
 another barrier for the powers that be to overcome, would be turned into a sign of 
 what Beijing could and would accomplish (Price, 2008, p. 1). 
 
 Not just the Olympics, but all events require some form of effort to be set apart 
from the ordinary. Should a revolution be the object of our analysis, then we must consider 
how narrators elevate this “event” above the underlying and ongoing process of “political 
transition.” Take the 2011 Egyptian revolution. Egypt had already been going through 
some level of political transition before that specific event – and it certainly did so 
afterwards. In order to turn the revolution into an event, narrators had to argue that it was 
not simply one of many steps in a long process of political transition, but that it was a 
standalone item. Or, to consider a very different sort of event, the 1969 moon landing is 
not remembered as simply one moment in the complex history of the Space Race: it is an 
exceptional, magical event that requires a separate and considerate storytelling-treatment. 
 When narrating an event, we build on the event’s symbolic hinterland, on its pre-
existing symbols. For instance, in the case of the fall of the Berlin Wall, preexisting 





Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech, and East German border guard Conrad 
Schumann’s “leap to freedom,” among others. Global iconic events also benefit from 
background knowledge regarding their place and context; for instance, an understanding of 
the symbolic meaning of the twin towers helps to strengthen the story of 9/11. 
 When thinking about the narrative prerequisites of an event, we must also consider 
the balance between the power of the event and the power of its story. How much power 
does an event possess inherently, and how much is provided by its narration? Of course, 
events do provide some boundaries for their narrators; to put it boldly, it would be difficult 
to narrate an assassination as a wedding. Nevertheless, within these boundaries narrators 
still have quite a bit of leeway in shaping the story of the event (Meyers, 2007; Neiger, 
Meyers, & Zandberg, 2011; Zandberg, 2010; Zelizer, 1993). For instance, the Kennedy 
assassination had certain inherent characteristics as event, but journalists still strongly 
shaped its narratives as well (Zelizer, 1992). Both the event and its story matter if we want 
to understand why particular international news events become global iconic events while 
others do not. Our consideration should always include the power balance between the 
“event” and its “story.” For, as Michael Schudson summarized that permanent puzzle that 
is journalistic narration: “News is socially constructed, but it is constructed out of 
Something, not out of whole cloth. And the Somethings that journalists are most sensitive 
to and responsive to and that scholarship has barely begun to think about are what we call 







1.2.2 Myth-making: Construction of the Event’s Elevated and Interpretative Story  
In order to last, news events need an elevated and interpretative story that resonates over 
time and across space. Like other social myths, the stories of global iconic events are 
powerful and resonant because they talk to our hearts rather than convincing our minds. 
While specific facts may alienate those unfamiliar with the exact context, elevated and 
interpretative stories appeal and attract by touching on the universal.  
 Elevated means that in their stories journalists lift their sights from the earth bound 
detail to lofty universals. Journalists engage in myth-making: they communicate simple 
and universal social meanings - like division, renewal, loss, and hope - that people can 
relate to regardless of cultural differences (Carey, 1988; Lule, 2001).5 The event’s 
universal social meaning speaks to our hearts, whether we are familiar with the event’s 
contextual details or not. To be sure, “universal” does not mean that anyone without any 
knowledge of the context would immediately understand a particular event in all its 
aspects. These events are certainly not interpreted identically in distinct parts of the world. 
Nonetheless, differing degrees of knowledge and interpretation often retain the core 
universal social meaning of a global iconic event unaltered.  
 To build the elevated story of an event, journalists have to eliminate 
incomprehensible facts, confusing processes, and messy webs of actors. They have to turn 
an occurrence into an occasion and replace the actual with the symbolically potent. This 
constructed occasion may have little resemblance with the original occurrence, but it will 
come to represent it.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I use myth in a positive sense, not to denote something skillfully manufactured with the intention of 
distortion. I take mythmaking to be a process of simplification and universalization that enables large and 





 Interpretative means that journalists perform the strongly interpretative work of 
summary, condensing the meaning of an event down to a phrase. For instance, “border 
opening” for the fall of the Berlin Wall, “terrorism” for 9/11,6 and “genocide again” for the 
Rwandan mass killing. While arguably all journalistic language is interpretative, here 
interpretative means summarizing in a clear and concise form.   
 When constructing the elevated and interpretative story of the event, journalists 
generally reside in the “sphere of consensus” as opposed to the “sphere of legitimate 
controversy” (Hallin, 1986, p. 116; Schudson, 2002, p. 48). In the sphere of consensus, 
journalists speak in the name of an imagined “we,” employing a language of shared values 
and assumptions. Later, when they are ritually remembering the event – at anniversaries, 
for instance – journalists occasionally move back to this sphere of consensus, replaying or 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 While by now the language we use about 9/11 seems relatively settled, that was not the case immediately. 
As Michael Schudson noted, American journalists “did not have a language for terrorism at first. Tragedy. 
Atrocity. Yes. But is this war? Or is this criminal activity? Where is responsibility? Where is resolution?” 
(Schudson, 2002, p. 47).  
 
7 The speed at which journalists develop an elevated and interpretative language for a given event and the 
language’s duration can vary. With regard to 9/11, American journalists used a strongly elevated and 
interpretative language for about two weeks. However, by September 28, 2011, they had largely returned to 
their regular, factual and objective reporting style (Schudson, 2002, p. 44). In the case of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, as this dissertation will show, West German newspapers made this shift after ten days, around 
November 19, 1989. The Holocaust, to give a third, more complex example, presents a particularly 
challenging puzzle in this respect, as it took around two decades to develop and spread its elevated and 
interpretative language. In April 1945, the event was described simply as an “atrocity” in the pages of the 
American printed press and on the radio – as one among many brutalities of a world war. It has been a long 
way to get from there to the event’s current status, with its moral connotations widely recognized and 





1.2.3 The Story’s Condensation Into a “Package” of Simple Phrase, a Short Narrative 
and a Recognizable Visual Scene   
 
Global iconic events become lasting symbolic reference points if they can be easily 
referred to. Therefore, they need narrative “branding.” Ideally, events get condensed into a 
simple phrase, a short narrative and a recognizable visual scene. Through the processes of 
textual and visual condensation, global iconic events also become compressions of time 
and space: they often come to stand for something that lasts longer and is larger than 
themselves. 9/11 was – literally speaking – one day on which the sun came up and then 
went down again. But metaphorically speaking, 9/11 stands for a game-changing event in 
world politics, the beginning of what was once called “the war on terror.” Similarly, the 
fall of the Berlin Wall represents more than one historic night of hugs between Germans 
from the East and the West; it also serves as a shorthand for the end of the Cold War – 
something larger and more durable than what November 9, 1989 could offer.  
 Like powerful theatrical performances, global iconic events also need key figures, 
objects and places. The stories of global iconic events become more poignant if they 
include symbolic persons, symbolic objects, and symbolic places. These symbolic persons, 
objects and places help embody the social meaning of the event, and aid its condensation 
into a simple phrase, a short narrative and a recognizable visual scene. For instance, when 
we think about apartheid, we automatically think of Nelson Mandela. Stories and images 
of the imprisoned anti-apartheid activist and first democratically elected president of South 
Africa have become symbolic condensations of the entire tragic event called apartheid. 
Symbolic objects, too, can play a significant role in the narrative and the imagery of news 





recognizable and memorable object: the physical wounds inflicted by the weapon are 
symbolical proxies for the pain the genocide inflicted upon individuals as well as on 
society at large.  
 Finally, we often remember a symbolic building or a symbolic place when we 
remember news events: recalling the visual appearance of the place helps us connect to the 
event itself. The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, for example, have been captured in 
thousands of digital photographs that circulated online, on television, and in newspapers 
less than 24 hours after the attacks took place; yet while we might not specifically 
remember an individual photograph, we do remember the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower, the 
site of the attacks. The building’s unusual architectural features made it a memorable 
symbolic place. In sum, symbolic figures, objects and places can contribute to the narrative 
branding of events, especially to their condensation into a simple phrase, a short narrative, 
and a recognizable scene.  
 
1.2.4 Competing Stories of the Event 
Next, global iconic events have alternative stories that interpret them in a different light. 
Global iconic events might even have strong counter-narratives that refute their 
significance or that even question whether the event “in fact” took place. The mythological 
character of global iconic events makes them particularly vulnerable to such practices of 
counter-narration: it is precisely an event’s elevated and interpretative story that those with 





Therefore a careful analysis of how news stories travel through time, space and media must 
pay attention to the existence and structure of competing stories.  
  
 
1.2.5 The “Package” of Phrase, Narrative and Visual Scene Travels Across Multiple 
Media Platforms and Diverse Social and Political Contexts 
 
Finally, the event’s “package” of phrase, narrative and visual scene travels through time, 
space and media, trying to find a home in distinctively different political, social and 
cultural environments. With the inclusion of this fourth element, my theory is sensitive to 
both collective memory and media convergence. It also highlights the process by which the 
event’s story may become global. 
 Of course the stages of condensation and travel are not easily separated; they 
overlap considerably. Also, the package of simple phrase, short narrative and recognizable 
visual scene may break down: its components do not always appear or reappear together. 
Often, the package does not travel through time, space and media accidentally; direct 
promotion can enhance the event’s portability and mobility. Commemorative ceremonies, 
memorials, monuments, rituals of remembrance and campaigns need promoters as well: 
the politics of remembrance are key to any study of global iconic events. 
 
1.2.6 Conclusion 
New theoretical frameworks are useful if they help us in better understanding a crucial 
aspect of social life. What kind of insight, then, does this theory of global iconic events 





dimensions of globalization. With this theory I raise the question whether and how an 
international news story, resonating over a long period of time, can function as a social 
myth for the global civil society. With the concept of global iconic events I also expand 
Daniel Dayan’s and Elihu Katz’s Media Events by considering how the stories of events 
travel through time and media in highly fragmented interpretational spaces.  
 A new concept is often best illuminated by being contrasted with a distinctively 
different concept. So let’s contrast the theory of global iconic events with Barbie Zelizer’s 
important essay, Cannibalizing Memory in the Global Flow of News (2011). Zelizer argued 
that Western media - as a key player in the global media environment – in its influential 
coverage of events tends to “squash” local experiences, especially local experiences’ 
internal variation, nuance, particularity, hesitation and pauses. Western media aim at 
immediate mnemonic certainty and definite interpretations. Her essay provides a valuable 
critique of how distant suffering is sensationalized and simplified for Western consumption 
at the expense of local context and nuance. Zelizer suggested that there are four elements 
of Western media’s “cannibalization” of local experiences: (1) minimalization of local 
memories (2) substitution, when local experience “is addressed through adjacent events 
that do a better job of encapsulating the meanings of the trauma, crisis, or catastrophe that 
the West wants to invoke”, (3) displacement, when imported mnemonic frames for local 
experience get “sustained at the expense of the original event” regardless of their accuracy, 
and (4) transportation, in which “borrowed elements that have been strategically welded 
together by the Western media move on to additional local contexts” (pp. 30-34). All in all, 





interpretations of local experience; like a cannibal, it “devours its victims, leaving no 
evidence to contest what went wrong” (p. 34).  
 Like Zelizer’s essay, my dissertation addresses simplification, journalistic 
storytelling, and global media. However, her perspective is critical, arguing that Western 
media rapidly construct strategic and often erroneous associations, which deprive local 
populations of the chance to make sense of their experiences. It presumes that local 
meaning must be richer and more fragile, that Western representations must be strategic, 
and that the fundamental contest is between the two. None of these assumptions overlap 
with the theory of global iconic events I offer here. I focus on the desire in all of us from 
East, West, North and South to construct and remember events that are larger than our 
messy lives and confusing histories. Zelizer speaks about “victims” of Western media 
representation, while I speak about “protagonists” in stories of our global library. Zelizer 
describes a violent and habitual practice of erasure, her central metaphors “squashing,” 
“silencing,” and “cannibalizing.” I describe a cooperative, benevolent process, which 
succeeds only rarely, and my central metaphor is travel. While Zelizer’s essay cherishes 
local nuance and experience, my theory celebrates the surrender of the local to the 
universal.  
 I argue that the only opportunity for a local incident to acquire long-term resonance 
globally is if it becomes a simple and universal myth. This happens first through the 
development of an elevated and interpretative journalistic language that builds on already 
existing narrative pre-requisites. Then, through condensation, the event gets turned into a 





event’s simple phrase, short narrative, and visual scene start to travel globally, together or 
separately.8 Finally, throughout the event’s travel, I argue, counter-narration, narrowly 
factual storytelling, forgetting and other factors can create roadblocks to universality that 
some events are never able to overcome.9  
 Global iconic events structure time and provide us vulnerable humans with lasting 
orientation points. They are also compressions of social meanings; simplified stories with 
resonance and endurance that help us interpret the challenges of our time.10 As quick 
reference points, they can serve the same function myths served for traditional societies. 
However, the social construction and maintenance of global iconic events requires 
substantial narrative and promotional effort. Moreover, global iconic events operate in 
fragmented and hybrid interpretative spaces (Bhaba, 1994; Kraidy, 2005). There will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I connection with the fall of the Berlin Wall, I will highlight four, predominantly non-journalistic types of 
travel: recycling, reenactment, possession, and memorialization. 
 
9 To further highlight the difference with the aim of clearly drawing the contours of the theory of global 
iconic events through contrast, let’s take the central case study of the dissertation, the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Zelizer argued that “the collapse of Communism in 1989 was depicted in the West in ways that celebrated 
the embrace of democracy rather than the East/West split or the dissipation of authoritarian governments, 
described in terms like ‘revolution’ or the rise of ‘civil society’ which hardly reflected what took place on the 
ground” (p. 29). But in the case of the most covered and remembered event of the collapse of Communism, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, West German narrators were simultaneously Western and local. They described 
events they were intimately connected with, adapting them into a simple and universal format for their local 
(and through further mediation, international) audience. This format was not more certain than the East 
German story that did not survive the passing of time; it was just more memorable. Moreover, even the 
American coverage, to which Zelizer likely refers to by the “West,” delivers a more complex picture. For 
instance, Tom Brokaw from NBC was the first reporter to interview the East German party spokesman about 
the new travel regulation; they co-produced the regulation’s interpretation. Instead of erasing local 
experience, they made local experience. The contest was not between powerful Westerners and hesitant 
locals, but between the mythical and the narrowly factual. Moreover, Western narrators built on the story of 
the Berlin Wall that was co-developed by East and West, as my next chapter discusses.   
 
10 In his critique of the discourse of globalization, Jeffrey C. Alexander has argued that, while we frequently 
discuss the unprecedented compression of space and time in the “global age,” our understanding of the 
compression of meaning is far less developed: “Compression affects not only the pragmatics but also the 
semantics of communication, the basic meaning units, the symbolic languages upon which interactions 
depend. (…) It is by compression of space, time, and meaning that globalization creates a significantly more 





always be those who will under-narrate, counter-narrate, or simply ignore them. Therefore, 
global iconic events will remain rare. They will always be exceptional wonders for the 
















CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL ICONIC EVENTS: 






Chapter 2. Narrative Prerequisites of the Story of the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
 
In this part of the dissertation I systematically apply the theory of global iconic events to 
the case study of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The first chapter discusses the fall of the 
Berlin Wall’s narrative pre-requisites. When you narrate an event, you must build on 
existing stories. You emphasize those aspects of the event that you would like to be 
remembered, and hide the ones you do not find useful. Narrating an event like the fall of 
the Berlin Wall requires at least two major narrative steps. First, the story of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall has to build upon the story of the Berlin Wall itself – and become its happy 
ending. Second, storytellers need to set the event of the fall of the Berlin Wall apart from 
the slow (or rapid, depending on your perspective) and transitional (or revolutionary, 
depending on your perspective) process that was at play in East Germany in 1989. The fall 
of the Berlin Wall must be more than just one protest among the many protests taking 
place in a weakened state. Storytellers need to elevate the event above the regular: it has to 
become independent and magical, marking the end of the Berlin Wall era.  
What comes next are brief analyses of the Berlin Wall story and that of East 
Germany in 1989. In order to understand how journalists and other storytellers narrated the 









2.1 The Story of the Berlin Wall 
Late on a cold November night in 1989, due to the erroneous announcement of a new 
travel regulation, the immense confusion and agony that pervaded the East German 
political leadership, and the efficient communication by some West German broadcast 
media, crowds were able to cross the border between East and West Berlin. Calling this 
event the “fall of the Berlin Wall” was possible only because both the East and the West 
were already speaking of the Berlin border in metaphoric, rather than fact-oriented, terms. 
The Berlin Wall as a single, coherent wall dividing a nation is an abstraction, an imagined 
entity, whose name has somehow been accepted from the start. In reality, the Berlin Wall 
was a multifaceted border control regime with a continuously changing material presence 
and an ever-shifting aesthetic design. If we want to understand the Berlin Wall as a 
symbol, we must consider its real material qualities. In particular, we need to ask what the 
border control regime looked like in its physical reality, as compared to the Berlin Wall 
symbol featured in Western memory. What comes next is a quick sketch of the “real” 
Berlin Wall. 
The Berlin Wall was erected to stop emigration from East Germany. Between the 
founding of East Germany, in 1949, and the erection of the Berlin Wall, in 1961, an 
estimated 2.7 million people had left the East German state. Although many of them 
decided to emigrate for political reasons, economic factors played an important part in the 
mass exodus as well. While West Germany experienced an economic boom in the 1950s, 





collectivization, was faced with shortages of consumer goods and housing. As a popular 
East German slogan summarized the situation at the end of 1959: “Ohne Butter, ohne 
Sahne, auf dem Mond die rote Fahne” [There’s no butter, there’s no cream, but on the 
moon the red flag flutters].  
 East Germany had already sealed its border with West Germany in 1952, skipping 
the borderline between East Berlin and West Berlin. On August 13, 1961, East Germany 
closed the remaining open section of the border. In its very first form the “Berlin Wall” 
was more like a “Berlin Barbed Wire.” Closing the last bit of open border required 150 
tons of barbed wire, 18.200 concrete posts, 5 tons of binding wire, and 2 tons of staples. 
An additional 150 tons of barbed wire were used to create some separation between East 
Berlin and its provincial hinterland. It was this excessive use of barbed wire that prompted 
Frederick Taylor, in his recent, bestselling book on the Berlin Wall, to call the day of the 
Wall’s erection “barbed-wire Sunday” (Taylor, 2006, p. 147, 167). So much of barbed wire 
was needed, in fact, that in July of 1961 a Socialist Unity Party (SED) internal memo 
expressed concern that the country just did not possess enough material to do the job. 
Indeed, as German art historian Leo Schmidt has noted: “[w]hat could be more typical of 
East Germany than that the wall’s history began with a supply shortfall?” (Schmidt, 2009, 
p. 54). 
Only barbed wire made it possible to finish the job within the five short hours 
between 1 a.m. and 6 a.m., August 13, 1961 (Sälter, 2011, p. 122). But this provisional 
sealing required more work. Over the course of the next weeks, the Berlin Barbed Wire 





the Berlin Wall during its 28-year existence (Klausmeier & Schmidt, 2004, pp. 14-19). The 
first-generation wall consisted of large square breezeblock elements that had originally 
been designed for residential architecture. Two to four layers of smaller breezeblocks 
covered the large block elements, making the wall approximately six and a half feet high. 
The wall also included concrete beams into which iron railings had been set. Where 
buildings stood in way of the Wall, residents were evacuated and their windows were 
bricked in.  
Although this first-generation wall was no longer a barbed-wired fence, there was 
still confusion about its name. For instance, a famous Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg 
documentary shot during the first two weeks of the Wall was titled “Die Mauer” [The 
Wall]. But its sequel, showing the fortification and augmentation of the wall through the 
end of December of 1961, was called “Stacheldraht” [Barbed Wire] (Rundfunk 
Brandenburg, 1961). And the West German studio that broadcast right from the Berlin 
border to the east side was named “Studio am Stacheldraht” [Studio at the Barbed Wire] 
(Wentker, 2011, pp. 198-199). This coexistence of the barbed wire and the wall in naming 
practices did not last long. 
A second-generation wall was built in 1962, which was largely a fortification of the 
first. Heavy concrete slabs replaced many of the breezeblocks to discourage escapes with 
vehicles.11 In 1965, East Germany erected a more professional, third-generation wall that 
consisted of “fairly narrow concrete slabs inserted horizontally between H-sectioned posts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Since the differences between the first and second generations of the Wall are rather limited, some 
researchers consider these two stages as one generation, dividing the history of the wall into three, not four 





of reinforced concrete; it was then topped by lengths of concrete sewage pipe, rendering it 
virtually impossible to scale” (Klausmeier & Schmidt, pp. 15-16).  
Finally, in the mid-1970s, a fourth-generation wall, the Border Wall 75, sought to 
solve all previous problems with a physically and aesthetically perfected design. The 
Border Wall 75 resulted from an extensive research process that had even included the 
erection of test walls. Due to its L-shaped element, this fourth-generation wall needed no 
foundations and was so strong that virtually no vehicle would ever break through. The 
surface of the Border Wall 75 was smooth and white, conveying coherence as well as 
power.  
The story of the four generations of the Wall is a story about progress in design. 
But the four types of walls can also be regarded as symbols for the changing international 
image of East Germany. From 1961 to 1965, the period of the first- and second-generation 
walls, the East German state was isolated from the field of international relations. In 1949, 
when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) were founded, the West German FRG did not recognize the East German GDR as a 
state. Beginning in 1963, however, West Germany’s policy of political isolation gradually 
began to soften; the two German states over time negotiated border passes for West 
Germans and started ransoming East German political prisoners. However, the Berlin Wall 
continued to remain impermeable for East Germans.  
In 1969, when the Wall was in its third generation, Willy Brandt became West 
German Chancellor. He was the candidate of the Social Democratic Party of Germany 





leadership. Brandt introduced a more collaborative “Ostpolitik,” aimed at easing the pain 
caused by the Wall by accepting the division (Anthon, 1976; Krell, 1991). In the German-
German basic treaty of 1972, West Germany finally recognized the GDR as an 
independent state. The third-generation Wall witnessed a shift in East German political 
leadership as well, as Erich Honecker succeeded Walter Ulbricht. By 1975, when the 
fourth-generation Wall arrived, East Germany was admitted to UNESCO and established 
diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain. It was a relatively hopeful time for East 
German politics, and the Wall’s design reflected a newly gained confidence. At the same 
time, the increasingly professional and expensive Wall also helped to conceal the 
economic realities of the GDR: growing despair and a highly inefficient economy. 
Telling the story of four generations of walls brings to light the changing aesthetics 
of, and politics around, the Wall. That said, the idea that there were four generations 
reflects a Western perspective – one that was developed before the relevant archives were 
opened (Sälter, 2011, p. 122). This narrative focuses on how the Wall changed over the 
years as seen from the western side; it pays little attention to the physical obstacles on the 
eastern side of the border. In contrast to our Western image – of one Berlin Wall – there 
were in fact multiple layers of surveillance and control on the east side of the border 
(Klausmeier & Schmidt, 2004, pp. 22-27; Klausmeier, 2012). 
From the eastern side, a would-be escapee first saw warning signs and the 
inscription “Frontier area – Passage not allowed” in German, English, French and Russian. 
After these initial signs, she confronted additional obstacles: concrete walls, light 





Hinterland Wall that marked the zone in which border guards were responsible for the 
protection of the border (Klausmeier & Schmidt, 2004, pp. 22-28). From the Hinterland 
Wall began the “death strip,” ranging from fifteen to more than a hundred and fifty meters 
in width (Hertle, 2011, p. 113).  
After the Hinterland Wall, the escapee entered a narrow area right in front of an 
electrical signaling fence. The fence was too elastic to climb, and if touched it would 
immediately send a silent alarm to the nearest command post. Anyone who managed by 
some lucky chance to scale this fence landed on other obstacles – like long sharp spikes 
that caused insufferable pain. In some areas, after passing the fence an escapee would be 
confronted with dog runs (Hertle, 2011, p. 113; Sälter, 2011, p. 129).  
Border guards monitored the entire border area closely. They had military training, 
and were constantly watched by infiltrated secret police members to prevent desertions. 
The border guards had permission to “arrest or exterminate” border violators (Hertle, 
2011). They used the patrol road to travel the death strip; light strips provided plenty of 
light for them even during the darkest nights. Over three hundred watchtowers helped them 
detect movement on the death strip and beyond (figure 1). An underground telephone 
network also connected the border posts, enabling continuous communication (Klausmeier 






Figure 1: One of the two remaining command posts in Berlin, located at Kieler Eck, 
surrounded by pink and white residential buildings. The command posts were used to 
monitor and direct the watchtowers at the death strip. In the picture, in front of the 
command post, is Jürgen Litfin, brother of Günter Litfin, the first escapee to be shot dead 
at the sealed border on August 24, 1961. Jürgen Litfin now runs the memorial site ‘The 
Watchtower at Kieler Eck – Memorial for Günter Litfin,’ not far from the Humboldt harbor 
where his brother took the lethal bullets. (Julia Sonnevend, June 2012) 
 
After the patrol road came the six-meter-wide control strip, covered with sand to 
retain footprints. Then came an anti-vehicle trench, followed by a final strip that could be 
as wide as forty meters. Finally, at the end of all these obstacles, there was the 
approximately four-meter-high, ten-centimeter-thick Border Wall, that one wall we 
generally have in mind. Although the GDR continued to reshape this system of obstacles 





the twentieth anniversary of the East German state, in 1969 (Sälter, 2011, pp. 129-130; 
Hertle, 2011).  
Over time, the name Berlin Wall came to stand for this multi-layered and multi-
generational border control regime that included, among others, barbed wire and concrete; 
anti-vehicle crash obstacles and control strips; self-activating search lights and patrol 
roads; watchtowers; and heavily armed border guards. Moreover, it also came to stand not 
just for the 37 kilometers of Wall running through populated areas, but also for the 55-
kilometer border along rail embankments, marshland and fields, and the 24-kilometer 
border along waterways. In these areas, the wall was often no more than a line through a 
lake or a river or even a bridge (Baker, 2005, p. 21; Rühle & Holzweissig, 1988, p. 145); 
nonetheless, it was “the” Berlin Wall.  
Even photographs of the various generations of the Wall, capturing it in all of its 
alternating states, have come to represent the Berlin Wall. For instance, the most widely 
reproduced Berlin Wall photograph depicts the East German border guard Conrad 
Schumann’s leap to freedom – or more precisely, his jump over a barbed wire fence, on 
August 15, 1961. Peter Leibing’s photograph of the jump is now the central image at the 
Berlin Wall Memorial in Berlin (figure 2). On Brunnenstrasse, a few steps away from the 
Memorial, a citizen-initiated sculpture embodies the photograph as well. The sculpture 
includes a piece of barbed wire to represent the “wall” (figure 3); while being barbed wire, 
















Figure 3: Sculpture at Brunnenstrasse 142 Berlin by Michael Bauer, Florian Bauer 
 and Edward Anders. (Julia Sonnevend, June 2012) 
 
So how do we account for the exceptional consensus in calling an elaborate and 
ever-changing system of obstacles “the” Berlin Wall? And why do we still use that name 
today? There are at least three quite distinct reasons that could help explain the 
perseverance of the concept of the Berlin Wall. None of them stands alone, but together 
they may help solve the puzzle. The first reason is aesthetic, and has to do with the 
changing architectural design of the Wall; the second reason is semantic, having to do with 
the differences in meaning of two German words for “Wall”: Mauer and Wand. And the 





As described above, the four generations of the Berlin Wall progressed towards a 
coherent wall image. Looking from the west side, the provisional, rough and shoddy 
“patchwork wall” over time began to look more and more like a professionally designed 
wall system. The GDR aimed to make the wall look smooth and flat for the West. Still, 
from platforms built on the western side Western viewers were also able to see the 
increasing number of obstacle zones, towers and alarm systems on the eastern side; they 
were confronted with the reality of the wall. The disconnect between image and reality was 
somewhat mitigated, however, by the fact that the German word Mauer slightly differs in 
meaning from the English “wall.” The German languages differentiates between Mauer 
and Wand: while Mauer means “wall” as in “barrier,” Wand denotes the “face,” or the 
surface of a wall. The Berlin Wall was called Mauer in both East and West Germany; only 
adjectives connoted ideological differences. But even with this semantic difference, the 
name Mauer remains puzzling – for while the Berlin border remained a Mauer for East 
Germans throughout its existence, it increasingly became a permeable Wand for the West 
Germans who, by the 1980s, step by step gained the right to cross it (Baker, 2005, pp. 22-
23). 
Neither the changing design of the Wall, nor the semantic complexity of the word 
Mauer can fully explain the perseverance of the Berlin Wall concept. Perhaps a look at the 
propagandistic representations of the Wall will provide some answers. The Berlin Wall 
was a powerful propaganda object for both sides: perhaps neither side had an interest in 





the East and West German propaganda efforts in building up a lasting concept of “the” 
Berlin Wall. 
In the mind of SED leader Walter Ulbricht, the border regime existed as a Wall 
months before its birth. Producing one of the more famous lies in political history – one 
still frequently reprinted on Berlin postcards – Ulbricht announced at an international press 
conference on June 15, 1961: “Niemand hat die Absicht, eine Mauer zu errichten” 
[Nobody has the intention to build a wall]. This was obviously not true, but Ulbricht’s 
“wall” was at that point still a metaphor rather than a practical reality. In a meeting in 
September 1961, the East German military advocated for keeping and extending the barbed 
wire fence instead of building a wall. The military believed that border guards, rather than 
physical obstacles, should be catching any would-be fugitives. For the military, an actual 
physical wall seemed like a meaningless barrier – one that potentially might even “hide” 
Western provocateurs from the border guards’ prying eyes (Schmidt, 2011, p. 457).  
But Erich Mielke, who was the Head of the Ministry of State Security (MfS) 
throughout the Wall’s existence, expressed a different opinion at that meeting: “the 
security measures at the border have a big political meaning” (Schmidt, 2011, p. 457). In 
fact, by the time of the September 1961 meeting, a physical wall was already under 
construction at a few – very visible – locations: in the city center, between the 
Brandenburg Gate and the Postdamer Platz, and between Checkpoint Charlie and the Spree 
(Schmidt, 2009, p. 59; Schmidt, 2011, p. 457). On August 13, 1962, a whole year since the 
date we have come to associate with the “erection of the Berlin Wall,” physical walls 





entire border of West Berlin. Nevertheless, by this time the concept of the Wall went 
uncontested: those percentages were enough to make it represent a reality that did not yet 
exist.  
Already in 1961, East German chief agitator Horst Sindermann had come up with 
the name “Anti-Fascist Protection Wall.” As a participant in the anti-fascist resistance 
movement, Sindermann had spent the ten years between 1935 and 1945 in various prisons 
– including, toward the end, the concentration camps of Sachsenhausen and Mauthausen. 
Yet his choice of name was not a subversive or idiosyncratic one: after all, anti-fascism 
had been the central founding myth of the GDR. Struggling to construct a legitimate 
national identity, the GDR used anti-fascism as the main justification for its existence 
(Anderson 1983; Jarausch, 1991; Orlow, 2006). As political myth (Flood, 1996), anti-
fascism made the founding of the new German state seem morally and historically 
desirable. The GDR presented itself as embodying both the resistance against National 
Socialism and the better traditions of German history (Zimmering, 2000, p. 37).  
Sindermann’s coinage of the name “Anti-Fascist Protection Wall” for the wall was 
perfectly in keeping with East Germany’s widespread anti-fascist propaganda campaigns. 
East German propagandists called the 1953 uprising by East German workers calling for 
the resignation of the government a “fascist putsch”; its posters depicted the anti-
communist West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as the “Hitler of today”; and its 
slogans emphasized West Germany’s failure to go through an efficient process of 
denazification. East German propaganda also used anti-fascism to discredit Western 





propagandistic efforts of the Völkischer Beobachter, the infamous newspaper of the 
NSDAP (Demke, 2011, pp. 104-105).  
The Anti-Fascist Protection Wall was advertised as an effective barrier that kept 
out provocateurs, fascists, aggressors aiming for armed conflict, and immoral economic 
activities like pornography, smuggling and human trafficking. While this combination of 
unwanted elements might seem awkward or arbitrary to the contemporary reader, it fitted 
the anti-fascist narrative. The GDR understood fascism in the terms offered by Georgi 
Dimitrov: “fascism is the power of finance capital itself” (Zimmering, 2000, p. 37). 
Barring capitalism and manifestations of fascist politics were equally important.  
In visual representations, the Anti-Fascist Protection Wall was generally reduced to 
one single image: that of the Brandenburg Gate (Demke, 2011, pp. 97-103; Schmidt, 2011, 
pp. 458-459). This central photograph of the East German visual propaganda for the Wall, 
taken on August 14, 1961, showed “Combat Groups of the Working Class” 
[Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse] lined up in front of the Brandenburg Gate to protect 
the GDR (figure 4). These groups had been organized in the 1950s as paramilitary reserves 
for the army; they embodied the tradition of “proletarian self-defense” (Ward, 1996, p. 21). 
Another set of photographs showed foreign politicians looking at the border from a 
platform, also in front of the Brandenburg Gate: the physical presence of these visiting 
diplomats affirmed the Wall’s legitimacy.  
East German photographs of the Wall consistently avoided showing any details of 
the border barriers; all obstacles of the death strip were omitted from the East German 





carefully designed every item of the death strip in such a way as to avoid fueling Western 
propaganda. In designing the elements of the Berlin border area, they especially tried to 
avoid any visual resemblance to the concentration camps. For instance, the first-generation 
watchtowers, which were made out of wood and resembled concentration camp 
watchtowers, were quickly replaced by brick and plastered towers with a very different 
design (Schmidt, 2009; Sälter, 2011, p. 132). Seeking international acceptance and 
recognition, the GDR even tried to make the wall look increasingly “humane” as time went 
by – for instance, by eliminating the death strip’s much-hated dog runs by the 1980s.  
The West responded to the Anti-Fascist Protection Wall with a counter-propaganda 
campaign. West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt coined the poignant, if less innovative, name 
“Schandmauer” [Wall of Shame] (Schmidt, 2011, p. 458). The West German press framed 
the wall’s construction in the context of the Nazi past. For instance, just eight days after 
the initial erection of the Wall, Der Telegraf presented a photo series with the caption: “In 
the East: concentration camp, in the West: free” [Im Osten: KZ, Im Westen: Frei] (Demke, 
2011, p. 105).  
The West’s Wall narrative was enforced by American presidential and vice 
presidential visits to the Wall. Anxiety about seclusion had already been part of the West 
Berlin psyche prior to 1961, especially since the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade. Diplomatic 
visits from the “outside,” and most importantly from the United States, helped ease this 
anxiety somewhat. The American presidential and vice presidential visits also revitalized 
the memory of the Berlin airlift, and strengthened the feeling that the west “belonged 





Lyndon Johnson (1961) and Presidents John F. Kennedy (1963) and Ronald Reagan 
(1987). Kennedy and Reagan also offered some of “the” Berlin Wall’s more memorable 
one-liners: “Ich bin ein Berliner” and “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!,” respectively. 
These rhetorical performances highlighted the symbolic power of the Wall, without 
actually doing much against the real border control regime.  
In its visual imagery, the West focused on divided families and communities: 
children separated from their parents or their extended families, weddings where essential 
guests were absent, and friends who could wave at each other only from a distance 
(Schmidt, 2011, pp. 459-460). Another set of images showed high-level foreign politicians 
as they observed the horrors of the death strip. The West also stressed the undesirability of 
the Berlin Wall with the help of escape and victim stories. Through these narratives and 
images, the various generations and versions of the wall were unified. The exact shape and 
material of the Wall did not matter to the West. What mattered that the Wall separated 
communities that belonged together.  
Highly publicized incidents included, for example, the first successful escape by an 
East German border guard (Conrad Schumann, August 15, 1961); the first deadly shot 
fired at the Berlin border (Günter Litfin, August 24, 1961); a visually well-documented 
case in which border guards from both sides let an escapee bleed to death on the death strip 
(Peter Fechter, August 17, 1962, figure 5); and the story of the last escapee to be shot dead 
at the Berlin Wall – he had thought that the order to shoot was no longer in effect (Chris 





necessary to overcome the Wall, like the use of tunnels, air balloons, bulldozers, and even 
a Trojan cow (Nooke, 2011). 
Like escape stories, Western lists of Berlin Wall victims helped fortify the concept 
of “the” Berlin Wall as well – even if the development of an adequate definition of the 
victims of the Berlin Wall was particularly challenging (Nooke, 2009, p. 90). Most cases – 
apart from the obvious one of being shot at the death strip – were difficult to classify: some 
escapees died from injuries after arriving on the West side, others suffered heart attacks 
during their escapes, and the Berlin Wall’s psychological effects also shortened many 
lives. The recently established Berlin Wall Memorial’s photo collection of the victims, the 
“Window of Remembrance,” illustrates this problem by leaving some of the windows 
blank (figure 6). Despite such challenges, however, Western narratives of victims and 











 Multiple narratives and circumstances, then, helped shape the mental image of “the” 
Berlin Wall. At the same time, neither the East nor the West visualized the realities of the 
death strip. On both sides, people embodied the propaganda message. On the East side, the 
working class, fighting back fascism with its very own body, dominated the visual image 
of the Wall; on the West side, freedom-loving individuals played this role. In each case the 
imagery focused on persons and hid the objects of the border area. In this sense, the visual 
practices of the East and the West were surprisingly similar. Both contributed to an image 
of “the” Berlin Wall; both veiled the actual details of the death strip. At the same time, 





propaganda revolved around one central image of the Anti-Fascist Protection Wall, 
focusing on the Brandenburg Gate, the West had many photographs depicting the Berlin 
Wall in circulation – although all of them dealt exclusively with the Wall’s Western side 
(Schmidt, 2011, p. 459). 
 If the lack of visual representations of the death strip is more or less understandable 
in the case of the East, it is harder to divine what motivated the West: surely, showing the 
real brutalities of the death strip would have made an influential tool for Western 
propagandeers. Besides, every year millions of visitors actually saw the death strip with 
their own eyes from platforms on the West side. Why did the visual representations not 
build on such personal experiences? Perhaps stories of escape, victimhood and personal 
trauma seemed better vehicles for the message of freedom and humanity. The mental 
image of “the” Berlin Wall, condensing the horrors of the death strip, constituted a quick 
and easy reference to all omitted details. 
 Another explanation for the West’s omission of the death strip from visual 
representations may be the fact that the West simply got used to the existence of the Wall. 
While the Wall initially seemed both outrageous and impermeable to West Germans, it 
became relatively normal and relatively permeable over time. Writing about the West 
German image of the Wall, German historian Herman Wentker described the period 
between 1971 and 1989 as “the normalization of the abnormal.” In the sixties the Berlin 
Wall was a slap in the face for West Germans, and they protested against it intensely; by 
1976, however, only 45 percent of them knew the correct answer to the simple survey 





“the” Berlin Wall became mostly a symbol – detached from the realities of the border area, 
and elevated above historical facts. 
 There was the increasingly efficient Berlin border separation barrier that prevented 
East German mass exodus – and whoever tried to cross the Berlin border from the east side 
faced the actual realities of the death strip. There was also “the” Berlin Wall, a symbol of 
separation and difference for both sides. As a symbol, the Berlin Wall is not susceptible to 
the tools of accuracy and objectivity: it requires us to think in abstract terms. The Berlin 
Wall represents separation between East Germans and West Germans; it also stands for 
the difference between communism and capitalism. Even for a symbol, though, the Berlin 
Wall is quite puzzling: we would assume a central symbol of the Cold War to be 
something initiated by the Soviets and deemed unacceptable by the Americans – or the 
other way around, some American project that the Soviets hoped to eliminate. The Berlin 
Wall was neither. Throughout the fifties the hardline East German leadership insisted on 
building the Berlin Wall, while post-Stalinist Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev held off on 
the idea until 1961 – suggesting, instead, that the underlying problems that triggered the 
mass emigration be solved (Harrison, 2003). And although Western politicians often 
condemned the Berlin Wall with words, they did not actually act against the separation. As 
President John F. Kennedy summarized the Western position right after the Berlin border 
was sealed: “not a very nice solution, but . . . a hell of a lot better than a war” (Smyser, 
2009).   
 Nonetheless, the Berlin Wall as a symbol prevails in spite of all these facts. It 





the story of the Berlin Wall offered a readily available vocabulary in which the story of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall could be told: a vocabulary dedicated to feelings and imagination, 
not to facts and reality. This pre-existing language made the story of the fall of the Berlin 







2.2 The Social Context of the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The East German Political 
Transition in 1989 
 
 
As the first part of this chapter explained, the Berlin Wall as symbol rose above historic 
details and facts. It began to live a life somewhat independent from its material context. 
Something similar happened to the story of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Just as we tend to 
forget the numerous iterations and obstacles of the Berlin separation barrier when we recall 
the Berlin Wall, we also tend to forget the East Germany of 1989, recalling the fall of the 
Berlin Wall instead. But no matter how miraculous or sudden it may now appears, the 
Berlin Wall did not fall in a vacuum. Instead, the fall of the Berlin Wall was embedded in a 
long, dispersed and contradictory transitional and revolutionary process. In order to 
understand the narration of the fall of the Berlin Wall, we must first refresh our memory of 
the East German political transition of 1989. 
Of course, when we set about describing and interpreting that transition – the 
“Wende” (turning point), as Honecker’s successor Egon Krenz called it – our resulting 
narrative will inevitably betray life’s complexity. Narratives use terms and present causal 
relationships that never quite seem to match life. The incredibly boring term “mass 
demonstration,” for example, does not even begin to reflect the unforgettable feeling of 
taking to the streets and having your heart beat a bit (or a lot) faster. And when you 
compile an elaborate list of causes of an event – in this particular case the political, 
economic and cultural “factors” leading up to a country’s collapse – such a seemingly 





Still, the inevitable imperfection of historical narratives is no reason to abandon them 
altogether. 12  
The story of East Germany in 1989 consists of at least seven separate strands: the 
GDR’s changing relations with the Soviet Union; the GDR’s economic deterioration; 
growing public discontent, expressed through mass exodus and mass demonstrations; the 
weakening of the East German leadership; the influence of West German electronic media 
on the East German society; and the decision process surrounding the new travel law that 
was the most direct trigger for the fall of the Berlin Wall. What follows next is a short 
narrative regarding each of these pieces of the puzzle (and of course, there were still many 
more pieces, lots of different puzzle images, as well as the unbeatable powers of 
contingency and human agency).  
The German Democratic Republic was never politically independent from the 
Soviet Union. The GDR was established on October 7, 1949, on the territory of the Soviet 
occupation zone, as a state with a unique mission. As Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas 
Mikoyan put it two months prior to the erection of the Wall in 1961:  
The GDR, Germany, is the country where it must be determined that Marxism-
 Leninism is right, and that communism is the higher, better social order for 
 industrial nations as well. […] If socialism does not prevail in the GDR, if 
 communism does not show itself to be superior and viable here, then we have not 
 won (Hertle, 2011, p. 35).  
 
 In line with this mission, the GDR received political, financial and military support 
from the Soviet Union throughout its existence. In return, the GDR, as a post-fascist and 
socialist nation, oriented itself toward the Soviet Union (Orlow, 2006, p. 540).  
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 By the 1980s, however, the Soviet Union increasingly found itself struggling to 
provide adequate support to the East bloc in general, and to the GDR in particular. The 
economic crisis forced the Soviet Union to rethink its relations to the East bloc. In 
November 1986 Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
announced major changes regarding the Soviet relationship to socialist countries. 
Gorbachev declared “the independence of each party, its right to make sovereign decisions 
about the problems of development in its country;” he also emphasized each country’s own 
“responsibility to its own people” (Hertle, 1999a, p. 4). The Brezhnev doctrine of 
intervention was replaced by the “Sinatra doctrine,” in which each socialist country could 
do it “its way” (Gedmin, 1992, p. 19). By providing this level of independence and 
autonomy, Gorbachev hoped to stabilize the region; he did not intend to dissolve the 
alliance.  
 By 1988, both the Soviet and East German leadership became increasingly 
suspicious of one another. The Soviets were well informed about East Germany’s financial 
dependence on the West. As early as March of 1986, Gorbachev expressed fears that 
“[East] Berlin could be tempted to throw itself into the arms of West Germany under the 
pressure of economic problems” (Hertle, 2011, p. 167). East Germany, meanwhile, knew 
that the Soviet Union’s own economic crisis was forcing the superpower to comply with 
some demands of the West – for instance, in US-Soviet disarmament talks.13  
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 The GDR became suspicious of its most important supporter at a time when its 
economy was at the brink of collapse. On May 16, 1989, the Head of the State Planning 
Commission told SED leaders that the GDR’s debt to the West was growing by 500 
million Valutamarks a month, and predicted that with this growth rate, the GDR would be 
insolvent by 1991. At the end of October 1989, the ever-increasing debt brought leading 
East German economists to consider negotiations with West Germany about financial 
assistance; the alternative option was that substantial changes be made in economic and 
social policy, along with a reduction in the standard of living by 25-30% (Hertle, 1999a, 
pp. 7-9).14  
 The latter seemed impossible in a country that obtained its legitimacy from the 
promise of social welfare. When Erich Honecker came to power in 1971, he had promised 
to maintain the unity of social and economic policy. Basic services and goods were heavily 
subsidized in East Germany, while price hikes were unimaginable from a political 
standpoint. In order to cover the high state subventions the country put itself in debt; the 
many inefficiencies of the state-controlled economy caused major supply shortfalls, even 
in basic food products (Major, 2010, pp. 228-230).  
 The Soviet Union had frequently saved the GDR financially before, but on 
November 1, 1989, just eight days before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Mikhail Gorbachev 
made it clear that this time, the Soviet Union would not be able to provide the GDR with 
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the much-needed financial assistance. Therefore, on November 6, 1989, East and West 
Germany began to negotiate a credit of around 12-13 billion DM. West Germany 
conditioned its financial support upon East German political reforms.  
 By this time the widespread social dissatisfaction was palpable all over East 
Germany. Signaling the levels of public discontent with the regime, more and more East 
Germans voted with their feet – and tried to leave the country. At the start of 1989, more 
than 100,000 applications for permanent leave awaited an answer from the East German 
authorities (Hertle, 2011, p. 178); and then there were the many East Germans who did not 
even ask for permission at all.  
 On May 2, 1989, Hungary began dismantling its fortified border with Austria 
(figure 7). Even after this symbolic act, however, Hungary did not allow East German 
citizens to cross the border to the West. Still, many East Germans used the summer holiday 
to visit Hungary in the hope of leaving the GDR behind. By summer’s end, the situation 
began to escalate: approximately two thousand East Germans crossed the Austro-
Hungarian border illegally by August 20, 1989, and several thousands more were residing 
in Hungarian refugee camps. Other would-be GDR emigrants stormed the West German 
embassies in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest. Finally, on the night of September 10-11, 
1989, Hungary opened the border to Austria for East German citizens, resulting in 18,000 
border crossings over the next three days (Maier, 1997, p. 126; Schuller, 2009).  
 Around this time, Czechoslovakia tightened the control of its border with Hungary, 
trying to create a new, invisible wall for East Germans. As a result, more than ten thousand 





September 1989, demanding the right to leave for West Germany. This conflict provided 
one of the most dramatic scenes of the East German crisis. On September 30, 1989, 
Honecker gave in and permitted the embassy occupiers to emigrate to West Germany. To 
get to West Germany, the Prague embassy emigrants traveled through East Germany in 
sealed trains (figure 8). They were stripped from their citizenship and their identity 
documents were confiscated. The East German leadership wanted to humiliate the 
emigrants by branding them as traitors, but this “performance” had the opposite effect: 
fellow East Germans greeted the refugees as the trains traveled through the country. On the 
train, the simultaneously frightened and cheerful refugees, who lacked any form of trust 
towards their political leaders, could not believe that they were free until they actually 
crossed the border, where they were greeted by West German crowds. West German 
television captured the moving scenes and broadcasted the once-in-a-lifetime visuals to the 
East side (Taylor, 2006, p. 408; Major, 2010). In a context in which the use of sealed trains 
to transport people had strong historical connotations, the Prague embassy incident 
delivered a major blow to the image of an “anti-fascist” East Germany.  
 The mass exodus fueled the protests that were taking place on East German soil 
(Hirschman, 1993). There had of course been active opposition groups well before the start 
of the mass exodus. Most of these started out as human rights, environmental protection, or 
pro-peace initiatives during the late nineteen-seventies and early nineteen-eighties. Many 
initiatives were supported and protected by the Lutheran church. But the levels of public 
support for, and the visibility of, their opposition activities increased substantially after the 





founded as well, most notably Neues Forum, Demokratie Jetzt and Demokratischer 
Aufbruch (Maier, 1997, Pfaff, 1996).  
 During 1989, demonstrations and other forms of political resistance were taking 
place in approximately five hundred locations in East Germany. The center of opposition 
activity was Leipzig, where demonstrations began each Monday with a prayer for peace in 
the Church of St. Nicholas. On October 9, 1989, 70,000 demonstrators occupied the streets 
of Leipzig, a number state organs were completely unprepared for. And the number of 
demonstrators kept growing by the week. On November 6, 1989, three days before the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, more than 200,000 protesters in Leipzig chanted: “We are the people!” 
and “We need no laws, the Wall must go!” On the very same day, 100,000 protesters took 
the streets of Dresden, and 60,000 stormed the marketplace of Halle (Bahrmann, Links, 
1999, pp. 11-67). The protest wave seemed unstoppable.  
 In the midst of this social crisis, the GDR’s political leadership was starting to fall 
apart. In the centralized structure of East German leadership, everybody expected solutions 
to come from the Central Committee and the Politburo. However, the increasingly ill Erich 
Honecker seemed to have lost the pulse of the times. The highest ranks of SED leadership 
seemed cut off from reality as well, not realizing the level of public discontent in the 
country (Popplewell, 1992, p. 49). Finally, on October 17, 1989, Honecker was forced out. 
The 52-year-old Egon Krenz became the new General Secretary of the SED Central 
Committee. Further changes in leadership included the firing of the Central Committee 





Council of Ministers also resigned. Ultimately, on November 8, just one day before the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the entire Politburo tendered its resignation (Hertle, 1999a, pp. 8-9).  
 The West German electronic media made sure to keep the East German population 
well informed about the collapse of the GDR’s political and economic systems. On 
average, “only” ten percent of the East German population actually participated in the 
protest activities: the overwhelming majority of East Germans followed their own 
revolution on television (Czaplicki, 2000, p. 112). There is little reliable data from this 
period, but researchers estimate that up to ninety percent of East Germans had access to 
West German television in the late eighties (Hanke, 1991, p. 10; Czaplicki, 2000, p. 114).  
 A 1988 study, based on interviews with migrants who left East Germany for West 
Germany, found major differences in their engagement with, and appreciation of, East 
versus West German television. These interviewees were of course exceptionally critical of 
the country they had left behind, but the results still offer some insights. Eighty-two 
percent of the interviewees claimed to watch West German television “almost daily”; 
another twelve percent watched it “frequently”; five percent “sometimes”; and only one 
percent “rarely” viewed West German television programs. In terms of trust, on a scale of 
1 (no trust) to 10 (full trust), the interviewees gave West German media an average of 8.00, 
and an average of 2.5 to East German media (Hesse, 1988, p. 42).  
 The researcher who conducted the study concluded in 1988 that each night an 
“electronic reunification” was taking place between the two German societies (Hesse, 
1988, p. 9). Nothing really explains why East Germany allowed this virtual reunification to 





standards, and different levels of freedom, on the two sides of the Wall. Some Western 
specialists speculate that it was an attempt to quiet protests against travel restrictions: a 
nightly “virtual emigration” was always better than real emigration (Sarotte, 2009, p. 41; 
Torpey, 1995, p. 97; Morozov, 2011).  
 When everything seemed to collapse, the East German leadership tried to calm 
things down by easing the restrictions on travel. Back in October 1989, during the Prague 
Embassy incident, East Germany had withdrawn the right of GDR citizens to travel 
without a visa to Czechoslovakia. On November 1, 1989, East Germany reversed this 
decision, prompting additional tens of thousands of people to leave. Czechoslovakia was 
not pleased: it had little intention of turning into an East German refugee camp (Taylor, 
2006, p. 421). Therefore, on November 4, 1989, the East German leadership permitted its 
citizens to cross Czechoslovakia and leave for West Germany. Over the next three days, 
30,000 GDR citizens used this opportunity to flee to the West (Süss, 2011, p. 231).   
 This situation put enormous pressure on Czechoslovakia as well: it had now 
become a crowded highway to West Germany. East Germany had to find a way to release 
this pressure. In addition, by opening the “highway” through Czechoslovakia the East 
German leadership had created a rather absurd situation in which permanent emigration 
through fellow socialist countries was perfectly legal, while a short visit to an aunt in 
Hamburg remained illegal. New regulations would have to solve this issue as well. The 
East German leadership had been preparing new travel legislation for a while, but the 





with West Germany about the much-needed financial assistance were still ongoing (Hertle, 
1999a, p. 12).  
 As a compromise, SED leadership decided, on November 6, 1989, to at least 
publish a draft of the new travel legislation. The draft permitted 30 days of travel a year, 
and provided travelers with 15 DM in exchange for 15 GDR Marks. The draft also 
included plenty of opportunity for the authorities to deny permission to travel. Again, as 
had been the case during the Prague Embassy Crisis, SED leaders did not fully grasp the 
level of frustration among its citizens. Instead of calming the waters, the new draft inspired 
in passionate demonstrations, with slogans like “Around the world in thirty days – without 
money!” and “Let us fly to Hawaii!” (Hertle, 1999a, p. 12). It appeared that all the reforms 
came too late, or came in the wrong shape.  
 Next, the Politburo, trying to find at least a temporary solution for the crisis in 
Czechoslovakia, decided on an early promulgation of that portion of the travel legislation 
that regulated permanent emigration (Hertle, 2009, pp. 118-119; Süss, 2011). The draft 
regulation did not introduce complete freedom to travel; it required the possession of 
passport and visa. At the time, only four million GDR citizens had passports. All the others 
would have to apply for one, and then wait at least four weeks as the document travelled 
through the East German bureaucratic labyrinth. With this tactic, the East German 
leadership sought to avoid a stampede and to slow down the mass exodus. The bureaucrats 
who prepared the draft also wanted to make sure that the border guards and other relevant 
authorities would have enough time to prepare for the crowds of applicants. Therefore, 





reliable East German media until the next day, at 4 a.m. on November 10, 1989 (Hertle, 
1999a, pp. 12-13).  
 On November 9, 1989, given the dramatic situation at home as well as abroad, the 
draft went through the bureaucratic stages in a “fast track procedure” in the hope that it 
could be passed by 6 p.m. – thus leaving an entire night for preparations by the passport 
and registration authorities. Egon Krenz received the draft at 3 p.m. and quickly got it 
approved by both the Central Committee and the Politburo. Between 5 and 5:30 p.m., 
Krenz gave the draft and the related press release to Politburo member Günther 
Schabowski, who was about to serve as a party spokesman at a live international press 
conference.  
 Schabowski had not been present at the meetings of the Central Committee and the 
Politburo where the new travel regulation and its launch had been discussed; therefore, he 
did not know that the regulation would not go into effect until the next morning (Hertle, 
1999a; Süss, 2011, p. 234). He was also uninformed about the exact details of the draft. 
However, Krenz told him either that “[t]his will be a sensation for us” (according to 
Schabowski’s memory), or that “this news will affect the whole world” (according to 
Krenz’s memory) (Steinmetz, 2004, p. 472). Lots of events in the GDR made for 
sensational world news in those days; so when at 6 p.m. on November 9, 1989 an 
exhausted Schabowski entered a large press conference room filled with relatively bored 
journalists, he was quite unprepared to make history. He did not even read the draft until 





 When we take all these pieces of the GDR puzzle into account – the weakening 
Soviet relations; the collapsing economy; the growing social dissatisfaction reflected by 
mass exodus and mass demonstrations; a weakening political leadership; influential 
Western media; and a hastily prepared new travel law – the fall of the Berlin Wall seems 
less of a magical event. In fact, it comes to look more like the inevitable eruption of an old 
volcano; but that is not how we remember it. 
 This chapter aimed to show that each event, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, is 
part of a complex process, a series of interconnected moments with historic significance. 
However, when we narrate an event, we push its contextual details to the background and 
focus on “surprise,” “magic,” and “unexpectedness.” This chapter also showed that the 
story of the Berlin Wall was narrated with an elevated and interpretative language, 
centering on feelings rather than facts. This language would greatly enforce the narrative of 









Chapter 3. “The Gates of the Wall Are Wide Open”: The Elevated and Interpretative 
West German Story of the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
 
This chapter is concerned with the second element of the theory of global iconic events: 
“mythmaking: construction of the event’s elevated and interpretative story.” It is my aim, 
in this chapter, to track how the elevated and interpretative language of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall was developed. First, I describe the press conference of Günter Schabowski. 
Second, I examine, on a minute-by-minute basis, how American and West German news 
agencies and West German television covered the Schabowski press conference and its 
aftermath on November 9, 1989. I will show how confusing the developments of 
November 9, 1989 were – much more confusing than our simplified image of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall lets on. I will also show that in our story of the event, we tend to rule out 
the possibility that the media did not just cover the fall; it may, with its elevated and 
interpretative narrative, have helped to precipitate it.  
 
3.1 The Schabowski press conference 
German historian Hans-Hermann Hertle, author of the most thorough reconstruction of the 
events of November 9, 1989, once remarked that “[i]n relation to the intention behind it, 
Schabowski’s announcement is the world’s greatest disaster in the history of the press 
conference” (Hertle, 2011, p. 193). That claim seems a hard one to prove: is there anyone 
who has knowledge of all the disastrous press conferences that took place in world 
history? But Schabowski did show that even the most awkward press conference can go 





press conference was broadcast live by GDR state television. Journalists representing East 
and West both attended the conference. Ideologically different, they were all equally 
exhausted from an ever-escalating political crisis that needed continuous coverage. 
Frankfurter Rundschau GDR correspondent Karl-Heinz Baum’s feelings probably 
mirrored those of many other journalists that day. Baum told his colleagues at the 
headquarters: “I attend the press conference of the Central Committee of the SED, listen to 
what Schabowski says; then I go to sleep. If he says something important, I will write a 
lead article tomorrow” (Hertle, 1999b, p. 51).  
 It is worth recalling the visual scene of the press conference: the image did not 
make a very likely candidate for iconicity (figure 9). The press conference room had a 
1970s feel to it, with socialist shades of red and brown; and although the room was packed, 






Figure 9: “International Press Center at Mohrenstrasse, East Berlin, November 9, 1989. On the 
podium from left to right: Central Committee members Helga Labs, Manfred Banaschak, Günther 
Schabowski and Gerhard Beil.” (Thomas Lehmann, Bundesarchiv) 
 
The attending Central Committee members and journalists were exhausted, and all were 
still grappling with the news they had heard the day before – that the entire Politburo had 
tendered its resignation. For the better part of an hour, the press conference was far from 
fascinating. Schabowski began the conference at 7 p.m.; he spoke for fifty-three minutes 
before the topic of travel came up. He presented the details of, and his free-floating 
thoughts on, a party conference to be organized in December – “Parteitagsscheiße” [party 
conference shit], was how West German journalists referred to this part of the information 
package (Grimm, 2009). Shabowski also offered lengthy thoughts on free elections and his 
party’s various desperate plans for reform. Finally, at 7:53 p.m., came the decisive, if 
poorly formulated, question from Italian journalist Riccardo Ehrman:  
Question: My name is Riccardo Ehrman, representing the Italian press agency 
ANSA. Mr. Schabowski, you spoke about mistakes. Don’t you believe that it was a 
big mistake to introduce this travel law several days ago? 
Schabowski: No, I don’t believe so. (Um) We know about this tendency in the 
population, this need of the population, to travel or to leave the GDR. And (um) we 
have ideas about what we have to bring about, (such as) all the things I mentioned 
before, or sought to mention in my response to the question from the TASS 
correspondent, namely a complex renewal of the society (um) and thereby achieve 
that many of these elements... (um) that people do not feel compelled to solve their 
personal problems in this way. 
Those are quite a number of steps, as I said, and (um) we can’t start them all at 
once. There are series of steps, and the chance, through expanding travel 
possibilities ... the chance, through legalizing exit and making it easier to leave, to 
free the people from a (um) let us say psychological pressure... Many of these steps 
took place without adequate consideration. We know that through conversations, 
through the need to return to the GDR, (um) through conversations with people 
who find themselves in an unbelievably complicated situation in the FRG because 





So, the absorptive capacity of the FRG is essentially exhausted. There are already 
more than, or less than provisional (um), that these people have to count on, if they 
are put up there. (um). Shelter is the minimum for constructing an existence. 
Finding work is decisive, essential... 
Beil: (softly) ... integration... 
Schabowski: ...yes, and the necessary integration into the society, which cannot 
happen when one is living in a tent or an emergency shelter, or is hanging around 
unemployed. 
So, we want... through a number of changes, including the travel law, to [create] 
the chance, the sovereign decision of the citizens to travel wherever they want. 
(um) We are naturally (um) concerned that the possibilities of this travel 
regulation—it is still not in effect, it’s only a draft. 
A decision was made today, as far as I know (looking toward Labs and Banaschak 
in hope of confirmation). A recommendation from the Politburo was taken up that 
we take a passage from the [draft of] travel regulation and put it into effect, that, 
(um)—for better or worse, as they say—that regulates permanent exit, leaving the 
Republic. Since we find it (um) unacceptable that this movement is taking place 
(um) across the territory of an allied state, (um) which is not an easy burden for that 
country to bear. Therefore (um), we have decided today (um) to implement a 
regulation that allows every citizen of the German Democratic Republic (um) to 
(um) leave the GDR through any of the border crossings. 
Question: (many voices) When does that go into effect?... Without a passport? 
Without a passport? (no, no)—When is that in effect?... (confusion, voices...) At 
what point does the regulation take effect? 
Schabowski: What? 
Question: At once? When... 
Schabowski: (... scratches his head) You see, comrades, 
I was informed today (puts on his glasses as he speaks further), that such an 
announcement had been (um) distributed earlier today. You should actually have it 
already. So, (reading very quickly from the paper): 
1) “Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made 
without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel 
or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued 
within a short time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particular 
exceptional cases. The responsible departments of passport and registration 
control in the People’s Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue 
visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the 
existing requirements for permanent exit.” 





Schabowski: (um...) (reads:) “Permanent exit is possible via all GDR border 
crossings to the FRG. These changes replace the temporary practice of issuing 
[travel] authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with a GDR 
personal identity card via third countries.” 
(Looks up) (um) I cannot answer the question about passports at this point. (Looks 
questioningly at Labs and Banaschak.) That is also a technical question. I don’t 
know, the passports have to ... so that everyone has a passport, they first have to be 
distributed. But we want to... 
Banaschak: The substance of the announcement is decisive... 
Schabowski: ... is the ...  
Question: When does it go into effect? 
Schabowski: (Looks through his papers...) That goes into effect, according to my 
information, immediately, without delay (looking through his papers further). 
Labs: (quietly) ...without delay. 
Beil: (quietly) That has to be decided by the Council of Ministers. 
Question: (...Many voices...) You only said the FRG, is the regulation also valid 
for West Berlin? 
Schabowski: (reading aloud quickly) “As the Press Office of the Ministry ... the 
Council of Ministers decided that until the Volkskammer implements a 
corresponding law, this transition regulation will be in effect.” 
Question: Does this also apply to West Berlin? You only mentioned the FRG. 
Schabowski: (shrugs his shoulders, frowns, looks at his papers) So ... (pause), um 
hmmm (reads aloud): “Permanent exit can take place via all border crossings from 
the GDR to the FRG and West Berlin, respectively.” 
Question: Another question also: does that mean that effective immediately, GDR 
citizens – Christoph Janowski, Voice of America – does that mean that effective 
immediately, all GDR citizens cannot emigrate via Czechoslovakia or Poland? 
Schabowski: No, that is not addressed at all. We hope instead that the movement 
will (um) regulate itself in this manner, as we are trying to. 
Question: (many voices, incomprehensible question)  
Schabowski: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary.  
Question: (many voices, incomprehensible)  
Schabowski: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary.  
Question: (many voices, incomprehensible)  
Schabowski: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary. 





just before I came over here I was given this information. (Several journalists hurry 
from the room.) 
Question: Mr. Schabowski, what is going to happen to the Berlin Wall now? 
Schabowski: It has been brought to my attention that it is 7:00 p.m. That has to be 
the last question. Thank you for your understanding. 
(um...) What will happen to the Berlin Wall? Information has already been 
provided in connection with travel activities. (um) The issue of travel, (um) the 
ability to cross the Wall from our side, ... hasn’t been answered yet and exclusively 
the question in the sense..., so this, I’ll put it this way, fortified state border of the 
GDR.... (um) We have always said that there have to be several other factors (um) 
taken into consideration. And they deal with the complex of questions that 
Comrade Krenz, in his talk in the—addressed in view of the relations between the 
GDR and the FRG, in ditto light of the (um) necessity of continuing the process of 
assuring peace with new initiatives. 
And (um) surely the debate about these questions (um) will be positively 
influenced if the FRG and NATO also agree to and implement disarmament 
measures in a similar manner to that of the GDR and other socialist countries. 
Thank you very much. (Hertle, 2001, pp. 157-158) 
 
 The scene did not spark. It was not golden; rather, it was grey – or a worn-out red. 
Schabowski’s announcement was awkward, boring, and painfully drawn-out. Nevertheless, 
the press conference constituted a decisive moment in history. By calling the Berlin Wall 
“a fortified state border of the GDR,” Schabowski tried to soften the potential symbolic 
force of his announcement. But it was too late. Although his announcement on itself did 
not immediately open the borders, it did provide a space for an elevated and interpretative 
story.  
 Who deserves the credit for this confusing yet liberating final scene of the 
Schabowski press conference? Should it go to Riccardo Ehrman, for asking the first 
question and some of the follow-up questions? Or should the credit go to the successful 
albeit unorganized team-effort of a small group of journalists who asked a sequence of 





shy away from answering journalists’ questions even though his knowledge of the draft 
legislation was so limited? In what follows next, I will offer sketches of the key 
protagonists and their roles in the press conference. Examining the dynamics of the 
journalistic questioning at the press conference is key if we want to understand how and 
why the fall of the Berlin Wall came to be narrated as it did.  
 Colleagues describe ANSA correspondent Riccardo Ehrman as a lovable person, 
who was somewhat careless with details. Facts and myths were often mixed up in his 
accounts of events (Grimm, 2009).15 Ehrman enjoys talking about his role in the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and he does so in a playful manner. Some of his story’s building blocks have 
remained the same throughout its various versions. He claims to have arrived late at the 
conference because he could not find a parking spot. Therefore he was seated to the right 
of the podium, close to Schabowski (Hertle & Elsner, 1999, p. 40). Displaying a mixture of 
pride and modesty, he believes that he gave history a slight push with his first question 
about the travel law (König, 2009); in a somewhat different version of his narrative, he 
believes to have given history a “cue” (Wirtz, 2009). He tends to simultaneously 
emphasize both the importance of his own question and the larger importance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Riccardo Ehrman was born in 1929 in Florence, where his parents went for their honeymoon from 
Lemberg (Poland) and then decided to stay. This decision saved their lives; all their relatives in Poland 
perished in the Holocaust. After the war, Ehrman studied law and started to work as a print journalist, first in 
Florence, then in Rome. Later he worked as a correspondent for the news agencies AP and ANSA, living in 
Canada, the United States and, from 1976 until 1982, in East Germany. In 1982, ANSA decided to send him 
to New Delhi and then, in 1985, back to East Berlin. According to Ehrman, the country had not changed in 
those three years in between: “I went back to the same apartment, I spoke with the same officials, I saw the 
same police officers, it was the same GDR” (Arntz, 1999).  He has a story on almost each stage of his career, 
which he recycles in interviews. One of his favorite stories is the one in which he met the shah of Persia in 
the 1950s in Rome, who was on escape from Iran. Ehrman himself conveyed the news to him: “Your 
Majesty, you are back in power.” The shah responded, according to Ehrman: “Ehrman makes news happen” 
(Arntz, 1999). Another favorite story is related to his move to India: he had his East German car shipped to 
New Delhi as “souvenir” just to drive around with an East German license plate there (Arntz, 1999). As an 





Schabowski’s answer. He believes his question to a top GDR official was powerful 
because it was so irreverent: 
 One must remember that in a totalitarian regime, accusing the spokesman of the 
 Politbüro, hence the highest authority in power in the country, of having made a 
 mistake was rather unbelievable. In fact, later on Schabowski told me that I had 
 annoyed him intensely (Cesario, 2009). 
 
Ehrman also likes to recall a comment that Willy Brandt made to him later on: “short 
question, enormous impact” (Cesario, 2009). Over the last two decades, Ehrman has been 
trying more and more to shift his legacy from being the person who asked the first 
question, to being the person who understood the answer instantaneously: 
 Should I be remembered, I do not wish to be remembered as the journalist who 
 asked the question, because in such a case, as in all life’s events, it is not the 
 questions that matter but the answers. In this case the answer was phenomenal and 
 changed the world. I would like people to acknowledge that I understood the 
 answer. I understood instantly. Perhaps that is the only credit I believe I am owed 
 (Cesario, 2009). 
 
Emphasizing how quickly he understood the stakes involved, Ehrman frequently 
points out that he, together with a West German diplomat, left the conference hall right 
after Schabowski’s statement, before the conference was over. The West German diplomat 
ran out of the room to inform Chancellor Kohl, while Ehrman informed ANSA. Ehrman 
believes he deserves special credit for decoding the “Communist German” language of the 
scene and immediately offering the ultimate interpretation and phrase: “La caduta del 
Muro di Berlino” [the fall of the Berlin Wall] (Wirtz, 2009, Hertle and Elsner, 1999, p. 
56).  
 Over the last two decades, Ehrman’s account has changed in one key respect. Until 





spontaneous one (Hertle & Elsner, 1999, p. 40; Hertle, 2009, p. 141). Ehrman kept to this 
version even on October 29, 2008, when he was awarded a prestigious German prize for 
his journalistic role in the fall of the Berlin Wall. But in April 2009, annoyed by an article 
in Die Welt that claimed that whatever the Italian journalist had contributed had been by 
chance, Ehrman presented a substantially updated version. According to this new version, 
Ehrman got a “tip” to raise the issue of travel at the press conference – his question, in 
other words, was prompted. The tip came from one of his long-term sources, Günter 
Pötschke, director of the East German press agency ADN. According to Ehrman, Pötschke 
had phoned him right before the press conference, and had urged him to ask a question 
about the freedom to travel (Hertle, 2009, p. 141). Ehrman justified his belated release of 
this information with the journalistic ethic of source protection (Cesario, 2009) – even 
though the director of ADN had died three years before Ehrman’s update.  
 But even the elements of Ehrman’s narrative that have remained constant seem 
somewhat dubious. His argument about his heroic irreverence toward a top GDR official 
clashes with his claim that he had multiple sources within the East German leadership, 
including the former GDR Minister of Culture (Cesario, 2009). While Ehrman believes 
that he was the one to ask the two crucial follow-up questions, about the regulation’s day 
of effect and its application to West Berlin, former Bild Zeitung journalist Peter Brinkmann 
is leading an online campaign on his website to claim these questions as his own.16 As the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Peter Brinkmann, like Riccardo Ehrman, has always been a heroic journalist, according to his personal 
website: “a journalist since 1975 (Welt, Bild, Hamburger Morgenpost, Tango, Berliner Kurier). Television 
moderator since 2001 at TV Berlin. Reporter in various wars. In Baghdad severely injured. Several times in 
Israel and Palestine. Meeting with Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro. The one, only, and last correspondent 






Wall Street Journal summarized the dispute twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall: 
“The world believes Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev or peaceful protests brought 
down the Berlin Wall 20 years ago next month. But for those who had front-row seats, the 
argument boils down to Ehrman vs. Brinkmann” (Walker, 2009).  
 In September 2009, Brinkmann acquired a signed note from Schabowski that was 
meant to end the confusion regarding the ownership of the famous follow-up questions 
once and for all (Brinkmann, 2009). In the note, Schabowski tried to solve the ownership 
question with a soccer metaphor: Ehrman gave the ball the first kick, moving it into the 
area of the goalpost; and then it was Brinkmann who finally scored the goal. “Both deserve 
recognition” – Schabowski concluded, sounding like a good preschool teacher – almost 
twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 The dispute’s intensity and perseverance belie the actual quality of the questions at 
stake. These questions did not require investigative work from the journalists, nor were 
they posed in a uniquely eloquent way. The questions so relentlessly claimed by 
Brinkmann are: “At once? When…?” and two questions about West Berlin: “You only 
said the FRG, is the regulation also valid for West Berlin?” and: “Does this also apply for 
West Berlin? You only mentioned the FRG.” In the context in which they were asked, East 
Berlin in 1989, these questions do not appear innovative; nor are they very stylish. Still, 
due, perhaps, to their immediacy and directness, they have become central to the narrative 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 Actually, Ehrman and Brinkmann are not the only ones claiming credit for the 





for prestige. So how do we interpret Schabowski’s role? Throughout the conference, he 
received multiple questions that constituted appropriate occasions to present the new 
regulation. As the former editor-in-chief of the central party organ Neues Deutschland, 
Schabowski could have stirred up the scene much earlier, had he wanted to.  
 For instance, just before Ehrman asked his question, Schabowski was asked what 
would happen if none of the party’s reform plans succeeded and the refugee wave 
continued. Schabowski went off on a lengthy answer about the importance of trusting 
one’s ability to control the crisis. Why did he not combine this statement of faith with an 
announcement of the travel law? If anything, the new travel law was meant to stem the tide 
of refugees by providing both the possibility of emigration and the possibility of short-term 
travel. From the roadmap Schabowski wrote for himself on a piece of paper right before 
the conference, it is clear that he planned to present the travel law at the end of the 
conference; and no amount of journalistic prompting led him to waver from this original 
plan.  
 Why did Schabowski want to announce the regulation at the end? There are at least 
three possible explanations. First, he may have wanted to do so in order to express that the 
new law was a decision of the Council of Ministers, not of the Politburo (Hertle, 2009, p. 
134). In fact, he marked this information about the law in his notes for the press 
conference.17 Second, if Krenz did indeed suggest to Schabowski that the announcement 
would make world news, Schabowski probably wanted it to be the highlight of the 
conference. From the video recording of the press conference, it would seem that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Schabowski’s note for the conference included: “TIME! Close to the end & end of the discussion, 
reference to MiRa [Council of Ministers] statement [underlined in orig.]. no PB-[politburo]paper. 





Schabowski enjoyed the excitement that was running in the air at the end of the “show”: 
the crowd of journalists surrounding him, the feeling of shaping history, even if in a 
somewhat unprofessional way. Third, although Schabowski denies this, he might perhaps 
have been tipped to single Ehrman out for questions at the end. This surmise is supported 
by the observation that he interrupted the question of another journalist in order to let 
Ehrman speak at the crucial time: seven minutes before the end of the press conference.  
  Perhaps, the discussion about who deserves recognition for the event – Ehrman, 
Brinkmann, or Schabowski – would be a better informed one if we first asked a series of 
questions. First: did Schabowski actually need a specific journalistic question in order to 
start speaking about the new regulation? This is not likely: he could have used almost all 
of the previous questions to move on to the announcement. With a direct request from 
Egon Krenz to announce the regulation, he probably would not have left the topic out of 
the conference regardless. Moreover, as evidenced by his note, he planned to announce the 
regulation at the end of the conference.  
 Was he then pushed by journalists to continue speaking about the regulation? Yes: 
he was pushed by journalists to specify the regulation’s day of effect and its application to 
West Berlin, and to comment on the passport requirement. Without these specific 
questions, presumably he would not have gotten himself into this level of confusion. 
Finally, did journalists need to be on top of their game to ask those questions? Day of 
effect and areas of application – are these not obvious questions to ask about any new 
legislation? They are. But in the written and oral history of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 





3.2 The aftermath of the Schabowski conference: The development of the elevated 
and interpretative language of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
 
 
 After the press conference most journalists remained confused. They stormed the 
podium and tried to extract further information from Schabowski. The most urgent case 
was that of the press agencies: they had to unpack the conference’s meaning within 
minutes. The first two news agency reports, from Reuters at 7:03 p.m. and the West 
German news agency Deutsche Presseagentur (DPA) at 7:04 p.m., featured the somewhat 
confusing formulation that “from now on” any GDR citizen was entitled to leave the 
country “via all border crossing points.”18 While Reuters at least mentioned that the 
appropriate police offices would immediately provide visas for emigration, Deutsche 
Presseagentur omitted any technical details of the border crossing process. These news 
agency reports, while leaving out some important aspects, did not yet provide an elevated 
interpretation of the event.   
 The real push came from the Associated Press (AP). At 7:05 p.m., AP announced 
that “according to information supplied by SED Politburo member Günter Schabowski,” 
the GDR was “opening its borders” (Taylor, 2006, p. 425). The headline read: “GDR 
opens borders” (Hertle, 1999a, p. 15). AP’s announcement moved beyond the realm of 
strict accuracy and interpreted the press conference in an accessible and elevated way. The 
author of the AP announcement, Frieder Reimold of the West Berlin office of AP, was 
very conscious about this interpretational step. After considering the inclusion of passport 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Reuters, 7:03 p.m., November 9, 1989: “Ausreisewillige DDR-Bürger können ab sofort über alle 
Grenzübergänge der DDR in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ausreisen.” DPA, 7:04 p.m., November 9, 
1989: “Von sofort an können DDR-Bürger direkt über alle Grenzstellen zwischen der DDR und der 





and visa requirements into the news agency report, he decided to emphasize the opening of 
the border instead: “It does not matter how many bureaucratic steps they will introduce, 
like permissions from the People’s police or regulations on passports: all that is no longer 
relevant. That is only a technical step: What do they do actually? The most important is 
that: [they] open the wall” (Hertle, 1999b, p. 54-55). 
 It took some time until AP’s imaginative interpretation became prominent in the 
West German television coverage. On the first major West German evening television 
news show after the press conference, Heute [Today], from the state-financed West 
German Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) [Second German Television] at 7:17 p.m., 
news about the press conference was the sixth item, and it did not feature AP’s strong 
words. The news almost did not make it to Heute at all: ZDF reporter Werner Brüssau left 
the Schabowski conference before its crucial final scene, and the chief editor in the 
headquarters in Mainz was uncertain about the meaning of the announcement (Steinmetz, 
2004, p. 473). Reflecting the reigning confusion, at 7:35 p.m. in the evening news show of 
Sender Freies Berlin (SFB) that was the most watched news show in Berlin, West Berlin 
Mayor Walter Momper said that “everything begins tomorrow.” But, contradicting himself 
somewhat, Momper also claimed that this day, November 9, 1989, was the day “we have 
all longed for a long time” (Hertle, 1999b, p. 59).  
 By 7:41 p.m., the West German DPA had turned AP’s hopeful claim (“GDR opens 
borders”) into a matter of fact: “The GDR border to the FRG and to West Berlin is open” 
(Hertle, 1999a, p. 61). At 7:41 p.m., and again at 7:56 p.m., DPA also called Schabowski’s 





the state-financed West German ARD’s19 evening news Tagesschau [Day Show] (Hertle, 
2009, p. 152). Tagesschau opened its bulletin with the news, using a firm headline: “GDR 
opens borders.”  
 ARD’s use of this sensational headline came at the request of Günther von 
Lojewski, who was the newly appointed director of Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), and 
responsible for the state-financed ARD network’s news coverage that evening.20 When 
Lojewski arrived at the studio around 7:45 p.m., he found an excited team of SFB 
journalists, whom he likened to a soccer team mourning a lost game, and promising to win 
the next one (Lojewski, 2000, p. 164; Lojewski, 2009, p. 9). But Lojewski had to provide 
the network of public service broadcasters with extensive footage from Berlin on a night 
when his best political journalists and broadcast technicians were out of the country. 
Chancellor Kohl was on a visit to Poland, and for the first time a team of journalists from 
the special unit of West Berlin had been permitted to accompany the West German 
Chancellor to an East bloc country (Lojewski, 2009, p. 9). Lojewski was proud to have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) 
is the Association of Public Broadcasting Corporations in the Federal Republic of Germany.  
 
20 Born in 1935, Günther von Lojewski, like Ehrman and Brinkmann, belongs to the generation of journalists 
that has formative memories of WWII and an acute understanding of history’s worst excesses. After earning 
a doctorate in sixteenth century Bavarian religious history, he started his career as a print journalist in 1960, 
first at Hannoversche Allgemeine later at Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In 1969 he switched to broadcast 
journalism and became responsible for ZDF’s news coverage. He was at ZDF when the Social-Democrat 
Willy Brandt won the elections on September 26, 1969, after twenty years of Christian-Democratic 
leadership. Lojewski’s colleagues were joyfully dancing on the tables, much to his dissatisfaction. He got in 
especially intense arguments about journalistic objectivity with news anchor Hans Joachim Friedrichs, who, 
as this chapter shows, would also become a key figure in the television coverage of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. In 1977 Lojewski switched to Bayerischer Rundfunk and finally in the summer of 1989 to Sender 
Freies Berlin (Lojewski, 2000).  
Günther von Lojewski faced widespread political resistance when he arrived at SFB. His pro-life advocacy 
and Christian-democratic take on German politics did not please the journalists of SFB. Social Democrat 
West Berlin Mayor Walter Momper and many cultural and political institutions were also dissatisfied with 
his appointment. Only a few months after his disputed appointment, he suddenly found himself in the midst 





live, German-Polish “broadcast bridge” with Warsaw on the chilly night of November 9, 
1989; accidentally, he ended up needing live connection with his very own West Berlin 
instead.  
 The 8 p.m. headline of the popular ARD evening news Tagesschau, “GDR opens 
borders,” was written at the last minute, influenced by the latest news agency reports as 
well as by Lojewski’s own assessment of the event (Lojewski, 2009, p. 9). Tagesschau’s 
headline was firm, even bombastic, but its coverage also conveyed some confusion. The 
related report started by explaining that the topic of the “refugee wave” had come up only 
at the end of Schabowski’s conference. Then, without further interpretative introduction, 
the report showed a one-minute excerpt of the press conference, including the question 
about the regulation’s application to West Berlin. At the end of the excerpt, Tagesschau 
offered an accessible interpretation in a concise, and crucial, sentence: “so overnight even 
the Wall is supposed to become permeable.”21  
 After this defining sentence, the rest of the news broadcast moved on to other 
topics. These included a meeting of the Central Committee about the ongoing crisis; the 
refugee wave through Czechoslovakia; the living standards of the refugees in West 
Germany; and an extensive interview with Chancellor Kohl in Poland. Tagesschau even 
featured detailed coverage on West German pension reforms, new poverty statistics, and 
train ticket price hikes. In its foreign reporting, Tagesschau covered Turkish and Chinese 
politics, a scandal around the diet of cows in the Netherlands and the U.K., and a ship 
collision in Bremenhaven. The Schabowski announcement had been ranked top news, but 
it did not dominate the Tagesschau. At the very end of Tagesschau however, a visibly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





enthusiastic news anchor announced that the late evening news, Tagesthemen at 10:30 
p.m., would provide further reporting on the GDR’s “border opening.” 
 As the 8 p.m. news aired, Lojewski started planning Tagesthemen, which would 
include personal commentary by himself (Lojewski, 2000, p. 166). Despite the promise 
made in Tagesschau’s, the late evening news did not start at 10:30 p.m. This was not 
because of the fall of the Berlin Wall: there was a longer-than-expected VfB Stuttgart-FC 
Bayern München soccer game that needed coverage. Finally, in Tagesthemen aired at 
10:42 p.m. anchorman Hanns Joachim Friedrichs, often referred to as the German Walter 
Cronkite, opened the late evening news with the statement that many Germans recall to 
this day:  
 One should always be careful when it comes to the use of superlatives. They are 
 scuffed very quickly; but tonight we might dare to use one: this November 9 is a 
 historical day. The GDR announced that from now on the borders are open for 
 anyone. The gates of the Wall are wide open (Steinmetz, 2004, p. 475).22  
 
In the hours before Tagesthemen’s belated airing, much had happened at the 
borders – but the gates of the Wall were certainly not “wide open.” Substantial crowds 
began to gather at border crossing points after the 8 p.m. Tagesschau. At this time, the 
GDR border patrols at the border crossing points were without orders from their superiors: 
the Central Committee had a meeting that ran until 8:45 p.m., and its members were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In his last interview in 1995, the cancer-stricken Hanns Joachim Friedrichs mentioned the sentence “the 
gates in the wall are wide open” as the most important sentence of his life. Not an obvious choice from a 
journalist, who was trained in the BBC culture of “to inform and to enlighten.” “Das hab’ ich in meinen fünf 
Jahren bei der BBC in London gelernt: Distanz halten, sich nicht gemein machen mit einer Sache, auch nicht 
mit einer guten (...)” [That’s what I had learned during my five years at the BBC: keeping distance, not 
associating yourself with anything, not even with a good one]. But Friedrich did not see his most important 
sentence and his most important professional ideal in contradiction, not even at his deathbed. ‘“Cool bleiben, 
nicht kalt”: Der Fernsehmoderator Hanns Joachim Friedrichs über sein Journalistenleben.’ Der Spiegel 





unavailable for questions. The patrol guards therefore advised East German citizens to 
leave the border crossing points and wait until the next day.  
 The Bornholmer Strasse border crossing point was the most popular one, due to its 
proximity to the lively artistic neighborhood of Prenzlauer Berg, rich with cafes and 
intellectuals. By 9:20 p.m., around 500 to 1000 East Germans had gathered at this border 
crossing point. At that time, under pressure from the ever-growing crowds and in order to 
“let off steam,” the border guards permitted the “most provocative” citizens to cross the 
border. Many of these early border crossers got a stamp in their passport that stripped them 
of their citizenship. The tactic of letting off steam produced the opposite effect: it provided 
hope that everybody could gain the right to cross.  
 By 11:30 p.m. the border guards could no longer resist the pressure from the 
crowds. The chief officer of passport control at Borhnholmer Strasse announced the 
“opening of the floodgates”: with this decision, the first gate was finally opened. In making 
this radical and independent decision, the chief officer hoped to save the lives of the border 
guards under his command (Hertle, 1999a, p. 16; Hertle, 2009, p. 166). But even this gate 
opening did not yet mean that all gates were “wide open”: the gates opened gradually, one 
after the other.  
 When Hanns Joachim Friedrichs announced around 10:42 p.m. that “the gates of 
the wall are wide open,” he knew that the border at Bornholmer Strasse had already 
become permeable to some East Germans. He had learned this from Günther von 
Lojewski; the two were in continuous phone contact. However, Friedrichs must also have 





Strasse, only a few were permitted to leave the GDR at the time of his announcement. 
However, his announcement envisioned, and very likely influenced, the real opening of the 
border about an hour later.  
 Right after Friedrichs’ emotional introduction, Tagesthemen gave live coverage 
from Berlin. The satellite-broadcast visual scene, provided from the border crossing point 
at Invalidenstrasse, could not have offered a stronger contrast to Friedrichs’ words: the 
imagery featured closed gates, calm border guards, inpatient journalists and not a single 
border crossing. The few East German citizens who showed up at that border crossing 
point were advised by the border guards to wait until tomorrow. None of this prevented 
reporter Robin Lautenbach from announcing, right in front of the much-guarded 
Brandenburg Gate, that the Berlin Wall, a “symbol of German division and the Cold War,” 
was now “merely a monument.” He had no choice of where he made this historic 
announcement: satellite technology at the time did not permit him to move to a more 
appropriate location.  
 After a short item on closed border crossing points, Tagesthemen switched back to 
Lautenbach, who was lucky enough to encounter a few witnesses who had at least seen 
some East Germans crossing the Berlin Wall.23 The visual scene of this interview was 
slightly more hopeful than the first visual impression provided by Tagesthemen had been, 
but it still lacked all the visual markers we now identify with the fall of the Berlin Wall. A 
West German interviewee in blue sweatpants, the ultimate outfit for such a historic 
occasion, reported seeing a crying East German couple cross the border around 21:25 p.m. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Even at this time, around 11 p.m., Lautenbach started the interview with the claim that the situation at the 





at Bornholmer Strasse (figure 10). This couple must have belonged to the few who were 
permitted to leave in order to “let off steam.” But the gates at Bornholmer Strasse still were 
not wide open: they were closed to most East German citizens. At Invalidenstrasse, where 
Lautenbach stood, border guards were still sending everybody back.  
 However, in his reporting Lautenbach named the border crossing points where 
some crossings had already occurred: Wedding, Bornholmer Strasse, Sonnenallee and 
Checkpoint Charlie. He and his interviewees also emphasized that the border crossings 
took place “without any complications.” These two pieces of information, offered in a 
popular evening newscast, must have inspired many more East Germans to test the 
borders. After these interviews, with visible relief at having at last delivered “something” 
to Tagesthemen, Lautenback turned the broadcast back to the studio in Hamburg.   
 Both Friedrichs’ and Lautenbach’s announcements were rhetorically charged, but 
they did not set the tone for the entire Tagesthemen. Tagesthemen was rather a patchwork 
of distinct styles. Occasionally, the elevated tone with regard to the “border opening” made 
way for irony: Tagesthemen mentioned for example that SFB was receiving many phone 
calls from American television channels asking “whether it was true that even the Wall 
was torn down.” SFB reporter Erhard Thomas responded: “it is not that far yet.” The 
Schabowski conference was also covered with some irony: the related reporting included 
the conference’s final question about the future of the Berlin Wall, and the news anchor 





question about the role of this fortified state border of the GDR will become even more 
pressing in the coming days and weeks” [emphasis added].24  
 Tagesthemen also featured modest and cautious tones. Using the Berlin-Warsaw 
broadcast bridge, it aired a recorded interview with Chancellor Kohl that still reflected 
confusion about the Schabowski conference’s possible outcomes. Answering the first 
journalistic question regarding the border opening, Kohl gave an exceptionally careful 
answer: “What grows out from this decision, I do not know.”25 But following the 
interview, a clip covering the Bundestag’s reaction to the news spoke of “a historic 
moment” and “an unbelievable announcement,” and showed the Bundestag’s sudden (and, 
in post-WII Germany, unusual) eruption into singing the national anthem. In the Bundestag 
Green Party Representative Helmut Lippelt even said: “We are joyful and we all welcome 
that the Wall fell.”26 
 After that clip, Tagesthemen moved on to Lojewski’s personal commentary.27 
Lojewski employed the same elevated style as Friedrichs had done in his announcement, 
and started with a sentence that was centered around symbols: “The building ‘GDR’ has 
been dilapidated for a while. Now even walls fall.”28 Lojewski’s commentary was not 
followed by news on Berlin; instead, viewers were offered a detailed report on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In German: “Die Frage nach dem Sinn dieser befestigten Staatsgrenze der DDR wird sich in den nächsten 
Tagen und Wochen noch wohl noch drängend erstellen.” 
 
25 In German: “Was wirklich aus dieser Entscheidung erwachsen wird, weiss ich nicht.” 
	  
26 In German: “Wir freuen uns und begrüssen alle, dass die Mauer gefallen ist.” 
 
27 Lojewski’s commentary became part of Tagesthemen only after he personally convinced the original 
commentator on phone to give up his now comparably insignificant commentary on the European Union. 
 





Nordrhein-Westfalen cultural week in Leipzig, and a lengthy interview with Nordrhein-
Westfalen governor Johannes Rau about his visit to the GDR. At the beginning of the Rau 
interview, which had been recorded two hours before it aired, Friedrichs had formulated 
his line about the gates in the wall in a more careful and open-ended way: “the gates in the 
wall are opening to everyone.” At the same time, Friedrichs also emphasized that the 
events of the day were “German history at first hand.”  
 Tagesthemen did not switch to Berlin after the Rau interview, either. Without any 
images from Berlin, another lengthy interview came from Leipzig, covering the chronic 
lack of physicians in the GDR caused by the emigration wave. Thereafter, the rest of 
Tagesthemen was dedicated to Kohl’s visit to Poland, the Soviet Union’s reaction to East 
German “developments,” shifts in Chinese communist politics, elections in Jordan, a US-
Philippines presidential meeting in Washington, West German pension reforms, the ship 
collision in Bremenhaven, and the recent soccer game. Finally, at the very end, a short 
report provided news from a border crossing point in Niedersachsen. A visibly frustrated 
reporter almost apologized for the fact that border had not yet been stormed. But he did 
interview two East German citizens who had miraculously been let through with only a 
government-issued ID. The reporter emphasized that the border guards were prepared for 
the storming of the border that night. He also suggested that things would most likely not 
kick off until the next day.  
 Tagesthemen’s elevated and interpretative coverage of the historic night of 
November 9, 1989 was incoherent and perhaps even messy. Much of the newscast was not 





pictured open gates, but the actual pictures showed gates that were all but closed. 
Nonetheless, Germans from both sides went to the border crossing points to form ever 
growing crowds. At around 11:30 p.m., Bornholmer Strasse was the first bastion to fall. 
This first victory was followed by victories at other border crossing points, culminating in 
a feast of happiness of historic proportions at the Brandenburg Gate.   
 Media coverage in itself does not make history: the border opening required 
curious and brave citizens, an impotent East German political leadership, and independent 
decisions made by border control guards. Conversation in pubs, on the streets and over the 
phone also inspired people to test the “new” borders. That said, the Western broadcast 
media were without doubt a crucial factor in the unfolding of the fall of the Berlin Wall on 
November 9, 1989.29 The extent of its exact influence is difficult to determine without 
reliable data; but a lack of influence would be even harder to prove. There were more than 
four and a half hours between Schabowski’s live-covered announcement and the opening 
of the very first border crossing point. It is hard to explain this lengthy gap without the 
power of the elevated and interpretative journalistic language that provided inspiration to 
test the borders.  
 There are two popular beliefs about November 9, 1989 in relation to media that I 
have tried to deconstruct in this chapter. The first belief is that the fall of the Berlin Wall 
received immediate and visually spectacular media coverage due to the historic 
significance of the event. As I showed in this chapter, this belief does not represent the 
reality of West German television coverage that night. A few dedicated West German 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 While not covered in this chapter, West German radio coverage and the event’s international media 
coverage also contributed to the event’s relatively quick unfolding. Further research is needed to clarify the 





broadcast journalists produced memorable coverage, often with words rather than images, 
while much of the media content, even in newscasts, was dedicated to other topics.  
 The second belief is that the fall of the Berlin Wall was a spontaneous event – 
covered, but not triggered, by the media. Or more precisely, that the media were a trigger 
only to the extent that journalists’ questions led to the unprepared announcement of the 
new travel law. In this chapter, I have shown that the power of journalistic questioning has 
been overestimated in connection with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and at the expense of the 
power of elevated and interpretative journalistic coverage. As mentioned previously, the 
real storming of the border crossing points did not begin immediately after the live covered 
press conference at which Schabowski, responding to journalists’ repeatedly asked 
questions, “announced” the new travel regulation (Hertle, 2009, p. 282).  
 The media triggering of the fall of the Berlin Wall was not an orchestrated 
journalistic effort. The event’s television coverage was confusing. Dealing with an event 
that was still open-ended, the coverage was sometimes even contradictory. But those who 
listened received something stronger than mere information: a story. This story was 
delivered in a disjointed way, but its foundations were established. During the night of 
November 9, 1989, an elevated and interpretative journalistic language represented and 
made history – not objective and narrowly factual reporting. Bold claims about wide-open 
gates memorably reflected the shape of history to come. In contrast, careful claims, while 







Chapter 4. “Wall and Barbed Wire Do Not Divide Anymore:” Condensation into a 
Simple Phrase, a Short Narrative and a Recognizable Visual Scene 
	  
We also know that collective memories are material. They have 
texture, existing in the world rather than in a person’s head. We 
find memories in objects, narratives about the past, even the 
routines by which we structure our day. No memory is fully 
embodied in any of these cultural forms, but instead bounces to and 
fro among them on its way to gaining meaning. 
 
     Barbie Zelizer, 1998, p. 4. 
 
In this chapter I focus on the third element of the theory of global iconic events: 
condensation. I will show how the complex and confusing developments of November 9, 
1989 were condensed into a simple phrase (“fall of the Berlin Wall”), a short narrative 
(“freedom,” “end of division”) and a recognizable visual scene. I apply a close textual 
analysis to the fall of the Berlin Wall’s coverage on West German television and in the 
pages of its printed press from November 10, 1989 until the official opening of the 
Brandenburg Gate on December 22, 1989. 
 On November 10, 1989, the West German press was still searching for the right 
kind of language for the event of November 9, 1989. Since the event took place so late in 
the night, most newspapers needed a day to find the appropriate words and tone – but no 
more than that. By November 11, West German print and television coverage were 
remarkably similar in terms of their words and their visuals. On November 10, 1989 Die 
Welt chose a careful headline – “The SED Opens Borders to the West: Nobody Will Be 
Prevented from Departure” – and displayed an image of Krenz and Schabowski in front of 
the Central Committee headquarters (figure 11). The next day, by contrast, the newspaper 
used West Berlin Mayor Walter Momper’s quote as headline: “The German People Are the 





the fall of the Berlin Wall (figure 12). Not a single politician made it to the November 11 




Figure 11: “The SED Opens Borders to the West: Nobody Will Be Prevented from 







Figure 12a: “The German People Are the Happiest in the World,” front page of Die Welt, 







Figure 12b: “The German People Are the Happiest in the World,” front page of Die Welt, 






 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) went through a similar shift in language 
between November 10 and November 11, 1989. The headline on November 10, 1989 used 
the factual, objective and “local” formulation: “The GDR Opens Its Borders to the Federal 
Republic” (figure 13). In contrast, on November 11 the FAZ made the elevated, 
interpretative and universal announcement that “Wall and Barbed Wire Do Not Divide 
Anymore” (figure 14). The headline on November 10, 1989 still used the language of the 
early news agency announcements and tied the event to its local context (“GDR,” “Federal 
Republic.”) On November 11, 1989, the headline used a strongly elevated language, 
speaking about the universal human experience of division. The emotional claim that “wall 
and barbed wire do not divide anymore” presented the event as an international event of 
freedom, the meaning and resonance of which carried well beyond the borders of Berlin.30 
 On November 10, 1989, the front page of Süddeutsche Zeitung did not have any 
information on the historic occasion at all. On November 11, however, the newspaper led 
with strong symbolic language and imagery. Above the headline “The GDR Cracks the 
Wall,” Süddeutsche Zeitung printed a photograph of the Berlin Wall conquered by a 
jubilent crowd (figure 15). The subtitle read: “The Wall no longer divides: Berliners from 
both sides celebrated until early Friday in front of the Brandenburg Gate.” The front page 
also printed Willy Brandt’s commentary in bold: “Berlin will live and the Wall will fall.” 
Again, the language emphasized the universal experience of overcoming physical division.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














 The tabloid Bild Zeitung, with its general sympathy for bold claims and bombastic 
headlines, was quicker to find its elevated pitch. Already on November 10, 1989, it simply 
announced: “Done! The Wall Is Open” (figure 16). The front page did not feature any 
distinctive imagery that day, but by November 11, 1989 Bild had also settled on the image 
of the Brandenburg Gate as the central symbolic scene of the event (figure 17).   
 On November 10, 1989, West German newspapers did not praise, or even allude to, 
the power of the elevated and interpretative language provided by West German television. 
Journalists were only praised for their assertive questions at the press conference. The 
Berliner Morgenpost, for example, wrote that “it was three minutes before the planned end 
of the conference, when Schabowski – in response to a journalist’s question – almost 
casually announced the sensation: the GDR opens the borders for its citizens to the West” 
(Waltert, 1989a, p. 2). The fact that West German television may have played a role in 
inspiring people to test the new travel law was mentioned nowhere either. Even a day later, 
the same Berliner Morgenpost reporter still believed that the West German television 
coverage had only helped to make Berlin “a topic in the world” – its potential role in 
precipitating the Berlin Wall’s fall was not mentioned in his article (Waltert, 1989b, p. 2). 
 Overcoming their original slowness and incoherence, West German television 
channels provided frequent live coverage in special editions on November 10, 1989. The 
Tagesschau, which had been a patchwork of distinct styles on November 9, found its voice 
by November 10, 1989. “Open borders,” its yellow caption declared – and the smiling 
news anchor announced the latest developments in front of an image of the “feast” at 





short-term visits and the permanent emigrations that had been taking place since the 
borders had opened. However, it lacked any reporting on the exact unfolding of the event 
just a day before.  
 The event appeared as a sudden, miraculous eruption – heroic, and in no way 
media-triggered. The coverage told a story of ever-increasing numbers of citizens 
succeeding in crossing the border in the evening, first with state-issued identification in 
hand, later without any documentation at all. The coverage focused on citizens and their 
hugs, smiles and tears. Politicians were given attention only in so far as they commented 
on the event that had already unfolded. For instance, Walter Momper’s claim about the 
German people being the happiest in the world was presented as central – it was in fact 
aired twice. In contrast, his prediction, made a day before, that “everything would begin 
tomorrow,” had already faded from memory. On November 10, 1989, in front of a 
cheering crowd, Willy Brandt – who, as mayor of West Berlin in 1961 embodied all the 
memories of the Berlin Wall – declared his belief that “separation through barbed wire and 
a death strip were against the stream of history.” He did not detail exactly how “the stream 
of history” had decided the battle a day before. 
 The elevated language included universal and simple symbols of oppression. All 
the awkwardness, confusion and open-endedness of the day before vanished from the 
coverage. Accident, misunderstanding and “failure” did not fit the grand narrative – and 
were omitted. Nor was the event placed in context; it appeared in isolation, not as one 
moment in an ongoing reform process. Tagesschau did not explain that East Germany had 





particular piece of legislature fitted into to larger East German plans for renewal.31 Facts, 
processes, and contradictions were put aside to highlight the historic “event.”32  
 Tagesthemen adopted the same vocabulary. It focused on interviews with visitors to 
West Berlin. The word of the day was “Wahnsinn!” [Awesome!], which was repeated in 
almost every interview. Tagesthemen showed crowds celebrating the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, and hitting the walls with their hammers. The event was presented as an event of 
“the people” overcoming a boundary that had separated them for almost three decades.  
 The background image for news anchor Hanns Joachim Friedrichs showed crowds 
standing on and surrounding the Berlin Wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate (figure 18). 
Tagesthemen did also report that East German border troops had restored the order on the 
east side of Brandenburg Gate by the morning of November 10, 1989. While crowds were 
still celebrating on the west side, on the east side friendly but firm border guards reminded 
everyone on the limitations of the newly won freedom to travel. ZDF’s evening news 
show, Heute, also used the Brandenburg Gate as a key visual marker. News anchor Volker 
Jelaffle spoke in front of an image of the Brandenburg Gate, occupied by a euphoric crowd 
(figure 19). 
 The Brandenburg Gate became the central image of the event with remarkable 
speed: its role was established within one short day. The rapidity of this visual 
condensation is made even more stunning by the fact that the Brandenburg Gate was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Tagesschau covered the reform decisions of the SED’s Central Committee entirely separately from the 
coverage of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In this separate section, a short excerpt from an Egon Krenz address 
highlighted that the “new travel regulation” was part of a larger East German reform package.  
 
32 The only exception was President Richard von Weizsäcker’s appeal for “prudence and a feeling of 
responsibility.” He reminded both sides of the need for a step-by-step process to freedom. However, 
Weizsäcker also employed some of the symbolic language in his commentary, when he said  that “freedom 





deeply contradictory symbol. On the one hand, the imagery of crowds occupying the 
Brandenburg Gate area on the night of November 9, 1989 provided the fall of the Berlin 
Wall with a uniquely memorable visual scene. On the other hand, the Brandenburg Gate, 
unlike other points at which people were crossing the border, remained closed after that 
exceptional, uncontrolled night of November 9, 1989. If anything, the Brandenburg Gate 
was a symbol of contrasts, or even an inaccurate symbol: open in imagination and imagery, 
but still (or again) closed in reality.  
  While the Brandenburg Gate served as a central symbol for abstract concepts like 
“division” and  “freedom,” the coverage also focused on more materialistic aspects of the 
event. Both television and print news highlighted that most visits to West Berlin were 
short-term visits with a commercial component. East Germans received 100 DM 
Begrüssungsgeld [welcoming money], to be picked up at visitor centers and at designated 
banks. After they picked up this modest sum, their first trips were often to the consumer 
area of Kurfürstendamm (Ku’damm), where they admired the variety of goods and 
purchased the small souvenirs they were able to afford. While coverage about the 
Brandenburg Gate area centered on the common, celebratory experience of both East and 
West Germans, the reporting on these brief shopping trips indicated difference – both 
between communism and capitalism and between East and West Germans.  
 Two symbolic objects embodied the message of the “fall of communism” more 
than any other: the “capitalist” banana and the “communist” Trabant, nicknamed “Trabi.” 
(Stein, 1996). The objects, very different in nature to begin with, stood for a balanced 





Western abundance; the car Trabi, with its basic design and long waiting lists, represented 
the state-controlled economy and limited access to goods (figures 20-21). West German 
newspapers were deeply ironic about the Trabi, Bild especially. As a Bild journalist noted 
only two days after the fall of the Berlin Wall: “it is the bitter irony of fate, that this 
caricature of a car (…) over night became the symbol of freedom – in the West” (figure 
22). 
 
          
Figure 22: “The mule says to the Trabi: if you are a car, I am a horse,” Thomas Mauz, 
Bild, November 11, 1989, p. 8. 
 
 But even stories on the visits to the shopping district sometimes captured 
something that went beyond economic issues. For instance, four days after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall Bild reported on the arrival of the “Open Wall Baby.” The East German baby 
had been born unexpectedly under a maple tree in West Berlin, after her unassuming 





 The Brandenburg Gate and Ku’damm became the symbolic places of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, representing two key components of the event’s message: “end of German 
division” and “universal defeat of the economic order of communism.” However, the two 
were in immediate contradiction: the common joy of having overcome the tight control at 
the Brandenburg Gate for a miraculous night was not followed by a similarly common 
experience at Ku’damm. Here, economic difference structured the experience, thus 
revealing a stronger division between East and West than any physical wall could provide. 
West German newspapers often published this contrasting imagery on a single page. For 
instance, Bild on November 15, 1989 juxtaposed a photograph of the impromptu 
performance of cellist Mstislav Rostropovich at the Berlin Wall with an article about East 
Germans who stood in long lines for the 100 DM welcoming money (figure 24).  
 After ten enthusiastic days, around November 19, 1989 the West German press 
coverage started to focus on “normalization”: on how life would return to some degree of 
normality. The journalistic language returned to its regular objective and factual style – to 
the sphere, in fact, of “legitimate controversy.” Frequently discussed topics included the 
problem of parking thousands of East German cars in West Berlin; potential ways to 
control the black market; and negotiations between East and West German politicians. 
However, use of the elevated and interpretative language persisted in connection with one 
topic: the awaited opening of the Brandenburg Gate.  
 The problem inherent in having the closed Brandenburg Gate as a symbol of 
openness was particularly clear to journalists. Hundreds of international journalists camped 





Their camping in the area was also inspired by the ultimate fear of every journalist: “what 
if they open the Brandenburg Gate without me?” This fear was probably enhanced by the 
frustrating experience of having missed the announcement of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
This time, journalists desired a media event in the traditional sense: a preplanned, well-
designed funeral for the Berlin Wall.  
 Journalists pushed for the opening of the Brandenburg Gate not just by being 
physically present in the area, but also by printing large headlines and powerful imagery 
from the fall of the Berlin Wall onward (figures 25-31). They frequently reported about 
themselves. On November 17, 1989, for instance, the West German tabloid Bild reported 
that 700 international journalists were camping in the Brandenburg Gate area despite 
severe weather conditions. The tabloid interviewed multiple American journalists about 
their experience of “waiting” (figure 27). Interviews with international journalists were 
also a frequent item in West German television news. On November 15, 1989, the late 
evening news Tagesthemen even made the ironic comment that these days, journalists 









Figure 25b: “Berlin Revives: The Entire City Awaits – When Does the Gate Open?” 






 Finally, after almost six weeks of waiting, on December 22, 1989 the Brandenburg 
Gate was opened. It was a media event in the traditional sense, co-organized by East and 
West Germany, providing the international media with plenty of opportunities for reverent 
narration (figures 32-33). Ironically, today it is the confusing and accidental fall of the 
Berlin Wall that is remembered as the symbolic closure of the social trauma of the Berlin 
Wall – much more so than its well-organized international funeral.  
 
 
Figure 32: “Berlin’s Nicest Gift. The Brandenburg Gate on the East Side Just Before 3PM 
Yesterday Afternoon: Thousands Awaited the Moment of Opening,” Berliner Morgenpost, 








Figure 33: “The Brandenburg Gate is Open. Entire Berlin Celebrates. Kohl: We Want 
Peace, We Want Freedom. Modrow Also Commemorates the Victims of the Wall,” front 





 While the Brandenburg Gate served as the symbolic place, and the banana and the 
Trabant as symbolic objects, Willy Brandt was a symbolic figure in media representations 
– embodying, as he did, the entire history of the Berlin Wall. His symbolic power was 
enhanced by a visit from Senator Ted Kennedy, evoking the famous imagery of President 




Figure 34: “Kennedy with Brandt in Berlin,” front page of Berliner Morgenpost, 
November 29, 1989 
 
 
 Gradually, the fall of the Berlin Wall began to stand for the potential fall of the 





instance, the GDR (DDR) is only one piece of the Wall, while the falling Berlin Wall 




Figure 35: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 18, 1989, p. 2. 
 
 In sum, the confusing and contradictory developments of November 9, 1989 were 
condensed with breathtaking speed into a simple phrase (“fall of the Berlin Wall”), a short 
narrative (“freedom,” “end of division”) and a recognizable visual scene (celebratory 
crowds at the Brandenburg Gate, at other areas of the Berlin Wall, and in various parts of 





and initial awkwardness. The potential influence of West German television coverage was 
pushed to the background in order to highlight the power of ordinary citizens. The East 
German leadership’s several months of work on the new travel legislation did not become 
a core element of the story. The fall of the Berlin Wall was elevated above its local 
contextual details, thus becoming universally accessible. The event’s simplified package of 





Chapter 5. Passport, Visa, and Stamp: 
The East German Story of November 9, 1989 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the fourth element of the concept of global iconic events: 
“counter-narration: alternative stories of the event.” Here I ask whether the story of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall could have been told in a distinctly different way. In particular, I 
examine the narrative that the East German political leadership constructed for the border 
opening between the accidental day of November 9, 1989 (fall of the Berlin Wall) and the 
ceremonial day of December 22, 1989 (opening of the Brandenburg Gate).  
 In theory, if we do not take the political and economic weakness of the regime into 
account, the East German leadership had a choice between counter-narration and under-
narration. In the case of the fall of the Berlin Wall, counter-narration would have involved 
crafting a powerful counter-story that deconstructed the Western elevated and 
interpretative story of the fall of the Berlin Wall. This counter-story would have 
constrained the event’s Western condensation into a simple phrase, a short narrative and a 
recognizable scene. And ultimately, it would have prevented the original tale of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall from traveling through time, space, and media.  
 The other, somewhat less ambitious option was what I call under-narration: telling 
a story about the “ordinary” rather than the “exceptional.” As Daniel Dayan’s and Elihu 
Katz’s Media Events described this narrative strategy – albeit without naming it:  
 The same public event may be treated as a media event by networks or channels 
 in one country and as news by those of other countries. The same public occasion 
 is thus submitted to two different textual treatments, an ordinary treatment (news) 
 and an extraordinary one (media event). Opting for the news treatment flatly 
 rejects the event’s aim of being experienced as an occasion. News broadcasts 





 spectators any possibility of “flowing with” the event (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 
 114). 
 
 In this chapter I argue that the East German media adopted the strategy of under-
narration and did not even attempt to spread a counter-narrative. The narrative constructed 
by East German media presented November 9, 1989 as merely one administrative moment 
that belonged to a long process of deliberate political reform. In doing this, East Germany 
abandoned the anti-fascist narrative that would have focused on the dangers of nationalism 
and reunification in the German context. Instead of trying to revitalize the mythical 
narrative of the Anti-Fascist Protection Barrier, East German media employed a generally 
factual and objective reporting style – which proved, in the battle with the elevated and 
interpretative Western narrative, to be the weaker one. In some ways, the weakness of the 
narrative reflected the weakness of the narrator. In order to examine and prove these claims 
I will present a detailed analysis of the development of the narrative of the simple “news 
event” in Aktuelle Kamera, the foremost East German evening television news show, and 
in two particularly influential East German dailies, Neues Deutschland and Berliner 
Zeitung, between November 9 and December 22, 1989.  
 On November 9, 1989, Günter Pötschke, director of the East German news agency 
ADN, followed the Schabowski conference on television. His first reaction: “I thought I 
[did] not hear and see well!” (Hertle, 2009, p. 149) Before he could initiate a call, Pötschke 
received a call from the government’s spokesman, who was equally stunned – and together 
they decided to repeal the original day and time at which the new travel regulation was 
supposed to go into effect (Hertle & Elsner, 1999, p. 53). At 7:04 p.m., only four minutes 





clients that was not meant to be publicized until the next day. This way, instead of 
correcting Schabowski’s mistake, the East German media ended up communicating the 
regulation’s immediate effect (Hertle, 2009).  
 East Germany’s most important evening news show, Aktuelle Kamera, began thirty 
minutes after the Schabowski conference, at 7:30 p.m. It opened with the news that a party 
conference was to be held in December. The item titled “Travels: new regulations of the 
Council of Ministers” came in second; it mainly involved the news anchor reading a 
lengthy excerpt from the new travel regulation that was full of obscure legal language. The 
related clip from the Schabowski conference did not focus on travel regulations, but 
featured Schabowski’s monotone analysis of the new election laws instead. Then the news 
anchor quickly moved on to the next news item. At the very end of that evening’s show, 
well into the 28th minute, Aktuelle Kamera finally returned to the topic of the new travel 
regulation, showing a lengthy excerpt of the Schabowski conference. It aired the last 
question that had been asked at the international press conference: “Mr. Schabowski, what 
is going to happen to the Berlin Wall now?” It also showed Schabowski’s answer:  
What will happen to the Berlin Wall? Information has already been provided in 
connection with travel activities. (um) The issue of travel, (um) the ability to cross 
the Wall from our side, ... hasn’t been answered yet and exclusively the question in 
the sense..., so this, I’ll put it this way, fortified state border of the GDR.... (um) 
We have always said that there have to be several other factors (um) taken into 
consideration. And they deal with the complex of questions that Comrade Krenz, in 
his talk in the—addressed in view of the relations between the GDR and the FRG, 
in ditto light of the (um) necessity of continuing the process of assuring peace with 
new initiatives. 
And (um) surely the debate about these questions (um) will be positively 
influenced if the FRG and NATO also agree to and implement disarmament 
measures in a similar manner to that of the GDR and other socialist countries. 






After this excerpt, viewers were left without any additional commentary on the “fortified 
state border of the GDR;” Aktuelle Kamera turned to the weather forecast, and then ended, 
as usual, at 8 p.m.  
 Between its 7:04 p.m. press release on November 9, 1989 and 2:06 a.m. on 
November 10, 1989, the East German news agency ADN remained silent (Hertle, 2009). 
The reason was that, due to ongoing meetings, ADN did not receive any guidance or 
directions from the political leadership until 10 p.m. – at which point it was advised to 
remain silent so as to avoid adding fuel to the fire (Hertle, 2009, p. 150). Because of this, 
the state-controlled East German media was in no position to delimit or counter the 
unfolding Western elevated and interpretative story of the “event.”  
 ADN broke its silence only once, at 10:55 p.m., with an announcement that detailed 
the offices to which citizens needed to turn for visas. Over the course of the night, East 
German broadcast media were not able to present their audiences with anything other than 
the earlier, strictly factual ADN announcement and this short supplement (Hertle, 2009, p. 
286). These pieces of factual information were so short, however, and they came so late in 
the game, that they were too weak to battle the already pretty strong story told by Western 
media. 
 The day after, on November 10, 1989, Aktuelle Kamera opened with the news that 
“tens of thousands [had] used the new travel regulations,” showing lines of Trabis at 
border crossing points. The headline displayed on the background to the news anchor read 
“Neue Reiseregelung” [“new travel regulation”] (figure 36). This time the evening news 





logistical details of the new regulation. Video excerpts showed the organized and friendly 
work that border guards at various border crossing points were doing. One excerpt even 
featured East German travelers who were handing out flowers to border guards, as a sign 
of their appreciation. Through brief interviews with travelers, the show emphasized that 
East Germans were paying short visits to West Berlin, quickly returning to their home 
country afterwards. It also presented international reactions to the “the new travel 
regulation,” including a comment by the West German President (figure 37). Toward the 
end of the newscast, the anchor returned to the “news of the day,” namely “new travel 
regulations”; the related report covered the situation at offices responsible for visas.  
 Finally, at the very end of Aktuelle Kamera, an excerpt showed crowds that had 
gathered at the Brandenburg Gate around 2 p.m. that day – young people, mostly, who 
were engaged in “a diverse dialogue” with the border guards. This friendly dialogue was 
the main focus of the report. Another news item, presented by the same anchor but 
recorded at 6 p.m., showed West German youth at the Brandenburg Gate. The reporter 
discussed the crowd’s alcohol consumption, and the demolition of the wall with hammers. 
During those four hours between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m., the reporter’s tone and attitude had 
shifted radically: the more recent scene was no longer framed as a dialogue. But a direct 
condemnation of the crowd could have been controversial, and the report tried to be 
balanced, not really opting for either positive or negative coverage. Besides these careful 
closing reports, the Berlin Wall did not come up once throughout the entire evening news 
show.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 After Aktuelle Kamera, a special program was inserted, starting at 8 p.m. that was meant to provide 





 The coverage of the news event in the central party daily Neues Deutschland can be 
summarized in a few short paragraphs as well. On November 10, 1989, the day after the 
news event, Neues Deutschland framed the story as being about “new travel regulations.” 
Its front page included only a short excerpt from the new travel law, under the title “GDR 
government spokesman about the new travel regulations” (figure 38). The excerpt was 
introduced by a single sentence that held that, according to the government’s spokesman, 
the regulation would go into effect immediately, and remains in effect until an appropriate 
travel law was passed.    
A day later, on November 11, 1989 – when compelling photographs would have 
been widely available – Neues Deutschland published only the transcript of the television 
announcement of the Interior Minister on its front page. The related photograph, showing a 
Trabi crossing the border, was captioned “Much traffic at border crossing points.” Inside 
the newspaper, related articles described the quick and “non-bureaucratic” process of 
acquiring visas.  
  On Monday November 13, after a Sunday break, Neues Deutschland published an 
article on its front page with the title “Hundreds of thousands used the new travel 
regulation of the GDR.” The attached photograph showed a meeting between the mayors 
of East and West Berlin. After four days then, not a single characteristic photograph of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall had made it to the front page of East Germany’s most important 
party daily. On November 14, 1989, only a tiny front page article referred to the historic 
event, under the title “Almost a million GDR citizens traveled to the FRG.” On November 





 The East German daily Berliner Zeitung’s coverage was similarly minimalistic. On 
November 10, 1989, the newspaper’s front page did not feature a single article referring to 
the “event.” A day later, Berliner Zeitung covered the border opening under the title 
“hundreds of thousands of GDR citizens went sightseeing in West Berlin.” The subtitles 
read “memorable day – most come back – trust grows again” (figure 39). The newspaper’s 
related articles focused on the shortness and bureaucratic ease of the visits. One of the 
articles gave the following concise summary of the “news event:” “since late Thursday 
evening GDR citizens can cross the border to West Berlin with an un-bureaucratically 







Figure 39: “Hunderttausende DDR-Bürger schauten sich West Berlin an” [“Hundred thousands of 







 On November 13, 1989, a Berliner Zeitung cover article titled “Demolishing the 
Wall in Berlin?” expressed the concern that West German neo-Nazis had gone on a 
rampage at the Brandenburg Gate. On November 15, the front page carried an article titled 
“Six million visas issued since November 9, 1989.” By November 16, 1989, one day later 
than in Neues Deutschland, the story of the “new travel regulation” had disappeared 
completely from the front page of Berliner Zeitung.  
 The story of the new travel regulation had a lifecycle of only a week in East 
German media, but it was revived somewhat around the time of the Brandenburg Gate’s 
official opening. Here, for the first time, East German journalists started to use an elevated 
and interpretative language in connection with the border opening, similar to that of their 
West German colleagues. East German journalists also began to employ the same visual 
vocabulary as the West, and published multiple images of the Brandenburg Gate and of 
celebratory crowds surrounding it. The headlines expressed enthusiasm, elevation, and 
emotion – all the while emphasizing that this well-planned “event” had been co-produced 






Figure 40: “The Brandenburg Gate is open – symbol of deep changes in the center of Europe. 
It got so far on Friday evening. The Brandenburg Gate will be freed for visitor traffic. Hans 
Modrow, Helmut Kohl, Erhard Krack and Walter Momper together carry out this act,” front page 






  From the East German perspective, November 9, 1989 had marked only the 
introduction of new travel regulations: a non-event that had been misrepresented as an 
“event” in the West. By contrast, the opening of the Brandenburg Gate on December 22, 
1989 was accepted and presented as an “event” on both sides. Somehow, though, this well-
organized and universally accepted ceremonial media event never embedded itself in 
international memory. Perhaps in a way it was too organized, or too official: it certainly 
lacked any sense of surprise or magic. It had been arranged by political actors, and 
therefore could not possibly be framed as a success story of individual or collective 
courage. Moreover, the event did not offer any new visual markers; it only reinforced the 
already existing symbolic power of the Brandenburg Gate. These reasons may explain 
why, in the end, the accidental day of November 9, 1989 has come to overshadow the 
perfectly planned day of December 22, 1989.  
 Thus the East German television and printed press framed November 9, 1989 as but 
one moment in a complex, deliberate, and continuous reform process. Instead of an event, 
a standalone item, the “new travel regulation” was presented as part of a chain of 
occurrences. This representation was no less accurate than the Western coverage; it may in 
fact have been more accurate. The East German coverage did not strip the border opening 
from its larger social, political and cultural context. Instead, the coverage kept the border 
opening embedded in a broader web of social actions and circumstances. 
 There were also similarities between East and West in their representation of 
November 9, 1989. For different reasons, both East and West German media chose not to 





component of their narratives. The West German media probably did so for narrative 
reasons – to turn the day into a coherent event. Their East German counterparts employed 
the same strategy for political reasons – in their journalistic practice, a new travel 
regulation’s immediate effect simply could not have been framed as the outcome of a 
Politburo member’s simple mistake.  
 Beyond these similarities, the most important difference between the Western and 
Eastern narrative was memorability. The objective and narrowly factual East German 
coverage of the new travel regulations offered little substance for social remembrance. 
(The East German media’s practice of under-narration also provided less material for 
analysis for event researchers – hence the relative brevity of this chapter.)  In contrast, the 
Western narrative, with its condensed story of a simple phrase (fall of the Berlin Wall), 
short narrative (freedom, end of division) and recognizable visual scene (crowds around 
the Berlin Wall and the Brandenburg Gate) represented a universal social meaning that has 






Chapter 6. The Berlin Twitter Wall: 
How the Story of the Fall of the Berlin Wall Travels Through Time, Space, and 
Media 
	  
So if the nation is the basis for authentic feelings and collective memory 
– as the critics of global culture seem almost unanimous in maintaining 
– then it cannot be maintained that representations are a superficial 
substitute for authentic experience. The nation was literally 
inconceivable without an imagined community. On the contrary, 
representations are the basis of that authenticity. And there is nothing 
inconceivable, theoretically and empirically, about them providing such 
a basis on a global level.  
 
Levy & Sznaider, 2002, pp. 90-91 
 
 
Almost a quarter of a century has passed since November 9, 1989. East Germany and the 
Soviet Union have disappeared from the world map, contemporary societies are grappling 
with new global conflicts, and the Berlin Wall exists only in our memories. This chapter is 
dedicated to the question of how powerful news stories can survive while almost 
everything around them changes radically. Focusing on the story of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, this chapter examines how the name, narrative and visual scene of a global iconic 
event travel through time, space and media, providing a social myth for the global civil 
society in ever-shifting social, political, and cultural settings. 
 Present-day visitors to Berlin often go for a walk on Potsdamer Platz. The history 
of the square functions as a quick summary of Berlin’s history of hope and tragedy: once a 
vibrant, modern town square, it suddenly found itself flat and empty after WWII 
bombardments, only to be cut in two by the Berlin Wall. Immediately after the German 
reunification, it was first a void and then a site for experimentation by global investors and 





commercial center with its history hiding in plain sight. Below Potsdamer Platz, the visitor 
finds Legoland Discovery Centre Berlin. Legoland Berlin offers all the regular features of 
a children’s amusement park. In addition, however, in devotes one room to the history of 
Berlin through a display of miniatures of famous landmarks of the city. One of these 
landmarks is the fall of the Berlin Wall (figures 42-43). 
 The Lego scene consists of one single wall and a crowd of tiny figures with 
hammers in hand. The crowd is diverse; women and men, blond and dark-haired, dressed 
in various styles. In the background we see the Brandenburg Gate. The figures are 
shouting, “Die Mauer muss weg” [the Wall must go!] – and they are waiting for a miracle 
to happen. When the visitor pushes a button, the Berlin Wall, this singular wall dividing a 
nation, simply falls. As it falls, Baywatch star David Hasselhoff begins to sing:  
  I've been looking for freedom 
  I've been looking so long 
  I've been looking for freedom 









Figure 42: “Mauerfall” [“Fall of the Berlin Wall”] in Legoland Discovery Centre Berlin  
 
 
Figure 43: Close-up of the “Fall of the Berlin Wall” in Legoland Discovery Centre Berlin. 






 The scene includes everything that makes the fall of the Berlin Wall such a 
memorable event for a global audience. There is a wall that separates a community. The 
scene shows courage and strength on the part of the crowds. It also displays a sudden, 
split-second moment in which everything changes, followed by euphoria. The figures are 
too tiny for individual features; they are “the” people. It is obvious who their enemy is:  
“the” wall. Politicians, dealmakers and other confusing types are simply absent. Only the 
Brandenburg Gate lets you know that this is Berlin; apart from that, the scene could be 
taking place anywhere, and anytime, in the world.  
 The Lego miniature displays the three elements of the “package” that make the fall 
of the Berlin Wall a global iconic event. The simple phrase “fall of the Berlin Wall” is the 
title of the scene. The short narrative of freedom is expressed both by the Hasselhoff song 
and the graffiti on the wall. The Lego landmark reproduces the recognizable visual scene 
of the event: the Berlin Wall, the crowds, and the Brandenburg Gate. The only thing that is 
missing from this spectacularly spot-on summary of the event’s elevated and interpretative 
story is the Trabi – and that is but a minor detail. The scene is simple and universal as 
opposed to complex and local. Even – or perhaps especially – without prior knowledge of 
the Berlin Wall’s multifaceted history and East Germany’s troubled year of 1989, the 
“global” visitor can immediately grasp the excitement of overcoming separation. Looking 
at the Lego “Fall of the Berlin Wall,” what we see is a strong effort of promotion, a visible 
act of social remembrance, and a reciprocal interest from the visitors – who even stand in 





 The Lego “Fall of the Berlin Wall,” while seemingly a toy, a “banal 
commemoration” (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2011), is in fact an essential representation of the 
global memory of the event. It conveys both the event’s meaning and appearance. And 
although this one is particularly powerful, it is but one example of how the universal myth 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall has managed to overcome the barriers of time, space, and 
media. In this chapter I will examine four distinct ways in which the event travels globally: 
through recycling, reenactment, possession, and memorialization. I will illustrate each 
form of “travel” with characteristic examples.    
 
5.1 Recycling: The Fall of the Berlin Wall as Analogy 
Recycling happens when the phrase, narrative and visual scene of the event are recalled, 
either separately or together, in connection with seemingly similar events. On the occasion 
of the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German state-funded non-
profit Kulturprojekte Berlin GmBH initiated “The Berlin Twitter Wall,” a project that ran 
from October 20 until November 15, 2009 (figure 44). The project addressed users of 
micro-blogging service Twitter with the following request: “[s]hare your thoughts on the 
fall of the Berlin Wall now or let us know which walls still have to come down to make 
our world a better place.” 
 Let’s consider, for a moment, the language of the announcement. It did not say: 
“Join us in celebration of this pivotal event of contemporary German history!” Instead, the 
announcement made the event as universal as possible. The project employed the simple 





condemning all of the world’s walls (“let us know which walls still have to come down to 
make our world a better place”). The announcement opened the space up for abstraction, 
but Twitter users pushed the universalization of the fall of the Berlin Wall even further. 
The Berlin Twitter Wall quickly became a surface of protest against all sorts of walls – 
physical as well as virtual, and from Mexico to Palestine to India. 
 
 
  Figure 44: Online monument for the “Berlin Twitter Wall” (2009) 
 
 According to the organizers, the project reached 1.4 million users. Of the 
approximately 7500 tweets, a stunning 40 percent were written in Chinese, 31 in English, 
and only 13 percent in German (Detjen, 2011, p. 548). The first tweet in Chinese arrived 





China. This first tweet was followed by a flood of similar requests. One tweet even alluded 
to the famous 1987 Berlin speech by Ronald Reagan: “Mr. Hu Jintao, please tear down this 
Great Firewall.” The popularity of the Berlin Twitter Wall as a public sphere in which to 
advocate freedom of expression triggered China to block its website after only three days. 
Chinese users were still able to tweet, but fellow Chinese users were unable to read their 
tweets – which gave the anniversary project an ironic contemporary political twist.   
 Of course, not all the tweets concerned the Great Firewall of China. Some tweets 
recalled the event’s short narrative of freedom: “Free Facebook, free Google, free my life!” 
Others transported the message of freedom to seemingly distinct areas and topics of social 
life, like education – “Für bessere Bildungschancen! Die Herkunft darf nicht über die 
Zukunft entscheiden!” [“For better chances in education! Social background must not 
determine one’s future”] – or climate change: “Still many walls left to be torn down! E.g. 
some companies’ ignorance regard. climate change & social misconduct.” 
 Twitter users also recycled famous sentences from the history of the Berlin Wall: 
“No one has the intention of constructing a Twitterwall,” one tweet went, echoing the 
words of Walter Ulbricht. Some users recalled the moment when they first heard about the 
Berlin Wall’s fall: “I remember watching Tom Brokaw choke up as students brought down 
the wall and thinking there would be no nuclear war in my lifetime.” Others placed this 
memory in a larger media context: “I was 9yo when the Berlin Wall fell. Also the same 
time I got my first short wave radio. The World got large quick.” 
 The story of the Berlin Twitter Wall is more than the story of an ephemeral, online 





gets stripped off and elevated above its local context. This project shows how the fall of 
the Berlin Wall can become a reference point in radically different contexts. Through 
recycling, the event’s phrase, narrative and visual image enter distinct hubs of the “global.”  
 
5.2 Reenactment: Demolishing Walls From Los Angeles to Qalandiya to Berlin 
 When we commemorate the fall of the Berlin Wall, we recall the destruction of an 
object; in doing so, we aim to commemorate both the object and its fall. This is an inherent 
paradox of the memory of the fall of the Berlin Wall; one way of overcoming it is by 
rebuilding parts of the Berlin Wall that we can, again, tear down. 
 In 2009, the Wende Museum, a small private museum in Los Angeles, decided that 
L.A. was in need of a Berlin Wall. More precisely, it decided that Berlin’s sister city 
needed both a Berlin Wall and a demolished Berlin Wall. The Wende Museum grew out of 
the private collection of modern history scholar Justinian Jampol, and is dedicated to the 
preservation and display of Cold War material culture from Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. The museum’s website defines the Wende Museum through its distance from 
Berlin: 
 The Museum’s location in Los Angeles provides independence and critical 
 distance from current political debates in Europe, and also facilitates the 
 questioning of preconceived ideas about our past and present. Moreover, the 
 Museum’s physical remoteness from Central and Eastern Europe has enabled it to 
 attract significant artifacts and collections that might otherwise have been 
 destroyed as a result of emotional and political reactions (Wende Museum, 2013). 
 
 With its substantial geographical distance from the event’s “place of origin,” then, 
the Wende Museum seems like an authentic site at which to shape the global memory of 





Wende Museum in fact launched a large-scale, multi-faceted media and public art initiative 
called “The Wall Project.” Note the title: this was not “The Berlin Wall Project.” Wende 
Museum founder Jampol was consciously encouraging the story of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall to travel through time, space and media:  
 So when we started The Wall Project then we said, listen, this is going to be a 
 project that is not a commemoration or a memorial, but engages Los Angeles, and 
 is about trying to visualize what it would be like if L.A. would be divided  between 
 East and West (The Wall Project Documentary, 2009). 
 
 “The Wall Project” consisted of two parts: the “Wall Along Wilshire” involved 
transporting segments of the original Berlin Wall to L.A., creating “the longest stretch of 
the Berlin Wall in the world outside of Berlin” (Wiener, 2012, p. 27). The second part, 
“The Wall Across Wilshire,” was a short, three-hour event, in which a 60-feet separation 
barrier was erected and then ritually demolished by a cheerful crowd (figure 45). The 
related art project asked renowned “wall-artists,” like Shepard Fairey and Thierry Noir, to 
paint the two walls. While Fairey’s painting drew parallels between the Berlin Wall and 
Israel’s West bank separation barrier, Thierry Noir’s artwork made an analogy between the 
United States-Mexico separation barrier and the Berlin Wall. The Wende Museum’s 
project thus framed the anniversary celebration of the fall of the Berlin Wall as a 
celebration of the event’s universal social meaning. The Wall Project centered on the 







Figure 45: “Berlin/L.A. Wall, 2009” (Wende Museum) 
  
 Like Los Angeles, Berlin also celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall by rebuilding and then demolishing the Berlin Wall. Here, approximately one 
thousand oversized dominos covered a route a mile in length, from the Reichstagufer, 
through the Brandenburg Gate, to Postdamer Platz. Most of the dominos had been 
decorated by those belonging to generations born after 1989, including children from five 
hundred school classes. As part of the “Mauerreise – the wall in the world” project, the 
Goethe Institute also sent several dominos out to be decorated by students, intellectuals 
and artists from around the world. In a series of events called 
“MUR|MURS|MAUER|ECHO,” organized by the Institut Français, German and French 





signifying the newly found political harmony between Germany and France. With 
approximately 15,000 contributors, this megaproject of nation branding (Dinnie, 2008) was 
meant to provide the most spectacular commemoration of the fall of the Berlin Wall thus 
far. The domino project culminated in a gigantic Festival of Freedom on the evening of 
November 9, 2009 – the exact twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 
event’s packed schedule offered a variety of attractions, including, at the end, the fall of the 
domino wall (figure 46):  
 
Program of the Festival of Freedom 
7:00 p.m. Concert of the Berlin State's Orchestra under the direction of Daniel 
Barenboim (music from Wagner, Schoenberg, Beethoven, and Goldmann) 
7:30 p.m. International politicians and former GDR civil right activists walk 
through the Brandenburg Gate and give speeches 
7:45 - 8:30 p.m. 
o The first domino falls 
o Performance of Jon Bon Jovi at the Brandenburg Gate 
o Interview with Michael Gorbatschow and former German foreign minister 
Hans Dietrich Genscher  







Figure 46: “Mauerfall” [“Fall of the Wall”] (Peter Punzel, 2009) 
 
 While Los Angeles and Berlin first needed to build separation barriers in order to 
reenact the fall of the Berlin Wall, other places in the world have more recent separation 
barriers that people sometimes try to tear down performatively. Israel’s separation barrier 
on the West Bank provides an especially rich case study in this respect. Graffiti on the 
separation barrier directly recalls the Berlin Wall (figure 47). Anti-separation barrier 
protesters also tend to perform some of the recognizable visual scenes (figure 48). On the 
twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, around 150 Palestinian activists and 
foreign supporters pulled down segments of the Israeli separation barrier near the 
Qalandiya refugee camp, outside Ramallah. They also stood on the top of the “wall,” thus 





direct link between the Berlin Wall and Israel’s barrier: “Today is the 20th anniversary of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and marks the first day of a week of resistance to the apartheid 
wall in Palestine and around the globe” (Palestine Telegraph, November 24, 2009). 
Connecting the story of the anti-immigration wall of East Germany to that of the anti-
terrorism wall of Israel, protesters blocked out substantial contextual differences and 




Figure 47: “On the road to Bethlehem, a very symbolic tag on the wall made on the Palestinian 






 Figure 48: “Palestinians Mark the Fall of the Berlin Wall by Taking Down the Wall on 
 Their Land.” (International Solidarity Movement, 2009) 
 
 
 Unlike Israel, most places have only a small piece of a separation barrier that can 
serve as a site for reenactment. Even Berlin has only a few segments of the Berlin Wall 
available for performing the event. In 2009, the Westin Grand Berlin, a hotel in the heart of 
the German capital, offered a “Fall of the Berlin Wall” package that included participating 
in the demolishing of an original segment of the Berlin Wall (figure 49). The package 
consisted of two nights in the hotel, breakfast, and a hammer and chisel to chip out a piece 
of souvenir. The package also included a map of the Berlin Wall, a Berlin curried sausage, 
and a glass of champagne. In a country so dedicated to the preservation of cultural 
heritage, and so exceptionally sensitive about historical memory, tourists paying a mere 
200 euros were invited to destroy a key historical object – and to toast the destruction with 





social myth, the 1989 visual scenes of destruction and “freedom” repeatedly triumph over 




 Figure 49: Original segment of the Berlin Wall in front of Westin Grand Berlin; the sign 
 warns that “damages to the wall are not permitted.” (Julia Sonnevend, May 2012) 
 
  However, the need for a wall is also a limitation for frequent social performances. 
Absent a wall or a wall segment, reenacting the event is challenging. Therefore, key 
touristic sites in Berlin are marked by confusion about how to recall and sell Berlin’s 
recent past. This confusion is particularly visible in front of the Brandenburg Gate, where, 
as a tourist attraction, performers are dressed like Lenin, Darth Vader and Soviet soldier, 







 Figure 50: Street performer dressed as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in front of the Brandenburg 
 Gate in Berlin. (Julia Sonnevend, June 2012) 
 
5.3 Possession: Touching the Berlin Wall  
 In addition to recycling and reenacting the fall of the Berlin Wall, possessing a 
piece or a segment of the Berlin Wall is also a common way in which people 
commemorate both the Berlin Wall and its fall. Small pieces of the Berlin Wall are 
available for purchase in most souvenir stores in Berlin, and they are popular items in 
many international, online stores. Pieces of the Berlin Wall often come with a certificate 





famous lines from the wall’s history, like Honecker’s one-liner from January 1989: “[t]he 
wall will remain for another hundred years” (figure 51).  
 
 
Figure 51: Berlin Wall segment with Honecker quote as souvenir (Julia Sonnevend, May 2012)  
 
 The fall of the Berlin Wall is also commemorated on postcards that have included a 
piece of the Berlin Wall in some characteristic image from the Wall’s history (figures 52-
53). The piece of rock, often claimed to be authentic, indirectly refers to the historic day of 
November 9, 1989. These postcards also suggest that the Berlin Wall’s distinctive imagery 





present, as symbolized by the piece of the wall – but the event does not constitute the 
central visual scene of the postcard. 
 
 






Figure 53: Condensation in souvenir stores: the Brandenburg Gate, the Trabi, and the 
Berlin Wall as one colorful souvenir. (Julia Sonnevend, May 2012) 
 
 Large segments of the Berlin Wall can be found all over the world, from Belgium 
to South Africa to Singapore. They find homes in commercial centers, embassies, 
museums, parks, parliaments and schools. Often displayed in publicly accessible places 
without surveillance, these powerful mementos are at the mercy of visitors, whose attitudes 
towards them vary. Sometimes the segments are subject to further destruction, or to artistic 
acts of reinterpretation. For instance, after falling prey to souvenir hunters, two segments 





completely red by an anonymous artist. As a consequence, on the fifteenth anniversary of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall the segments were moved to a safer location. The segments are 
owned by the Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats, a long-term coalition partner of the 
post-communist Hungarian Socialist Party; the red paint may have been in reference to 
this fact, although the exact motives remain unknown (figure 54). This case highlights the 
clash between the desire to preserve the Berlin Wall and the wish to playfully remember 
the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
 
 
Figure 54: Repainted Berlin Wall segments in the Maltese Charity Service’s garden in Budapest, 
Hungary. The Service gave shelter to thousands of East Germans in 1989. One of the refugees left 







5.5 Memorialization: Anniversary Journalism, Memorials, and Exhibitions 
Finally, the fourth way in which an event can travel globally is through memorialization: 
the event’s direct commemoration in anniversary journalism, memorials and exhibitions. 
While it is relatively easy to marginalize the context of the event during practices of 
recycling, reenacting and possessing, with direct commemoration such universalization is 
more challenging. Direct commemorative practices often have to deal with hard facts, 
strong personal memories, and actual places – all of which can get in the way of playful 
mythmaking. This clash, between simplified global memory and contested local memory, 
is visible in the German print and television coverage of the event as it evolved over time. 
 German newspapers gave only limited coverage to the first anniversary of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall; it came just after the spectacular coverage of the German reunification. 
At this first anniversary, German media also struggled with the weight of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall relative to that of the anti-Semitic pogrom of Kristallnacht [Crystal night] in 
1938. Both events took place on November 9, but their remembrance required distinctively 
different journalistic tones. Moreover, November 9 also marked the proclamation of the 
German Republic in 1918, and the defeat of Hitler’s first coup in 1932. The coincidence of 
these dates was repeatedly recognized by German media in their coverage of the first 
anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The competition among these multiple historic 
events actually prevented the fall of the Berlin Wall from becoming a national holiday in 
Germany. Instead, October 3 was named the new national holiday, “The Day of German 





 The competing force from the other events had become less substantial by the 
tenth, and certainly by the twentieth anniversary. Meanwhile, the remembrance of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall grew substantially in size. This growth is visible even in the amount of 
front page space dedicated to the event’s commemoration – see, for example, the Berliner 









Figure 55: “Heute vor einem Jahr: Das Ende der Mauer” [“Today a year ago: The end of the 






Figure 56: “Berlin feiert den Jahrestag des Mauerfalls” [“Berlin celebrates the anniversary of the 









Figure 57: “Revolution für die Freiheit” [“Revolution for freedom”], front page of Berliner 









 In addition to journalistic commemoration, exhibitions and memorials try to 
summarize the story of the event in a concise way for international and local audiences as 
well. These memorials confront one of the city’s central paradoxes: “[Berlin] became a top 
tourist destination the very moment it tore down its most famous landmark” (Knischewski 
& Spittler, 2006, p. 293). When establishing sites of memory (Nora, 1989), historians, 
archivists, curators and museum directors, among others, often find themselves confronted 
with the power of “place” as it blocks practices of universalization. As Andreas Huyssen 
described the space of Berlin after reunification:  
When the Wall came down, Berlin added another chapter to its narrative of voids,  a 
chapter that brought back shadows of the past and spooky revenants. For a couple 
of years, this very center of Berlin, the threshold between the Eastern and  the 
Western parts of the city, was a seventeen-acre wasteland that extended from the 
Brandenburg Gate down to Potsdamer and Leipziger Platz, a wide stretch of dirt, 
grass, and remnants of former pavement under a big sky that seemed even  bigger 
given the absence of any high-rise skyline so characteristic of this city (Huyssen, 
2003, pp. 55-56). 
 
 Every attempt to give shape to this void inevitably ran up against the strong 
personal memories of those who had experienced the Berlin Wall as a massive border 
separation barrier, not only as an abstract, universal symbol. The clash between the need to 
construct an official cultural memory and the need to maintain personal communicative 
memories (Assmann, 2011) was, and still is, acutely visible in the newly established Berlin 
Wall Memorial. The memorial makes explicit the broad range of tensions, frustrations and 
beauties faced by a new site of memory in a historically “loaded” place.  
 The Berlin Wall Memorial is situated on Bernauer Strasse, a street on which some 
of the most tragic Berlin Wall photographs were taken in the early sixties. The photographs 





weddings of their children; and the digging of elaborate tunnels of hope below the Berlin 
border control regime. This historically charged location is the locus for the Berlin Wall 
Memorial that was, eventually, extended along almost a mile of the original Berlin Wall 
border strip. The memorial’s construction began on the eighth anniversary of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, November 9, 1997; its first part was opened on the thirty-seventh anniversary 
of the construction of the Berlin Wall, August 13, 1998. Since 2003, the Berlin Wall 
Memorial also features a viewing platform, from which visitors can observe a long stretch 
of border installations (figure 58). Each and every element of the memorial is the outcome 
of an exceptionally heated debate. 
 
 
Figure 58: Viewing platform at the Berlin Wall Memorial overlooking a reconstructed “death 





 When it comes to the complexities involved in establishing a memorial for the 
Berlin Wall, German historian Helmut Trotnow has offered what may well be the most 
concise summary: 
The German Historical Museum had simply proposed preserving a section of the 
Wall along Bernauer Strasse. The initial chaotic demolitions of the Wall, 
however, proceeded so rapidly that officials responsible for the protection of 
historic monuments could not keep pace. Whenever a section of the Wall along 
the street was supposed to be placed under protection, it had already been torn 
down before the resolution could be passed (Trotnow, 1999, p. 11). 
 
 The debate also produced unexpected alliances and conflicts, bringing together and 
dividing communities and individuals. While confusing and seemingly endless, the debate 
revolved around a clear core conflict: one group of individuals and communities wanted to 
demolish the wall once and for all, while the other desired its historical preservation for 
social remembrance. The strongest anti-Berlin Wall voice came from the nearby 
Evangelical Sophien Parish, demanding that its cemetery ground, which ran alongside the 
wall, be returned. In a seemingly random move, the Sophien Parish even removed 32 
segments of the Berlin Wall in order to protect the WWII mass graves that purportedly lay 
below it – excavation revealed no graves (figure 59). The parish’s random actions led 
many to switch sides, and ultimately support the establishment of a Berlin Wall Memorial. 
 In contrast to the Sophien Parish’s position, another nearby parish, the Evangelical 
Reconciliation Parish, unexpectedly became one of the most dedicated advocates for Berlin 
Wall preservation. Their stand is particularly stunning in light of the fact that the parish’s 
church, which was on the “death strip,” had been blown up by the GDR as recently as 
1985: the images of the church tower in collapse had traveled around the world, causing 





strongest supporters of Berlin Wall preservation – he even personally stood in front of the 




Figure 59: Original segments of the Berlin Wall at the Berlin Wall Memorial, moved by pastor 
Hildebrandt of the Sophien Parish in his hunt for imaginary mass graves of WWII bombing 
victims. (Julia Sonnevend, May 2012) 
 
 
 If public memorials are the outcomes of heated debates, private memorials can 
often be arbitrary, or even strange. The most characteristic example is the activity of the 
huge Axel Springer media company in Berlin. Axel Springer, the company’s founder, had 
been a dedicated champion of reunification throughout Germany’s division; in 1959 he 
even commissioned an exceptionally tall golden headquarters for his publishing house 





of the Free West. His top floor office overlooked the “death strip.” Decades after 
Springer’s death, Axel Springer AG, which controls newspapers, magazines, online 
publications, and broadcast stations in 36 countries, remains invested in the 
memorialization of the fall of the Berlin Wall. While it has the financial means to fund new 
memorials, it does not necessarily have the expertise to make delicate decisions about 




Figure 60: A sculpture titled “Fathers of Unity,” representing Bush, Kohl and Gorbachev in front 
of the Axel Springer AG’s headquarters in Berlin-Kreuzberg. A work of French sculptor Serge 








Figure 61: “Balancing act” by Stephan Balkenhol (2009) commemorates the 50th anniversary of 
the laying of the foundation stone of the Axel Springer building (photo: Julia Sonnevend, May 
2012). The sculpture is framed by original pieces of the Berlin Wall. In the aesthetic interpretation 
of Dr. Mathias Döpfner, the Chief Executive of Axel Springer AG, “[t]he balancing man on the 
wall is on the one hand a sign of triumph over this architectural structure of division; climbing the 
Wall was deadly in the days of the shoot-to-kill order. At the same time the sculpture reminds us 
that dealing responsibly with freedom gained remains something invisible, varying – a balancing 
act” (Axel Springer, 2009). 
 
 
 In sum, although the story of the fall of the Berlin Wall is a remarkably successful 
traveler through time, space, and media, some conditions, especially local ones, may still 
block its universalization. These conditions include personal memories; individual and 
group frustrations; private property issues; ideological contestations; competing historical 
events; and conflicting commercial interests, among others. Through practices of 
recycling, reenactment, possession and memorialization, the event’s simplified and 





However, these practices inevitably disappoint many of those who experienced the process 
of political transition, rather than the “event,” in all of its confusing, contradictory, and 





Figure 62: Playing soccer on the Berlin Wall Memorial’s “death strip” (Julia Sonnevend, May 
2012) 
 
 To conclude: in this first part of the dissertation I have analyzed the process in 
which the fall of the Berlin Wall gradually became a global iconic event. Through an 
elevated and interpretative language, the story of the event was turned from something 





condensed into a short phrase, a simple narrative, and a recognizable visual scene, 
functions as a social myth for the global civil society. Finally, this simple and universal 
story is made to travel through time, space, and media through the practices of recycling, 
reenactment, possession and memorialization. 

























DECONSTRUCTING GLOBAL ICONIC EVENTS: 





Introduction to Part II 
 
This second part of the dissertation is meant as a playful intellectual excursion. In a loose, 
essayistic, and unsystematic way it invites the reader to think about the question of why, 
sometimes, the iconization of events fails. The 1956 Hungarian revolution is a uniquely 
suitable case study to contemplate this question: the event received extensive, and 
distinctively different, media interpretations in the West and “at home” during the Cold 
War. Its extensive international and local journalistic coverage provides us with plenty of 
material to analyze; it also makes it impossible to claim that the forgetting of the event in 
the international context was due to a lack of early media attention. 
Unfortunately (or fortunately), history does not provide social science with perfect 
comparative cases. Historic events happen at particular moments of time and in specific 
political, social and cultural settings. As such, they introduce more “factors” than any 
social scientist can ever take into account. While both my case studies come from the Cold 
War context, thus controlling for some variables, the 1956 Hungarian revolution still 
cannot be compared to the fall of the Berlin Wall in a controlled, social scientific 
laboratory. Moreover, in this particular comparative case, the textual analysis is about 
tracking “failure” rather than success. Locating absence is a tricky business: perhaps 
studies of failure are bound to fail themselves. Nevertheless, a consideration of the 1956 
Hungarian revolution’s narration in the United States and in Hungary may offer the 





 While the fall of the Berlin Wall is memorialized as the final, decisive tear in the 
Iron Curtain, the Hungarian revolution is often remembered as the first. A detailed 
description of what took place during those thirteen turbulent revolutionary days in 
Hungary is beyond the scope of this dissertation; but the short historical narratives that 
follow will point out some nodes of events, leaving the rest to the imagination of the 
reader. The revolution, from October 23, 1956 until November 4, 1956, was a nationwide 
protest against the Soviet-imposed policies of the People’s Republic of Hungary. It started 
as a student demonstration to express solidarity with the Polish democratic reform process, 
but within a few hours the demonstration had turned into violent protests against the State 
Security Police, and, later, against the arriving Soviet troops.  
 With the party’s hope that he would pacify the situation, the reformist Imre Nagy 
became prime minister. On October 28, 1956, the Nagy government reevaluated the 
protests, describing them as a broad, national democratic movement. A swift process of 
democratization culminated in the declaration of the reestablishment of Hungary’s multi-
party system on October 30. On November 1, feeling the threat of a Soviet intervention, 
Nagy declared Hungarian neutrality, announced his intention to withdraw from the 
Warsaw Pact, and appealed to the United Nations for help. On the same day, János Kádár, 
the Minister of State of the Nagy government, secretly went to the Soviet Embassy and 
flew to Moscow: there, he learned about the inevitable Soviet intervention and agreed to 
lead a new regime that would enjoy the support of the Soviet Union and the satellite 
countries (Békés et al., 2002; Rainer, 2009; Szakolczai, 2001).  





invaded Hungary on November 4. That same day, Kádár announced the formation of the 
Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, and declared the need to 
put “an end to the excesses of the counter-revolutionary elements” (Hitchcock, 2004, p. 
211; Békés et al., 2002). The armed resistance of the revolutionaries lasted until November 
10.    
Both locally and abroad, the 1956 Hungarian revolution gave rise to anti-
communist hopes, but these hopes were short-lived. After the revolution was crushed, two 
hundred thousand out of almost ten million Hungarians fled the country; many became 
international advocates for the respectful memory of the revolution. While the revolution 
enjoyed an appreciative interpretation in the West, within Hungarian borders a different 
understanding of the event was constructed.  
 I will examine the contrasting narrations of this potential global iconic event of the 
Cold War in the American and Hungarian press, guided by the theory of global iconic 
events. Since I am analyzing a case of failed iconization, the theory’s elements will appear 
in a different order this time. First, I will look at the event’s narrative prerequisites in the 
American context. Second, I will show how Time magazine attempted to condense the 
event’s story into a simple phrase (“Hungarian Freedom Fighter”), a short narrative of 
heroism and freedom, and a recognizable visual scene. In particular, I will offer a close 
textual analysis of Time magazine’s January 7, 1957 “Man of the Year” (MOY) issue that 
announced the Hungarian Freedom Fighter as Man of the Year. With knowledge about the 
condensation of the event, I will go back in time, and consider the elevated and 





Fighter in Time, Life, Newsweek and the New York Times (NYT) from the beginning of the 
revolution (October 23, 1956) until Time’s MOY issue (January 7, 1957) in order to track 
the development of the symbolic figure. Fourth, I consider the conditions that prevented 
the event’s story from traveling through time, space, and media. Finally, the last chapter 
will address the ways in which the local communist press represented the  
“counterrevolution,” as the regime called it, while trying to counter-narrate the Western 
story of the event. The 1956 Hungarian revolution’s strong local counter-narrative will be 
discussed in a detailed chapter of its own, one that follows after, and is put in contrast with, 







 Chapter 7. Narrative Prerequisites of the Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the first element of the theory of global iconic events – to the 
“narrative prerequisites” of the story of the 1956 Hungarian revolution in the American 
press. Despite the complexities of geographical and cultural distance, the American media 
gave extensive and overtly sympathetic coverage to the Hungarian revolution (Glant, 2007; 
Wagner, 1967). In a recent reflection on the revolution, Oxford historian Timothy Garton 
Ash wrote that the revolution’s simplest and most direct legacy was 
the sympathy and positive feeling toward Hungary on the part of people in the 
 world who either hardly noticed its existence before or had a rather negative 
 image of the country, seeing it as an oppressor of minorities before 1914 or 
 Germany’s ally in two world wars (Garton Ash, 2002, p. XXIII). 
 
Only two months after the 1956 Hungarian revolution, Time magazine even chose the 
symbolic revolutionary figure of the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” as its Man of the Year. 
Amid the general American sympathy towards this potential global iconic event, Time’s 
choice of an imagined, idealized figure of the fight for freedom – rather than a particular 
individual, place or object – is not surprising given the circumstances.  
The event was distant and opaque. The revolution took place in a city outside the 
American popular imagination of Europe. Budapest did not have buildings, monuments, 
squares or other spaces that were recognizable to the American audience. Garton Ash’s 
assessment of what people might have known about the country’s history was probably an 
optimistic one, given the distant American context and the media-landscape of the time, 





obscure Hungarian language made an emotional and intellectual connection with the 
revolution particularly challenging, and while the opposition between Soviets and 
Hungarians could be framed neatly as a power struggle, something more was needed for 
narration. 
 The reformist Hungarian leader Imre Nagy made an unlikely protagonist: American 
publications had trouble finding him a place in the narrative. In the eyes of the American 
press and beyond, Nagy presented an incomprehensible ideological mixture – he was, as 
the title of a New York Times profile put it, “A Strange Communist” (NYT, October 25, 
1956, p. 8). The article made it explicit that Nagy did not neatly fit into categories: 
 Walking down the streets of Moscow he looked like a prosperous Hungarian 
 peasant dressed in his Sunday best clothes on his way to church, rather than what 
 he was: the Hungarian Communist party’s farm expert on his way to his job as a 
 specialist at the Soviet Agrarian Institute (“A Strange Communist: Imre Nagy,”
 NYT 25 October 1956, p. 8). 
 
An unambiguous narrative required, or would at least greatly benefit from, a flawless 
symbolic figure; someone who could, in simple terms and broad strokes, represent the 
idealized, heroic fight for freedom. The abstract hero of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter 
does not fit in easily with a concept of news that also includes knowledge production, 
information sharing and objectivity; he is more like the protagonist of an epic tale, or the 
superhero in a comic book. Still, the symbolic figure of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter 
was meant to encapsulate the complex and contradictory event called the “1956 Hungarian 
revolution.”  
In Time’s elevated and interpretative presentation, the Hungarian Freedom Fighter 





could never exist in real life. He was young and courageous, and he fought for a cause that 
many had come to deem impossible. The Hungarian Freedom Fighter did not disrupt peace 
on American streets; he waged his bloody struggle in a conveniently far away place. The 
figure represented a heroic, spontaneous rebellion for freedom from an apparently 
permanent tyranny. The Hungarian Freedom Fighter was also a symbol of the Western 
hope that the “captive nations” behind the Iron Curtain would, over time, come to hear and 
follow the messages from the outside world. Both the Hungarian Freedom Fighter and his 
enemy, the Soviet tank, remained abstractions, hiding complex questions regarding the 
revolution – and, through that, enabling unconditional sympathy towards the 
revolutionaries.  
 Before closely examining the Hungarian Freedom Fighter, I will first address some 
further narrative prerequisites of its construction as symbolic carrier of the 1956 Hungarian 
revolution. To do so, I will offer a sketch of Time founder Henry Luce in the nineteen-
fifties to highlight how Luce’s political beliefs helped shape the contours of this figure.  
 
Further Narrative Prerequisites: The Fight for “Freedom and Order” and the 
Revolution That Was Meant for Henry Luce 
 
 
 Henry Luce’s Americanism, Presbyterianism, and Republicanism all explain why 
he saw in the Hungarian revolution a chance to construct a global iconic event. The 
founder of Time magazine, Luce did not merely hope his country would send “freedom and 
order” to all parts of the world; he deemed a moral imperative. “The American mission in 





Founding Fathers put it, Freedom under Law,” Luce summarized his views in an address in 
1952 (Neils, 1990, p. 268). The Hungarian revolution seemed to prove that the exportation 
of ideologies was indeed possible. The fact that a revolution against the Soviet Union was 
taking place in a predominantly Christian country spoke to the heart of many practicing 
Christians, including Luce’s. And, to a devoted Republican, the Hungarian revolution 
signaled the success of the foreign policy of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was 
passionately supported by Time, even against Luce’s friend from Yale, Senator Robert 
Taft.  
 If such political and religious beliefs seem somewhat obvious as explanations, 
other sides of Luce and of the magazine’s traditions deserve consideration as well. When it 
came to historic events, Luce had always been interested in how “big men” shaped history 
and contributed to grand historical narratives. He was especially fascinated by the struggle 
between “good” and “evil,” as David Halberstam summarized Luce’s take on the defining 
conflict of the age: 
 The Soviet Union was not just a bad society but an evil one. (…) The 
 Communists represented what he hated most. They were godless, they did not 
 value human freedom as he defined it. It was not a dislike, it was a genuine hatred 
 and it profoundly affected his magazines; his feeling took him beyond journalism 
 to the edge of crusade (Halberstam, 2000, p. 76).   
 
 The definition and meaning of freedom were central for Luce: on various levels, 
the question dominated many of his speeches, letters and memos to his staff. In a flood of 
memos sent to his magazines’ employees in 1954, Luce made it clear where he felt the 
magazines and his country needed to stand in terms of the value of freedom. He advocated 





governments of free people, for free people, by free people everywhere” (Brinkley, 2011, 
p. 375).  
 This desire to fight for freedom in what Luce called “the climactic crisis of the 20th 
Century” (Brinkley, 2011, p. 375) came together nicely with Time co-founder Briton 
Hadden’s ideas about what good journalism looked like: colorful, direct, driven by epic 
characters, and battle-ready. Though Hadden had died in 1929, the style he invented had 
remained with the magazine. In developing what came to be known as “Timestyle,” 
Hadden looked for the Homeric epic tale in every journalistic piece. He kept a copy of the 
Iliad on his desk: “Under no circumstances is it to be removed from the Editorial Rooms,” 
its bookplate declared (Wilner, 2006, p. 132). Hadden especially admired Homer’s colorful 
expressions, compound adjectives, epithets, backward syntax and battle sentences. His 
admiration did not stop at Homer’s stylistic features; he also believed the narrative 
structure of epic tales to be exemplary for news articles. Hadden believed that news articles 
which began with a package of facts destroyed news’ natural narrative; his preferred style 
followed the plot line of tension, crisis and resolution (Wilner, 2006).    
 Time’s staff writers were urged to look for “the details buried deep within that 
symbolized the story” (Wilner, 2006, p. 138). When, for instance, Winston Churchill lost a 
close election, Time summarized the event in a symbolic moment: Churchill’s cigar 
dropping from his mouth and falling to the floor. When Lenin died, Time, in its coverage 
of the Russians’ mourning ceremonies, reported on an air that was so cold that frozen 
sparrows fell dead from the trees (Wilner, 2006, pp. 138-139). If the magazine became 





focus on the personalities behind the news – and on the grand and ongoing epic tale of 
history (Angeletti & Oliva, 2010).  
 The Hungarian Freedom Fighter embodied Luce’s crusade against communism, his 
relentless interventionist efforts, and his fascination with the universal. The Hungarian 
Freedom Fighter was also a Hadden-style Homeric heroic protagonist, whose fight against 
evil invited colorful expressions and the much-desired narrative structure of tension, crisis 
and resolution. In order to be the symbolic condensation of a global iconic event, the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighter needed to become a hero. The figure had to rise from the 
particular to the universal. He had to become simple and universally accessible. The 





Chapter 8. The “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” as Man of the Year: Condensation 
into a Simple Phrase, a Short Narrative and a Recognizable Visual Scene 
 
 The Man of the Year had many faces, but he was not faceless; he had many names, but he 
 was not nameless. History would know him by the face, intense, relentless, desperate and 
 determined, that he had worn on the evening of Oct. 23 in the streets of Budapest; history 
 would know him by the name he had chosen for himself during his dauntless contest with 
 Soviet tanks: the Hungarian Freedom Fighter. 
 
      Time, Man of the Year issue, January 7, 1957 
 
 
From the narrative prerequisites of the 1956 Hungarian revolution and its symbolic figure, 
I now move on to the next element of the concept of global iconic events: the “event’s 
condensation into a short phrase, simple narrative and a recognizable visual scene.” In 
particular, I will offer a close textual analysis of the formation of the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighter as a symbolic carrier of the 1956 Hungarian revolution in Time’s Man of the Year 
(MOY) issue. 
 The Time reader did not even have to open the MOY issue in order to learn of a 
few essential characteristics of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter: they were right there on 
the cover (figure 63). In the center of the cover image, drawn in a style reminiscent of 
socialist realism, was a young man, looking desperate and somewhat tired, eyes filled with 
hope despite an utterly hopeless fight, small rifle in injured hands. In the background stood 
a woman and a young boy, guns in hands; behind them, somebody was waving the 
revolutionary flag. The three freedom fighters stood on a street of Budapest, as a few 





Freedom Fighter had was his determination and the support of fellow Hungarian 
revolutionaries – no real local resources or international military support.  
 Time’s 94-page issue included only five pages on the MOY, illustrated with three 
photographs. The section on the Hungarian Freedom Fighter was followed by three pages 
of photographs of other influential figures of 1956: Dwight Eisenhower and Richard 
Nixon; Nikita Khrushchev (who would become MOY the following year); UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser; Poland’s 
cardinal Vyszynski; the Parisian novelist Francoise Sagan; Elvis Presley; Martin Luther 
King; Dr. Jonas E. Salk with his polio vaccine; the Olympic star Bobby Morrow; and 
author George Bernard Shaw.  
 With such strong competition, the choice for the Hungarian Freedom Fighter as 
MOY needed some explanation. That explanation was much shorter and less 
comprehensive than what we have come to expect from Time, but it managed to draw the 
contours of an idealized foreign revolutionary, and it persistently used the name 
“Hungarian Freedom Fighter” to describe that figure. Time magazine focused on six 
characteristics of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters: their surprisingly sudden appearance on 
the stage of world history; their youth; their spontaneity in actions; the revolutionary 
traditions of Hungary, from which the Hungarian Freedom Fighter’s behavior sprang; their 
class diversity; and their courage to fight against the overwhelming power of Soviet tanks. 
I will discuss each of these characteristics, to show the textual and visual language that 





 The first paragraph of the MOY section introduced the Hungarian Freedom Fighter 
as a surprise guest in world history: 
 The world entered 1956 with a full complement of great men: national leaders, 
 statesmen, philosophers, artists and scientists, many of whom, pursuing their 
 legitimate vocations, would be remembered among the great names of the epoch. 
 But the man who put his stamp on this particular year – the Man of the Year – 
 was not on the roster of the world’s great when the year began. Nor could have 
 anyone guessed his identity, even when the year had run four-fifths of its course. 
 Yet by year’s end, this man was seen to have shaken history’s greatest despotism 
 to its foundations (“Man of the Year,” Time, January 7, 1957, p. 18). 
 
In contrast to the established celebrities who could have become MOY, the Hungarian 
Freedom Fighter made a sudden appearance in the practice of history making. Not only 
was he an uninvited guest; he was also surprisingly young, and as such he was perceived as 
disrupting to the more established political voices (figure 64). To the contemporary reader, 
children with guns might evoke negative associations with “child soldiers” – a label that 
the Hungarian communist press would attach to the revolt later on in an effort to denounce 
it; but in Time magazine, the revolutionaries’ young age was cast in a sympathetic light. 
Their youth proved the “purity” of the revolution, and it had further advantages: 
“Destroyed also was the 1984 fantasy that a whole generation could be taught to believe 
that wrong was right, or could be emptied of all integrity and curiosity” (p. 18). 
 The MOY issue emphasized and praised the fact that the revolution had been 
spontaneous and unplanned, led by a common, grassroots impulse rather than strong 
leadership: 
 Hungarians are not very good plotters. The art of conspiracy – so well understood, 
 practiced and detected by the Russians – would have been self-defeating in their 
 struggle. What the Hungarians, a people of a special heritage and unique 





 which suddenly united all classes against their enemy without the necessity of 
 planning or leadership (p. 18). 
 
 These Hungarian revolutionary traditions were evoked in the extra section on 
Hungary’s history that included a photograph of 1848 revolutionary Lajos Kossuth, as well 
as in the main MOY text. In the latter, Time managed to make a connection between the 
class diversity of the 1956 revolution and the memory of the 1848 revolution: 
 The restless and articulate Hungarian intellectuals who sparked the revolt of Oct. 
 23, mostly young Communists, were not thinking in terms of Lenin, but of the 
 Hungarian patriots who revolted against the Habsburg monarchy in 1848. The 
 street and rooftop fighters, who took over the struggle from the intellectuals, 
 performed their self-appointed tasks with a valor, pride and gallantry that is found 
 only in the revolutionary traditions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Then, as their 
 strength was exhausted in the battle against modern steel, the fight was taken over 
 by the stolid nerveless men of the factories, inspired by utopian ideals of a 
 democratic workers’ state. The Man of the Year was an amalgam of all these 
 men and all their qualities (p. 18). 
 
 The paragraph is not short on adjectives: the intellectuals are restless and articulate; 
the street and rooftop fighters fight with valor, pride and gallantry; and at the end come the 
stolid, nerveless men of the factories who, in addition to working and fighting hard, ponder 
ideals as well. The article continued with individual biographies of Freedom Fighters, each 
biography representing a particular class of revolutionary. Time articulated a link between 
the universal and the particular: “Among the thousands who made Hungary’s revolution, it 
was possible to see, in a few individuals, those qualities and characteristics that made the 
whole thing credible.” Class diversity was also indicated by the personal stories of four 
revolutionaries, “Lazlo Szabo, Peter Szanto, Ferenc Kocsis, Janos Feher,” who represented 





truck driver, Ferenc Kocsis a film worker and Janos Feher an intellectual. According to the 
concluding paragraph of the MOY section: 
 Lazlo Szabo, Peter Szanto, Ferenc Kocsis, Janos Feher – these are not their real 
 names – are, each in his own way, representative of those anonymous thousands, 
 many of them dead, who fought for their country’s freedom against the most 
 brutal tyranny on earth. Taken together, they epitomize the Hungarian Freedom 
 Fighter, the man who made history leap forward in 1956 – the Man of the Year
 (p. 20). 
  
 The Hungarian Freedom Fighter was imagined to be in “dauntless contest with 
Soviet tanks.” The second photograph representing the MOY showed a young 
revolutionary standing on the top of a tank. From all the available photographs of tanks 
and Hungarian revolutionaries, Time chose one that represented the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighter in a winning position: in possession of the vehicle. The third and last photograph of 
the revolution, also taken by John Sadovy, showed Pál Maléter, the Hungarian-army-
commander-turned-military-leader of the revolution, appearing optimistic and in charge.  
 While the photographs represented hope, the text repeatedly emphasized the 
heroism of engaging in a hopeless fight with machines that were much more powerful than 
people. The question, “why fight at all?” was answered with a reference to romanticism:  
 Did Hungary’s Freedom Fighters hope to win? The answer is that, unlike the 
 Poles before them, who infiltrated the party apparatus and to an extent controlled 
 their break from Moscow, they did not pause to think that far ahead. Their motto 
 might well have been that of another great romantic, William of Orange: “One 
 need not hope in order to act, nor succeed in order to persevere” (p. 18). 
 
 Time expressed some doubt about what the Hungarian Freedom Fighter had really 
achieved in a practical sense: “The ultimate consequences of his action could only be 
assessed in the future” (p. 18). But Time did not doubt the Hungarian Freedom Fighter’s 





event. The magazine trusted and valued the figure’s ability to communicate the message of 
freedom over long periods of time: 
 But his greatest triumph was moral: he demonstrated the profound and needful 
 truth that humanity is not necessarily forever bound and gagged by modern 
 terrorist political techniques. Thus he gave to millions, and specifically to the 
 youth of Eastern Europe, the hope for a foreseeable end to the long night of 
 Communist dictatorship (p. 18).   
 
 Keeping in mind this crystallized figure of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter, I 
return, in the next chapter, to the first day of the revolution to see how the figure was 
named, narrated and visualized from the beginning of the revolution until the MOY issue 
in a number of particularly influential American news publications. In terms of the theory 
of global iconic events, this chapter has been dedicated to “the event’s condensation into a 
package of a simple phrase, a short narrative and a recognizable visual scene;” the next 








Chapter 9. “We Greet You In the Name of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters”: 
The American Elevated and Interpretative Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
 
Man of the Year 
Sir: 
 I bet it will be Nasser. 
Eddy A. Salvo, Los Angeles 
 
Sir:  
He must be no other than President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia. 




Julius M. Westheimer, Baltimore. 
 
Letters in Time, November 12, 1956, p. 4 
 
In this chapter I examine the coverage of the 1956 Hungarian revolution from its beginning 
(October 23, 1956) until the MOY issue (January 7, 1957) in Time, Newsweek, Life, and 
the New York Times to track how the elevated and interpretative language around the 
symbolic figure of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter came into being.  
  
9.1 Towards a Simple Phrase: Naming the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” 
The first substantial Time, Life and Newsweek articles on the revolution were published 
after the revolution had already been crushed. All three magazines named, narrated and 
visualized the Hungarian Freedom Fighter as a posthumous figure of revolution. In Time, 
the first series of articles frequently mentioned freedom, but did not call the participants of 
the revolution “freedom fighters.” The first article called them “revolutionaries” and 
“rebels” instead, denouncing the local communist effort to brand them as 





Time did not refer to the protesters as “Freedom Fighters” until a week later, on November 
12, 1956: 
 On the hills around Budapest, heavy Soviet guns ranged in on the city’s old 
 Parliament House. Through the already battered streets thundered big new tanks, 
 this time protected by trotting groups of dark-visaged Asian-Russian infantrymen. 
 Weary but infinitely brave Freedom Fighters were mercilessly cut down (Time, 
 “The Kremlin” [Foreign News], November 12, 1956, p. 31). 
 
The same “Foreign News” section also included a subsection titled “Hungary;” one of its 
paragraph headings read “Freedom Fighters.” But the heading was followed by a short 
description of the freedom fighters that still differentiated between “rebels” (as the 
magazine called them) and “freedom fighters” (as they called themselves):  
 Now, as they began to realize what had happened and what they had done, the 
 faces of the rebels were lit with a kind of ecstasy. They were vigorous blond 
 students and tough looking workers among them, but many seemed pitifully 
 young. A correspondent noted a boy who could not have been more than ten 
 years old holding himself at the ready with a rifle as tall as himself. Beside him 
 was a 15-year-old girl with a submachine gun and a forage cap on her head. Grey 
 with the fatigue of four days’ ceaseless fighting, almost falling from exhaustion, 
 they solemnly welcomed the foreigners: “we greet you in the name of the 
 Hungarian Freedom Fighters” (Time, November 12, 1956, p. 42).  
 
 Using “Freedom Fighters” as a paragraph heading assumes some familiarity with 
the term on the part of the readers. A closer analysis of the daily coverage of the 
revolutionaries in the NYT will help shed light on how the name “freedom fighters” 
became established in the public discourse on the Hungarian revolution.  
 The word “freedom” was evoked in connection with the revolution in various 
contexts.34 New York City Mayor Robert Wagner, for instance, proclaimed November 2, 
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1956 “Hungarian Freedom Day” in honor of the “victorious revolution which ha[d] 
deposed the Kremlin dictatorship” in Hungary (“Hungarians Honored,” NYT, November 2, 
1956, p. 12). In his presidential campaign, Eisenhower also repeatedly evoked the language 
of freedom in connection with the event:  
 We have heard – with admiration and hope – the challenging cry for freedom of 
 the peoples of Hungary and of Poland. We have been reminded once again: this 
 love of man for his freedom is the thing no bullet can kill, no gallows can strangle 
 (“Text of Eisenhower’s Address at Philadelphia Rally,” NYT, November 2, 1956, p. 
 18).  
 
 Hungarian interest groups pushed the language of freedom as well, as can be seen, 
among other places, in their Letters to the Times (most notably: Bela Fabian [Member, 
Executive Committee, Hungarian National Council], “Revolt in Hungary: Struggle for 
Freedom Will Continue, It Is Stated,” NYT, October 30, 1956, p. 36). Finally, the language 
of freedom was evoked on signs at the sympathy demonstrations that were taking place in 
the US. Already on October 28, 1956, for example, the NYT covered sympathy 
demonstrations being held at the United Nations and at the headquarters of the Soviet 
delegations. Signs at these demonstrations advocated “Free elections in Hungary” and 
“Freedom for Mindszenty” (the imprisoned Hungarian cardinal), and posed a direct 
question: “Freedom or Slavery.” The related NYT photograph showed a protester carrying 
a sign that read “Hungarian Heroes Who Died For Freedom” (“Hungarian Pickets Carry 
Protest to U.N.; Also March to Soviet Delegation’s Home,” NYT, October 28, 1956, p. 34). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
revolution was crushed. On November 5, NYT published 50 articles on “Hungary,” out of which 36 percent 
(18 articles) mentioned “freedom.” Given that these articles, both during the revolution and on the day after, 
included reporting on UN sessions, strategic military information, and food supplies, among others, the fact 
that around 30 percent of the articles dealt with freedom during the revolt and the day after seems to suggest 





 The simple phrase “Hungarian Freedom Fighters” appeared for the first time on 
October 31, when a NYT reporter described what the rebels were calling themselves: 
 As I drove carefully up the street, past broken glass, broken telegraph wires, 
 unexploded shells, unexpended ammunition and the corpses of Soviet troops, the 
 car was immediately surrounded by a crowd of youthful insurgents. Their faces 
 were gray with exhaustion, their young chins were covered with a week’s beard 
 but their spirit was indomitable. “We greet you in the name of the Hungarian 
 freedom fighters” said one of them in German when we disclosed our identity 
 (“Victory Appears Near: Soviet Reported Leaving Hungary, An Eleventh-hour 
 Grant,” NYT October 31, 1956, p. 1). 
 
 After this introduction, the simple phrase “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” did not 
become exclusive or dominant.35 NYT journalists continued to play with the words in 
“Hungarian Freedom Fighter,” as well as with additional names. Describing hospital 
conditions, the NYT juggled “Hungarian,” “fighters” and “freedom:” “In helpless fury, 
doctors, nurses and stretcher-bearers watched hundreds of Hungarian fighters for freedom 
dying on streets that surround the hospital” (“Soviet Brutality in Budapest Told: 
Eyewitnesses to Slaughter Describe ‘Barbarity’ of Russian Marksmen,” NYT, November 3, 
1956, p. 15). On the same day, and on the next page, the NYT also discussed a deadlock 
“between the Soviet Union and Hungarian forces seeking freedom” (“’Searchlight’ Urged: 
Freedom House Asks U.N. to Turn It on Hungary,” NYT, November 3, 1956, p. 16).  
 Newsweek and Life did not use the simple phrase exclusively, or even frequently, 
either. In its first article on the revolution, published after it had already been crushed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In NYT “Freedom Fighters” was used six times during the revolution and “Hungarian Freedom Fighters” 
only once. “Freedom fighter” in singular is not mentioned during the revolution. From the end of the 
revolution until January 7, 1957 NYT mentioned “freedom fighters” forty times in articles that included 
“Hungary.” “Hungarian Freedom Fighters” during the same period was mentioned six times, “Hungarian 
Freedom Fighter” in singular only once. A more detailed search for Hungary or Hungarian and revolution, 
results in 241 NYT articles, out of which 206 dealt relatively directly with the Hungarian events. Only 15 
articles mention “freedom fighters.” A broader search for Hungary or Hungarian and revolution or uprising 






Newsweek spoke of “armed rebels,” “rebels” and “outraged civilians” (“The Great 
Challenge to Russia,” Newsweek, November 5, 1956, pp. 51-52 and 55-57). This more 
reserved naming practice, consistent with Newsweek’s generally more fact-oriented 
approach, remained in place throughout the period I examined.  
 Being part of the Luce press universe, Life remained full of admiration for the 
revolution as a potential iconic event throughout its reporting, but that enthusiasm did not 
result in sustained mentions of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter. In its first article on the 
revolution, titled “A Desperate Fight for Freedom,” Life repeatedly spoke of “rebels” and 
also mentioned “demonstrators” and “crowds” (Life, November 5, 1956, pp. 37-38). In a 
particularly emotional introduction to a series of photographs, more than three weeks after 
the revolution, Life still called the participants of the revolution “rebels,” not even 
“revolutionaries” (“Tanks and yet more tanks raze Hungary,” Life, November 26, 1956, p. 
28). 
 There was some ambivalence with regard to the attachment of quotation marks to 
the name of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter. In the NYT, the only time when Hungarian 
freedom fighters appeared in full form (all three words) and without quotation marks (due 
to technical reasons), was in an advertisement titled “Help Free Hungary;” the ad included 
a diplomatic cable from the International Rescue Committee (NYT, Nov 1, 1956, p. 33).36 
The cable used the phrase “Hungarian Freedom Fighters” and made frequent reference to 
freedom. The cable began by declaring that “HERE ON FRONTIER OF FREEDOM WE ARE 
WITNESSING HISTORIC BATTLE WHICH ENTIRE HUNGARIAN NATION IS WAGING AGAINST 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The cable was sent by Angier Biddle Duke, President of the International Rescue Committee and by 






COMMUNIST OPPRESSION.” The cable mentioned Hungarian Freedom Fighters once: “HERE 
IS EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN CITIZEN TO MAKE 
CERTAIN THAT HUNGARIAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS KNOW WE ARE ON THEIR SIDE WHATEVER 
HAPPENS.” Next to the cable, the advertisement’s text called the participants of the 
revolution “Hungarian patriots,” “Hungarian people,” “Hungarians,” and “anti-Communist 
patriots of Hungary,” but not “Freedom Fighters.”37  
 Apart from that one instance, articles mentioned “freedom fighters” only with 
quotation marks until November 4, 1956; afterwards, the term appeared sometimes with, 
and sometimes without them. On November 4, 1956, reporting on a visit of the chairman 
of the International Rescue Committee to Budapest, the NYT for the first time referred to 
Freedom Fighters without quotation marks: 
 He said he was also taken to the headquarters of the Freedom Fighters. The 
 backbone of the fighters, he said, were youths, and mainly college students. The 
 bottom age for the revolutionaries, he was told, was 10 years (“Hungarian Held to 
 Want Union: U.S. Relief Worker Says After Mission 99 Per Cent,” NYT, 
 November 4, 1956, p. 34). 
 
But even in this case, the article did not use the name exclusively: the article also 
mentioned “Hungarians,” “Hungarian rebels,” and “fighters.” 
 Although Time had been confident in its January 7, 1957 issue that history would 
know the Hungarian Freedom Fighter by his name, popular usage of the simple phrase was 
less pervasive than the close analysis of the MOY issue suggests. Until the MOY cover 
was published, the name did not dominate the coverage in the news publications I 
examined, neither during the revolution nor afterwards. The name was not the only name 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






used to describe the Hungarian revolutionaries, and for a while it was even couched in 
quotation marks, to indicate distance and to avoid journalistic ownership.   
 While Time had great faith in the power of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter’s name, 
the name was not strongly established during the revolution, and its power had not been 
established in the crucial first two months of the potential iconic event’s coverage. 
 
9.2 Towards a Short Narrative: Constructing the Story of the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighter 
 
Examining Time’s MOY issue, I identified six characteristics in the narrative of the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighter: sudden appearance on the world stage, youth, spontaneity, 
compliance with revolutionary historic traditions, class diversity, and the heroic fight 
against Soviet tanks. In this section I will examine the first five characteristics; the image 
of the fight against Soviet Tanks is the topic of the next.  
 In the news publications I examined, the claim that the revolution was ‘surprising’ 
was predicated on its seeming “impossibility:” 
 Whatever Hungary’s ultimate fate, the cracks in the Soviet “monolith” can never 
 be healed. They will remain proof that revolt against the Soviet giant is possible 
 and give encouragement to future dissidents (“The Great Challenge to Russia,”
 Newsweek, November 51, 1956, p. 51).  
 
The revolution had seemed particularly improbable because of communist indoctrination. 
The freedom fighters’ youth indicated that the communists’ educational practices, no 
matter how strongly they shaped new generations, were not completely successful. Already 
on October 27, 1956, the NYT published an article by Harry Schwartz with the telling title 





Failed” (p. 8).  Time continuously the failure of indoctrination, to the fact that “[e]leven 
years of relentless Communist-indoctrination of the satellites’ youth, in schools, 
workshops, clubrooms, gymnasiums, in cafes and across kitchen tables, has failed to 
capture their imagination or loyalty” (“The Crisis of Communism,” Time, November 5, 
1956, 68(19), p. 36). 
 The trope of spontaneity was also used from the beginning of the revolution. Time 
summarized it in the most compact form: “Unarmed, unorganized, unaided from outside, 
not even fully aware at first of what might be involved in their deeds, the Hungarian people 
rolled back the tide of Communism” (“Revolution,” Time, November 5, 1956, 68(19), p. 
32). American publications did not trust the Hungarian political leadership; it did not 
express the universal social meanings of the revolution as a global iconic event that 
Western audiences wanted to see. The more independent and spontaneous the Hungarian 
revolutionaries appeared in the coverage, the more they could communicate a “pure” anti-
communist message. During the revolution, some articles directly emphasized that the 
revolution was a leaderless one: “Now that the Russians have left Budapest no one seems 
to know who rules in Hungary. But everyone is certain it is not the Communists who rule” 
(John MacCormac, “Rebels Seek Leadership,” NYT, November 1, 1956, p. 26).  
 The Hungarian Freedom Fighter’s spontaneity and his independence from 
international influence had to be established as well. In this respect the presidential 
campaigns of Eisenhower and Stevenson were important in shaping the contours of the 
figure: the spontaneous and independent power of the Hungarian revolutionaries was 





Eisenhower’s successful foreign policy. The Stevenson camp introduced powerful 
language to that effect relatively early during the coverage. On October 28, 1956, for 
example, according to the NYT, democratic senator Herbert H. Lehman from New York  
 assailed the Republican national Administration for its “shameless attempt” to 
 claim political credit for the recent uprisings in Poland and Hungary. (…) Senator 
 Lehman applauded the revolt “against the cruel and ruthless tyranny.” He said the 
 uprising had “amazed and thrilled” the world. “Men and women who have given 
 their lives in the holy cause of freedom in recent days – and those who bear the 
 honorable wounds of battle against Soviet oppressors – they are the heroes who 
 will be celebrated in song and story as long as freedom reigns anywhere,” the 
 Senator said. (“Lehman Hits G.O.P. On Revolt Claims: Says Administration 
 Makes a ‘Shameless Attempt’ to Take Political Credit,” NYT, October 28, 1956, p. 
 75). 
 
 From a narrative perspective, the fourth characteristic of the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighter, Hungary’s revolutionary tradition, was particularly helpful at the beginning of the 
revolution, as it embedded the figure in a historical context. The first Life issue that 
mentioned the revolution included a large photograph of protesters gathering around the 
statue of the revolutionary poet Sándor Petőfi. The caption said:  
 Oath for Freedom, solemnized with upraised right hands, is taken by a Hungarian 
 rebel assemblage beneath the statue of Sandor Petofi, the celebrated patriotic poet. 
 Petofi died in the Hungarian 1848 and is believed to have been killed by Russians 
 intervening on the side of Austria (“Doubtful Future for the Russian Tyranny,” 
 Life, November 5, 1956, p. 48). 
 
 Articles also reported on how the memory of the 1848 revolution was evoked 
during sympathy demonstrations in the United States. The NYT for example mentioned that 
participants of a sympathy demonstration organized by the Student Council of Columbia 
University had placed a wreath at the statue of 1848 revolutionary leader Louis Kossuth in 





1956, p. 16). Such references required quite a lot of journalistic explanation, however, and 
presumably a healthy doses of historic interest on the part of the readers as well.  
 Finally, the diversity of the protesters in terms of gender, age and class was a 
particularly strong trope, as it conveyed the irony inherent in the fact that “everybody,” 
including the working class, participated:  
 Men, women and children jammed the streets of this city today to laugh and cry 
 and shout “Liberty, Liberty!” at the sight of Western automobile with Austrian 
 license plates (“Rebels Set Peace Terms,” NYT, October 29, 1956, p. 9).   
 
 The streets of Budapest were like a favorite proletarian tableau come to 
 frightening life – shouting students, muscular workers, flag-waving women 
 raising fists on the barricades and braving death. But the oppressors they defied 
 were their Communist masters (Time, November 5, 1956, 68(19), p. 32).  
 
 These characteristics were germane to shaping the figure of the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighter, but they were also problematic when it came to constructing a lasting and 
universal symbolic figure of a global iconic event. The evocation of the figure depended on 
numerous narrative building blocks that all required extensive explanation from the 
journalists, and careful attention and cultural openness from the readers. Without narration, 
the weakly named figure could not be a carrier of the story of the 1956 Hungarian 
revolution, and the narration required a level of effort that seems to have been challenging 
to sustain over a long period of time. 
 
9.3 Towards a Recognizable Visual Scene: Picturing the Hungarian Freedom Fighter  
In the MOY issue, Time argued that history would know not only the name of the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighter, but also his face, “intense, relentless, desperate and 





would not be the face of one particular Hungarian Freedom Fighter, but rather the 
imagined face of many Hungarian Freedom Fighters. Not one particular photograph, but an 
amalgam of different images would visually represent this newly found figure. A look at 
the coverage of the revolution from the first day until the MOY cover seems to confirm 
Time’s claim that no single revolutionary, and no single photograph of a recognizable 
visual scene dominated the coverage and the short-term memory of the event.  
 Even before his name was invented, the Hungarian Freedom Fighter was pitted 
against a machine: the “oppressive” Soviet tank.38 The very first NYT photograph of the 
revolution showed a Soviet tank on an empty street of Budapest (figure 65). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 During the revolution “Hungary” and “tank” appeared in 64 NYT articles. Out of 220 articles published on 
Hungary and revolution from November 5, 1956 (the end of the revolution) until January 7, 1957 (the MOY 
cover), 23.6 percent (52 articles) included the word “tank” after the occupation already took place. Some 







Figure 65: “SOVIET ARMORED VEHICLES PROWL STREETS OF BUDAPEST: A tank and a smaller 
vehicle moving yesterday along Kossuth Street in the embattled Hungarian capital. This picture 
was taken by a Western traveler, just before he left the city for Vienna. It was sent here by radio. 
The fighting that had started on Tuesday still continued” (NYT, October 27, 1956, p. 1).  
 
 The photograph needed a detailed caption: the blurred image barely showed 
anything of Budapest and depicted only distant, unrecognizable people going about their 
everyday lives, seemingly unbothered by the tank. There was something particularly 
uncanny to the image, to its darkness and opaqueness: the photograph left the viewer with 
nothing to relate to. The image evoked the fear of oppression and occupation, but it neither 
expressed human relations nor a message of hope. Without contextual explanation, the 
tank could have been anywhere in the world, representing any number of armed conflicts.  
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Article 1 -- No Title
New York Times (1923-Current file); Oct 27, 1956; 






 The Hungarian revolutionary was often “faceless” on visual representations. 
During the revolution, the NYT showed the Hungarian Freedom Fighter only as a non-
recognizable member of a crowd  (“Soviet Reported Pouring in Troops,” October 28, 
1956, p. 31). Or the newspaper showed him from a distance as he was busy reloading 
trucks in Austria (“Insurgents Hold Western Border,” October 28, 1956, p. 31); or in 
coffins at a funeral (“Mass Burial Held for 85 Rebel Dead,” October 29, 1956, p. 9). The 
only time during the revolution when the NYT showed protestors’ faces on its front page 
was on October 28 (figure 66). The front page juxtaposed two photographs. The first 
image showed “Russian-built tanks rumble along a street of the capital;” the second 
photograph, “University students rally their countrymen against regime,” pictured a group 
of protesters.  
 Time magazine employed the same visual strategy of juxtaposing protesters with 
“inhumane” tanks in its first extensive article on the revolution. The first Time photograph 
showed well-dressed young protesters, mostly students, while in the second photograph, 
Soviet tanks stood on an almost empty avenue of Budapest. The captions made the contrast 
explicit: “Young Hungarians Parading Banners of Freedom in Budapest: In six historic 
days, a magic chemistry of courage, anger, and desperation” and “Soviet Army Tanks in 
Budapest: The sniper’s single shot rang short and clear” (Hungary [Foreign News], Time, 
November 5, 1956, pp. 30-31).39  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 When the Soviet side was not referred to as “Soviet tanks,” it was often called “Soviet guns”: “Mercilessly 
Soviet guns mowed down civilians armed only with flags and the fire of their thirst for freedom” (“The Great 







 Such “tank versus people” photographs did not seduce viewers with a recognizable 
and memorable individual, performance, or scene. Many revolutions feature a contrast like 
this; there was not anything specifically Hungarian about it. This lack of specificity is 
visible in the NYT’s decision on October 28, 1956 to juxtapose a photograph of Polish (not 
Hungarian) protesters with a photograph of tanks (figure 67). What mattered was the 
contrast, not the particular context or performance.   
 After the revolution, photojournalists began to provide readers with powerful 
images of particular revolutionaries. Over time, then, the symbolic figure of the Hungarian 
Freedom Fighter did materialize in real individuals. But here, other chances and 
complications arose. To understand these chances and complications, let’s closely analyze 
the way in which Life magazine pictured the revolution from its beginning until Time’s 
MOY issue. 
 During this period, Life published ten issues, out of which only two, the October 29 
and the December 24, 1956 issues did not include any content on Hungary. The former 
was published too early to give a substantial representation; the latter, Life’s Christmas 
issue, was dedicated to another abstract hero, “The American Woman.”40 The number of 
articles and photographs, along with their appearance, mostly, in the front of the magazine, 
indicate a keen interest in covering the revolution – even if no photograph of the revolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The December 10, 1956 issue included only an advertisement at the end of the issue about a 100-page book 







made it to the cover.41 The only cover photograph referring to the revolution was published 
on January 7, 1957, the same day as the MOY cover; it depicted two little Hungarian 
refugee girls posing happily alongside Vice President Nixon (figure 68). The 
representational road leading to this cover had been a long one.  
 The first Hungary-related Life issue (November 5, 1956) employed exactly the 
same representational techniques as the early NYT coverage. Life even republished the two 
photographs that the NYT had used, juxtaposing the image of the innocent student 
protesters with that of the machines of tyranny (compare figure 66 with figures 69 and 70). 
The opening image of the article showed an endless line of tanks; the few passers-by that 
also appeared in the image seemed to be there only by accident. The caption, accounting 
for the rather action-less scene, presented it as a pre-action moment: “Guns pointed toward 
embattled Budapest streets, line of Russian tanks rambles ahead to attack the Hungarian 
ant-communist rebels” (figure 69). 
 Other photographs in that Life issue showed crowds of protesters, a captured tank, 
and a young female victim (figures 70 and 71). An extra section dealt with pre-
revolutionary Hungarian debates, and showed arguing intellectuals, workers, and writers 
(“Protests Before Cataclysm,” pp. 44-45). These photographs, while powerful and often 
tragic records of official and personal history, lacked any unique artistic features that could 
have contributed to a recognizable visual scene of the event. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The covers depicted a “Thrilling plane rescue at sea” (October 29), “Eisenhower in Minneapolis” 
(November 5), along with the first title: “Crisis in the satellites, new cracks in the red empire,” “Rosalind 
Russell as Auntie Mame in Broadway’s red-hot hit” (November 12) with the first title being “Pictures from 
two fronts: inside Hungary and on the Suez,” “An Egyptian wounded in battle for Mideast” (November 19), 
“Comeback for Bergman in film ‘Anastasia’” (November 26) with the first title “Russian terror inside 
Hungary,” “Flag at half-mast marks ‘Arizona’s hulk’” (December 3), “Bobby Morrow, Olympic sprint 
champ” (December 10), “Baptism: One of Seven Sacraments” (December 10), and “Working mother” 





 Following a substantial advertisement section and a colorful profile of Maria 
Callas, the November 12, 1956 issue published a ten-page section on the revolution, with 
extensive photo material (“Patriots Strike Ferocious Blow At Tyranny,” pp. 34-40; “People 
Were Dropping Like Flies,” pp. 40-44). Most photographs in this issue have become part 
of the Hungarian visual memory of the revolution; until 1989, they were used as 
propaganda tools to discredit the revolution. The photographs documented the outbreak of 
mob violence during the siege of the party headquarters on Budapest’s Republic Square. 
Although the event was an exception in a revolution mostly characterized by peaceful 
protests and armed fighting, its violent scenes dominated this issue.  
 The Life photo collection presented a dense series of horror – up-close shooting, 
piles of bodies, vengeance and weapons – but nowhere did it denounce the violence. One 
of the most disturbing photographs showed a rebel woman spitting at the corpse of what 
the crowd believed to be a Hungarian secret policeman (figure 72). Every violent scene 
came with some form of justification in its caption or in the articles: “Viewing former 
tormentors’ corpses, Hungarians said, ‘they shot our children,’” the caption read in this 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In the same Life issue, photojournalist John Sadovy gave a detailed and emotional account of his 
experience at the siege of the Budapest party headquarters. His eyewitness account started with a vivid 
description of the violence of the AVH (secret police), who shot at everyone from the building, even at first 
aid workers. Sadovy also described how the AVH men – who exited the building when they were no longer 
able to defend it – were shot by rebels (John Sadovy, “People Were Dropping Like Flies,” Life, November 





 In this Life issue, the only close-up image of a “freedom fighter” showed a 15-year-
old boy. The image depicted a tired but stubborn young revolutionary in the middle of a 
ruined city, the hopeless loneliness of the fight for freedom. The photograph might have 
become part of international visual memory, had it not been drowned out by images of 
excessive violence (figure 73). Still, the photograph was frequently republished at 
anniversaries – and, as the next chapter will show, the local Hungarian communist press 
was particularly invested in deconstructing its message of innocence.  
 The following week, in a rather quick move away from the violent revolutionary 
moments, Life contained imagery of refugee women and children “walking to freedom” to 
Austria, and Western riots and rallies in support of the revolution (“Lost cause shocks 
world,” Life, November 19, 1956, pp. 56-58). A week later, Life imagery returned to 
Budapest, showing tanks and ruined buildings photographed from a safe distance (“Tanks 
and yet more tanks raze Hungary,” Life, November 26, 1956, pp. 28-33). On December 3, 
in a richly illustrated section titled “Anguished Exodus to Liberty,” Life focused once more 
on the masses of refugees leaving Hungary (p. 35-42). The article gave a heart-wrenching 
account of the refugees’ struggle to get out of Hungary on “icy roads and broken bridges.” 
The article also spoke about the first sixty refugees welcomed in the US, who had arrived a 
day before Thanksgiving. The coverage featured them as they were celebrating 
Thanksgiving in the country of freedom (figure 74).  
 In that same issue, a photo section titled “Welcomes, Smiles and Tears of 
Freedom” showed Hungarian newcomers in Milwaukee (p. 39-41, figure 75). Some 






 SAFE AND SECURE, refugee couple in Milwaukee finds it difficult to relax at a 
 hotel press conference. Asked to smile for the photographer, the man said, “[i]t is 
 hard. We have not smiled for so long now” (Life, December 3, 1956 “Anguished 
 Exodus to Liberty,” p. 40). 
 
 On December 17, after a week of silence, the coverage turned, as the article title 
announced, to “Defiant Women of Hungary.” Here, the Hungarian Freedom Fighter had 
suddenly changed gender: photographs showed Hungarian women demonstrating, arguing 
with the police, and honoring and weeping for the dead (figure 76). For the first and only 
time, a photo caption called the revolutionaries “Hungarian Freedom Fighters” (figure 77). 
 On January 7, 1957, the day of the MOY cover, Life covered the American 
assimilation of one Hungarian family, the Csillag family. The little Csillag children were 
greeted by their great-uncle in Indianapolis, a “prosperous and philanthropic industrialist,” 
who arrived in a Cadillac, smoking an impressive cigar. The charming photographs 
documented the everyday harmony of the family in Indianapolis: the 9-year-old daughter 
pledged her allegiance to the flag on her first US school day; the parents became good 
American consumers by doing extensive grocery shopping; the father tried Kleenex for the 
first time in his life; the family enjoyed a meal of noodle soup, meat balls, potatoes and 
beans, experimented with the new washing machine, and was thrilled to have a television 
set (“They pour in, and a family shows refugees can fit in,” Life, January 7, 1957, pp. 20-
28, figures 78-79).  
 The photographs stood for the American dream: the availability of prosperous, 
modern American life to hardworking and compliant newcomers, especially to those with a 





understood, violent context, from a town where he “had known no one with flush toilets or 
refrigerators” (p. 22), became the model American worker and parent. His trauma was 
overcome by hard work and healthy family life. Already by the time of the MOY cover, 
the Hungarian Freedom Fighter had been thoroughly domesticated.  
 Life made three significant representational steps in its short coverage of the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighters between November 5, 1956 and January 7, 1957. At first, the 
coverage was characterized by “faceless” crowds and repetitive scenery of tanks. Then, 
only a week later, Life moved to photojournalistic masterpieces representing excessive 
violence. And in the final period of the examined coverage, Life tried to bring the 
revolutionaries, men, women and children, closer to its readers by showing their successful 
American assimilation.  
 Time’s MOY issue had been right in contending that the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighter had not just many names, but many faces as well. The figure represented multiple 
figures. The Hungarian Freedom Fighter was a man, a woman and a child. The Hungarian 
Freedom Fighter was both the young nameless revolutionary and colonel Pál Maléter, an 
individual and a member of a crowd, spontaneous but also a representative of a historic 
tableau. A forgivably violent fighter, a victim, a survivor and a refugee. A heroic fighter in 
an incomprehensible conflict; and now, to some Americans, a regular neighbor, a model 
worker and housewife, learning to cook a perfect Thanksgiving turkey. A person we 






Chapter 10. Why Did the Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Not Travel 
Through Time, Space, and Media? 
 
 
In these chapters I have argued that, well-intentioned efforts to provide the 1956 Hungarian 
revolution’s message of freedom with lasting representation not withstanding, the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighter failed to become a strong symbolic figure during the crucial 
first two months of American coverage. The Hungarian Freedom Fighter’s name was not 
strongly established in the American press; the narrative tools to describe the Hungarian 
Freedom Fighter were various and sometimes contradictory, complicated and highly 
contextual; and neither in visual nor in textual coverage did the revolution produce a scene 
that moved beyond the regular revolutionary imagery. As the Hungarian Freedom Fighter 
moved from an abstract figure to a real refugee, he gained an individual biography: he 
became an individual who gets married and looks for a job, a dynamic character who lives 
his everyday life with successes and failures, and who may or may not embody an abstract 
and flawless ideal. As he slices the Thanksgiving turkey, he may decide simply to “have a 
life.”  
 Time magazine did not invent the Hungarian Freedom Fighter on its own, or out of 
whole cloth: the figure’s name and key textual and visual characteristics recurred in all 
news publications I examined. In addition, ambitious photojournalists and dedicated 
amateur photographers, the European press and Hungarian interest groups also worked to 
shape the early image of the Hungarian revolution (Balázs & Casoar, 2006; Clément, 
1998). What Time’s MOY issue represented was a strong condensational effort: an attempt 





one more or less coherent representation of the 1956 Hungarian revolution as a global 
iconic event. With the symbolic figure of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter, Time tried to 
condense the story of the 1956 Hungarian revolution into a simple phrase, a short narrative 
and a recognizable visual scene. But without a solid basis, this attempt was overly 
ambitious. The hope for and attempts at coherence did not result in a textually and visually 
powerful symbolic figure for the event; the figure remained contextual, its contours vague.  
 Some objective challenges to the iconicity of the Hungarian Freedom Fighter had 
already arisen during the revolution. For instance, when the Suez crisis emerged as a 
competing event, it became harder to keep up the symbolic power of the Hungarian rebel. 
Its fading significance was visible when, on November 1, 1956, the City Colleges of New 
York decided to cancel the brief memorial service that was to be held “in honor of the 
students of Hungary who rebelled against the Soviet Union”: 
A spokesman for the schools explained that in view of the rapidly developing 
situation in the Middle East the “dramatic impact” of the two minutes of silence 
“would have been lost.” (“Memorial is Canceled: City Colleges Cite Mideast In 
Dropping Hungary Plan,” NYT, November 1, 1956, p. 78).  
 
 As further complication for narration was the question of leadership that inevitably 
arose during the revolution. On November 1, 1956 a NYT editorial described cardinal 
Mindszenty as the “living symbol of the Hungarian people’s uncompromising fight against 
communism these many long years” (“Victory in Hungary,” NYT, November 1, 1956, p. 
38). As soon as a revolution has a strong symbolic leader, the image of a spontaneous 
revolution from below is likely to fade. Although the 1956 Hungarian revolution was put 
down too soon for this problem to fully surface, its independent, “leaderless” character 





 The visual coverage faced some unique complications. Over time, as arrests and 
executions of the revolutionaries in Hungary began, Western press photographs were used 
as evidence against those revolutionaries who had not left the country (Hollós & Lajtai, 
1974, p. 168). The publication of photographs with recognizable revolutionaries meant 
putting actual Hungarian Freedom Fighters who remained in Hungary at risk. Moreover, a 
substantial portion of the professional photographs depicted the most violent scenes of the 
revolution – especially the famous Sadovy series. The violence in these photographs 
required efforts of justification and contextualization, and distracted from the innocent 
image of the young Hungarian Freedom Fighter. 
 Furthermore, the Hungarian revolution was an unsuccessful one, and without an 
especially strong impact on international relations. To be sure, the fact that the revolution 
was unsuccessful did not mean that its elevated and interpretative story had to fail as well; 
even unsuccessful revolutions can result in successful global myths – Tiananmen is the 
most obvious example in this respect (Lee at el., 2011). But in the Hungarian case, the 
actual power of the event faded over time, and its symbolic power did not produce any 
counterbalance.  
 Hungarians did not rise again until the peaceful “velvet” negotiations of 1989. A 
second revolution could have triggered an international revival of the figure of the 
Hungarian Freedom Fighter, but this did not happen. And, as the next chapter will show, in 
the local Hungarian context the new political leadership was invested in developing a 
counter-narrative of the revolution – with related counter-symbols that focused on the 





the Hungarian Freedom Fighter did not receive any political or journalistic support. The 
thirty-three long years of counter-narration (and the carefulness of the event organizers) 
might explain the fact that when, in 1989, Imre Nagy and other central figures of the 
revolution were ceremonially reburied in Hungary’s largest symbolic event of that year, 
the symbolic sixth coffin that was buried beside the leaders’ five coffins was of the 
“Unknown Insurgent” – it was not the coffin of the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter.” 
In the international context though, one achievement that might be attributed to the 
figure of the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” is the lasting practice of using the term 
“freedom fighters” to describe revolutionaries. While before October 23, 1956 the NYT had 
used “freedom fighters” in all of 30 articles, the newspaper mentioned “freedom fighters” 
2048 times between November 5, 1956 and December 31, 2008. The causes of this 
increase are likely to vary, but one early-day influence may have been the Hungarian 
Freedom Fighter and its MOY position.  
Perhaps another achievement is the fact that the memory of the revolution was kept 
alive during the Cold War – at anniversaries in the West, at least. The anniversary 
coverage remained diverse and contextual, but nevertheless it reminded readers of the 
event. In the NYT, such memorialization even became more elaborate over time: while the 
1961 and 1971 anniversaries received relatively scant journalistic commemorative 
attention, in 1976 and 1986 such attention was substantially more lavish. Commemorative 
journalistic interest dropped strongly after 1989, however. Of the 1944 articles containing 





March 31, 2006, 1638 were published prior to December 31, 1989 (Glant, 2007, pp. 1-2). 
As historian Tibor Glant summarized this loss of interest:  
Before 1989, during the communist period in Hungary, the New York Times 
wanted to remember and remind its readers of the Revolution on a regular basis. 
Since 1989, when Hungary officially recognized the October-November 1956 
events as “Revolution” the paper felt it no longer had such a mission, and 
confined its coverage to factual reporting on anniversaries and new historical 
revelations (Glant, 2007, p. 2).  
 
Memorialization – most importantly Western journalistic commemoration – was 
basically the only form of global travel for this event. Without the establishment of a 
universal social meaning – represented, first, in an elevated and interpretative language, 
and then condensed into a simple phrase, a short narrative, and a recognizable scene – 
global recycling of the event seems to be a tough call. The social meaning of the event did 
not materialize in an object or symbol that people, especially internationally, could possess 
or refer to; and without a recognizable visual scene, the event’s international reenactment 
was and remains challenging.  
After the revolution, a Life magazine editorial declared: “If we cannot help, free 
fighters of Hungary – if words alone are poor and shameful things to offer – nevertheless, 
amid the darkness, and as you die, hear this: your country will not die, and you yourselves 
will have eternal life in the memory of all men who love freedom” (“To the Heroes of 
Hungary,” Life, November 19, 1956). While the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” certainly 
resides in the memory of some freedom-loving men, the figure has never been strong 
enough a condensation of the 1956 Hungarian revolution to have a chance at eternal and 






Chapter 11. “Counterrevolutionaries:” The Hungarian Counter-narrative of the 1956 
Revolution 
  
This final chapter examines the last remaining element of the concept of global iconic 
events, “counter-narration: alternative stories of the event,” through a careful analysis of 
the official, Hungarian counter-narrative of the 1956 revolution. Unlike the East German 
leadership in 1989, the Hungarian leadership was in a position to develop and spread a 
powerful counter-story. This chapter tracks and reconstructs this three-decade long 
narrative effort. 
On November 4, 1956, with the Soviet army invading Hungary, János Kádár 
announced the formation of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Government. The Kádár regime would remain in power for three decades, and during this 
period it sought to control the collective memory of the event. The end of the revolution 
marked the beginning of the Kádár era, and denying that a respectable revolution had taken 
place was essential for the regime’s legitimacy (Cseh et al., 1999, p. 217).  
Articles about the event had to echo the official perspective in order to be published 
(Ungváry, 2000a). Party and state control over journalists took various forms, including 
prior restraint, post-publication censorship, and self-censorship. Journalists who were 
selected, approved, and trusted by the regime had to find a textual and visual language that 
served the political elite, without losing a recognizably journalistic style.43 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The January 21, 1958 press directive of HSWP’s Central Committee was to shape Hungary’s media 
landscape for the next three decades.43 It envisioned a press that was fully dedicated to the party and that 
educated the public in a combative and entertaining style, employing a variety of journalistic tools. The 
directive specifically prescribed journalists “to use indirect tools of agitation in addition to the direct ones” 
(Cseh et al., 1999, p. 290). The exact representational style was not specified beyond such general requests, 
not even when it came to the counterrevolution. While the directive demanded that journalists “fight against 





Based on a systematic examination of three decades of coverage (November 11, 
1956 – November 11, 1986) in the central Hungarian communist daily Népszabadság, I 
argue in this chapter that journalists, in alliance with the party, constructed symbolic 
figures, symbolic objects, and symbolic places in order to frame the event as 
counterrevolutionary. These symbolic condensations became shields against controversy 
and debate, especially with regard to the event’s Western narrative. 
 The Népszabadság coverage of the “counterrevolution” had four periods: 
In the first three months, Népszabadság’s interpretation of the event was still 
inchoate. During this period, coverage focused on the arrests and trials of 
counterrevolutionaries and on attempts to forge a new political community out of the rest 
of Hungarian society.  
In the second period (from February 1957 until November 1960), Népszabadság 
began to construct symbolic figures, objects and places of the counterrevolution, and began 
to attack the Western elevated and interpretative story of the event. The representation 
focused on the few hours of October 30, 1956 during which protesters had murdered 
several defenders of the party headquarters. Journalists constructed representative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should and should not employ. The contours of the counterrevolution frame were developed by December 5, 
1956, when the Provisional Central Committee of HSWP passed a resolution on the precedents and causes of 
the counterrevolution. The resolution gave four reasons: (1) The mistakes of the pre-1956 leadership that had 
“initiated a sectarian and dogmatic policy in party state and economic affairs, and introduced peremptory, 
authoritarian and bureaucratic methods of leadership;” (2) The weaknesses of the Nagy circle that took the 
criticism of the mistakes “outside the party and into the streets, where reactionary elements were able to join 
to it;” (3) The Horthy-fascists and capitalist landowners who intended “to restore the capitalist and landowner 
regime;” and (4) International imperialists whose “radio stations (Voice of America and Radio Free Europe) 
have not stopped instigating against the Hungarian People’s Republic and its institutions” in the last twelve 
years (Békés et al., 2002, pp. 460-463). Journalists needed to come up with innovative, direct and indirect 







personalities for this event: the martyrs, their mourning families, the few survivors, and the 
heroes who had saved lives. Republic Square – the site of the murders – became the 
symbolic place of the counterrevolution, and the bodies of the martyrs became powerful 
symbolic objects.  
In the third period (from November 1960 until September 1981), the event’s 
representation was reduced to anniversary journalism: Népszabadság restricted the 
narrative of the counterrevolution to yearly official commemorations of the 
counterrevolution’s victims.  
Finally, in the last period (from September 1981 until November 1986), 
Népszabadság focused on the economic and social advantages brought by the post-
counterrevolutionary decades of consolidation. This time, the narrative effort to construct 
symbolic figures, objects and places of the counterrevolution was replaced by carefully 
selected facts.  
Throughout the four periods, Népszabadság emphasized that the counterrevolution 
had been violent, internally pre-planned, and shaped by fascists and criminals. The local 
press pitted this characterization against the Western elevated and interpretative story that 
framed the event as a pure, local, and spontaneous revolution, brought on by a heroic 
youth. Népszabadság depicted the Western iconization of the event as a false 
interpretation, while constructing a counter-narrative with related counter-symbols to 







10.1 Criminalization of Counterrevolutionaries and Narratives of Social Inclusion 
(November 1956 – February 1957) 
 
 During the first three months after the revolution, the Kádár government had to gain 
control over the country. Although armed protests had ceased by mid-November, political 
resistance was still widespread. The government therefore decided to toughen its position, 
introducing martial law in December. In the first three years of reprisals, 35,000 people 
faced legal action for insurrectionist activities. Two hundred and twenty-four 
revolutionaries were executed before 1959, and an additional five between then and 1961. 
Imre Nagy was secretly tried and then executed on June 16, 1958; his death did not 
become public news until June 17 (Békés et al., 2002, pp. 366-375; Rainer, 2009). 
Articles in Népszabadság from this period reflect the confusing and fearful 
atmosphere. Already in November some reports about arrests of counterrevolutionaries 
were published. After the introduction of martial law, reports about trials, sentences, and 
executions became common. Sometime such articles coupled messages of repression with 
messages of relative hope. Reporting about summary court decisions in December, in one 
article Népszabadság coupled two rejected clemency appeals resulting in execution with 
three granted pardons resulting in life imprisonment (“The decision of the Presidential 
Committee of the People’s Republic about appeals for pardon,” Népszabadság, December 
21, 1956, p. 1). 
Along with these budding journalistic practices, Népszabadság also began to attack 
the event, and especially the Western attempts to frame it as a global iconic event. The 
most frequently used strategy was to focus on defendants with a criminal past. Articles also 





judgment. In addition, Népszabadság began to brand the counterrevolution as a 
preplanned, international project. During one week in 1957, two articles were dedicated to 
this topic. “Washington’s hand in Hungary: An American journalist exposes the foreign 
organizers of the counterrevolution,” written by Albert E. Kahn, called the event a 
counterrevolution and asked Americans devoted to peace and freedom to rethink their 
position on the event (January 20, 1957, p. 9). Six days later another article discussed the 
country of origin of the weapons, arguing that the counterrevolutionaries had fought with 
foreign weapons smuggled into the country (“They shot from German, Belgian, and 
American weapons: What does the expert say about the smuggled weapons?” 
Népszabadság, January 26, 1957, p. 4).  
While courts quickly sentenced “counterrevolutionaries” to death, the 
Népszabadság coverage was confusing. At this point, not even the name of the event, the 
counterrevolution, was fully established. A relatively slow process of standardizing the 
counter-narrative began only during the second period of the coverage. 
 
10.2 Constructing the Story of a Counterrevolution and Deconstructing the Western 
Elevated and Interpretative Story of the Revolution (February 1957 – November 
1960) 
 
While reports about court sentences continued to appear in the beginning of this period, 
Népszabadság also began to explicitly frame the event as counterrevolutionary. The 
counterrevolutionary frame was meant to deconstruct the Western elevated and 
interpretative story of the event (figure 80). The exceptionally violent siege of the 





represent all thirteen days of protest. All other events of the revolution, generally not 
involving mob violence, were gradually omitted from the coverage (Békés et al., 2002; 
Eörsi, 2006; Mink, 2006).  
 
 COUNTERREVOLUTION REVOLUTION 
PARTICIPANTS Criminals and fascists Innocent youth 
ORGANIZATION Preplanned Spontaneous 




METHOD/TACTIC Dominated by mob violence, in 
particular lynching 
Non-violent revolutionary 




Figure 80: The Hungarian Official Story of the Counterrevolution and the Western Elevated and 
Interpretative Story of the Revolution 
 
Népszabadság prioritized the construction of symbolic figures of the 
counterrevolution. On February 19, 1957, Népszabadság published an article about 
survivors of the siege on the Republic Square headquarters, titled “Those Who Returned 
from the Grave Accuse” (p. 9). One of the interviewed survivors, József Farkas K., was a 
military conscript who had been ordered to the headquarters on October 23. Farkas told the 
reporter that upon seeing the overwhelming power of the protesters, a secretary of the 
Budapest Party Committee had left the building waving a white flag, intending to negotiate 
a peaceful surrender. But instead of carrying out negotiations, he was murdered. Next, the 
defenders of the party headquarters were forcibly removed from the building, and shot at 





rescuers carried him to an ambulance as protesters tried to finish him off. The reporter also 
visited another survivor, Lajos Somogyi Berta. During the siege, Berta had been shot nine 
times, and robbed of his money. He had lost one leg to the damage from his gunshot 
wounds; and his poor family had to take care of him. The article included large 
photographs of the two young, handsome, and visibly traumatized survivors, as well as the 
original photographs of the shooting.  
The two interviewees were powerful symbolic figures of the counterrevolution 
because their words and faces offered concrete proof of the protest movement’s excesses. 
Showing these innocent victims was also a way for Hungarian media to trigger moral 
outrage in the readers (Ettema & Glasser, 1998; Gitlin, 2003). The moments at which they 
had been shot by protesters had been recorded by Western photojournalists. These “about 
to die” photographs (Zelizer, 2010) powerfully displayed the mortal fear felt by 
sympathetic young men, the meaningless violence of the counterrevolution.  
As previously discussed, Life photographer John Sadovy shot several rolls of film 
during the siege, and his photographs were published in Life magazine and many foreign 
news publications. Ironically, newspapers in Hungary used these same Western 
photographs to represent the counterrevolution – and the police was able to identify 









Figure 81: Two photographs from John Sadovy’s photo series on the events on Republic Square, 
October 30, 1956. In the first photograph Lajos Somogyi Berta is on the left and József Farkas K. is 
on the right. Originally published by Life magazine (“Hungarian Patriots Strike Ferocious Blows at 
Tyranny,” November 12, 1956, p. 34), reproduced by Népszabadság as illustration for the article 












Survivors and victims were not the only symbolic figures of the counterrevolution. 
The frame also needed everyday heroes, “regular” people who had saved lives during the 
dangerous days of the counterrevolution. These heroic rescuers showed that everybody, 
regardless of political position or social class, could do something against 
counterrevolutionary forces. The articles emphasized that many heroes had been ordinary 
people, not even necessarily strong adherents to the communist ideology.  
Népszabadság also made sure to contrast the abused bodies of the victims of the 
counterrevolution with the impure bodies of the counterrevolutionaries. Journalists 
emphasized that the lynching of the defenders of the headquarters had not ended with their 
deaths: the bodies of the victims were hanged, kicked, and mutilated – as evidenced by 
photographs that appeared in the Western press. If the bodies of the victims appeared 
almost sacred, the bodies of the counterrevolutionaries were presented as profane. An 
article titled “The sons of the US” argued that the photographer from Life magazine had 
made a mistake by not asking the photographed protesters to take off their shirts. He would 
have seen that their bodies were covered in tattoos that had been obtained while they were 
serving prison sentences (“’The sons of the US:’ Sketchy portrait of three tattooed 
murderers,” Népszabadság, May 14, 1958, p. 8). 
The strategy to discredit female revolutionaries was a different one: they were often 
described as prostitutes. Their pasts in the world of prostitution were ‘revealed’ in the 
reports about their trials, as well as in articles about foreign photographs that represented 
them (for instance: “Court sentence about the Republic Square prostitute 





By the first anniversary of the protests, the counterrevolution’s central symbolic 
figures, objects, and places were all in place. The disabled survivor, Lajos Somogyi Berta, 
wrote a commemorative piece for Népszabadság. He called the counterrevolutionaries 
“bloody and sadistic murderers” and praised the victims, their families, the survivors, and 
the heroes for their courage. He argued that while the West looked at the murderers as 
heroes, the West should instead praise the heroism of those who had saved lives on 
Republic Square (“It was today a year ago: True to your oath you died as heroes,” October 
30, 1957, p. 9). 
The party headquarters on Republic Square served as the symbolic place of the 
counterrevolution. By the first anniversary, the building had been restored and outfitted 
with a plaque that commemorated the victims of the shooting and lynching. On the day of 
the anniversary, an article in Népszabadság made it explicit that “not only the headquarters 
was restored, but also the Communist movement in Budapest” (“We shall remember!” 
October 30, 1957, p. 3). The building embodied the party’s message: although communism 
had been attacked and damaged, it was now in better shape than ever. Other damaged 
buildings in Budapest, that could have served as unofficial mementos of the revolution, 
were also quickly renovated – or replaced by new buildings (Ungváry, 2000b). The space 
of the revolution became only a memory, while the space of the counterrevolution was 
consciously shaped for remembrance. 
During this period of coverage, symbolic people, objects, and places came to 
embody the frame of the counterrevolution. As such, they directly countered the Western 





and places were meant to make it clear that the corrupt, violent, and internationally 
iconized event had failed to beat communism, humanity, and common sense.  
 
10.3 Repeating the Counter-Narrative (November 1960 – September 1981) 
 
During this period, Népszabadság focused on repeating the established counter-narrative, 
paring the memory of the event down to the symbols of Republic Square. Coverage 
focused almost exclusively on the official annual commemorations of the victims. 
Népszabadság’s annual reports on commemorative ceremonies were almost identical, as if 
based on a template. They were short and formalized, lacking interpretation. Each year, the 
articles bore more or less the same title: “Commemorations of the victims of the 
counterrevolution.” They reported on two events: the official ceremony at the 
commemorative plaque dedicated to the victims, and the official ceremony at Kerepesi 
cemetery, where the victims were buried. The articles were dominated by long lists of 
names of the party and state officials who placed flowers at these sites. A photograph of 
either ceremony frequently accompanied the articles: the leading party officials were 
mostly recognizable in those images, although their facial expressions were not readable 
(“Commemorations of the martyrs of the counterrevolution,” November 5, 1966, p. 1).  
The only times that Népszabadság moved slightly beyond the annual formula were 
the three anniversaries: 1966, 1971, and 1976.  
On the tenth anniversary, the leading article, titled “One decade,” took a relatively 
forgiving stand toward the counterrevolutionaries, suggesting that at the time, some 





focused on the government’s successful work: on how, with gentle and careful policies, it 
had gained back people’s trust and transformed the country (Népszabadság, November 4, 
1966, p. 3). 
 In 1971, the regular report about the official ceremony included a small extra 
section in italics. The section called the counterrevolution the largest imperialist 
provocation since WWII; the article also praised the victims of the counterrevolution 
(“Commemoration of the victims of the 1956 counterrevolution,” Népszabadság, 
November 5, 1971, p. 3).  
On the twentieth anniversary, Népszabadság published a larger analysis of the 
preceding two decades along with the regular report about the official ceremony. The 
article dedicated more space to the counterrevolution than it had in 1966, and also 
commemorated the victims. It expressed strong devotion to the Soviet Union and to other 
socialist countries; the closing lines summarized the achievements of two decades of 
consolidation (“Twenty Years Ago,” Népszabadság, November 4, 1976, p. 3).  
In sum, by mechanically reproducing the symbols of the counterrevolution 
Népszabadság avoided any discussion of other participants, objects, places and moments 
of the “commemorated” historic event in this period. The representational style in this third 
period of the coverage was so minimalistic, moreover, that one wonders if the political 
leadership really intended to remember any story about 1956 – or if it wished, instead, to 







10.4 The Fading of the Counter-Narrative (September 1981 – November 1986) 
Finally, by the twenty-fifth anniversary, Népszabadság had to respond to Hungarian 
emigrant groups and the international press, who were attempting to commemorate the 
event as an iconic event. The regime also had to deal with the increasing interest that the 
local democratic opposition was taking in the revolution. During the early eighties, as the 
leading local samizdat began writing about 1956, and the first illegal art exhibition on 1956 
was announced, the democratic opposition realized that a reconstruction of what had 
happened in 1956 might shake the legitimacy of the Kádár regime (Glant, 2007; György, 
2000, pp. 115-200).  
In 1981 Népszabadság initiated a series on the counterrevolution, titled “This 
happened.” Neither the title nor the series left much room for doubt or interpretation, but it 
did break with the long tradition of repetitive counterrevolutionary figures, objects, and 
places. Népszabadság also published letters from readers in connection with the series. 
Even though all published letters conformed to the counterrevolutionary frame, this was 
the first time that the newspaper included any substantial personal histories of the event 
(“The conclusions are the important: National unity, strong power of the workers,” 
Népszabadság, October 29, 1981).  
In 1986, reflecting new journalistic and political attitudes, the main series of 
Népszabadság on the thirtieth anniversary was titled “Facts respond.” The introduction 
declared that this time, the series would be debate-oriented rather than descriptive: the 
series’ aim was to correct “misunderstandings and mischaracterizations” regarding the 





introduction emphasized that those countries that were now “accusing” Hungary of 
“silencing 1956” had not been willing to confront dark periods in their own respective 
pasts. As an example, the introduction mentioned that the United States was actively 
commemorating 1956 – and asked, rhetorically: “Where do they officially remember the 
large protests of American students against the Vietnam war? When will they remember 
the victims of the persecutions in the McCarthy era, when will they rehabilitate the 
Rosenberg couple?” (“Facts respond: Documents about 1956 and the decades thereafter, 
new series in Népszabadság,” Népszabadság, October 15, 1986, p. 3). Like the 
introduction, the series as a whole conveyed the message that the success of the last three 
decades was the strongest proof that the framing of the event as counterrevolutionary had 
been right, and the Western elevated and interpretative story of a global icon had been 
false. 
The 1986 anniversary offered the party the last chance to celebrate its victory over 
the counterrevolution, and to attack the Western story of the event. János Kádár resigned as 
General Secretary in May 1988; on January 28, 1989 a member of HSWP’s Politburo 
called the 1956 event a “popular uprising.” With this act, the symbolic figures, objects and 
places of the counterrevolution became symbols of a narrative that belonged to a bygone 
age. On June 16, 1989, Imre Nagy and other central victims of the revolution were reburied 
during an official ceremony that was attended by several hundred thousand people and 
covered by international as well as Hungarian media. The legal rehabilitation of the leaders 





After 1989, the carefully constructed counter-narrative of the event and its related 
symbols disappeared from the public sphere, as though they had never existed. Since 1989, 
the event has been framed as a revolution in official, historical, and journalistic 
representations employing the Western elevated and interpretative language of the event. 
The symbolically charged name of Republic Square was erased in 2011, when the new 
right-wing administration re-named it Pope John Paul II Square. This official act of 
replacing a communist symbol with a Christian one was the only proof that Republic 
Square still had some symbolic resonance.  
Contemporary journalistic representations of the revolution rarely mention the 
atrocities that took place on Republic Square. The new official and journalistic 
representations of the heroic revolution are again simplifying the event, settling on a few 
symbols that synthesize only its elevated and interpretative Western story. Like those who 
pushed the idea that 1956 presented a counterrevolutionary moment, those honoring it as a 
revolutionary moment are selective about which factual pieces of 1956 to keep alive in 
memory. Imre Nagy and other leading figures of the revolution are undisputed symbolic 
figures; newly erected memorials serve as symbolic places for commemoration; and 
characteristic objects of the revolution, like the Soviet tank or the Hungarian tri-colored 
flag, with the coat of arms of Rákosi’s Soviet-style regime cut out of the center, are 
frequently evoked in contemporary representations of the event. Still, at the same time, the 
1956 Hungarian revolution is a “homeless” event in its own country: it is too communist 





feels any ideological closeness to it, both sides try to utilize its iconic power. The result: 
separate celebrations for separate parties, and an army of competing memorials.  
To conclude, this second part of the dissertation looked at the competing stories of 
the 1956 Hungarian revolution in order to examine what can “go wrong” in the process of 
constructing a global iconic event. Three potential causes of failure were put forward: the 
marginality of the event’s location, highly contextual and unstable international 
representation, and strong local counter-narration. No event has a single fixed set of factors 
to insure success or failure in global myth-making: but at least stories of failed iconization 








I have been making my way toward this book at least since I began 
collecting notes in 1977 and 1978 for a paper (that I never wrote) on 
what I called the social significance of statistically insignificant events.   
 
         Michael Schudson on Watergate in American memory, 1993, p. 1.  
 
 
I wrote a substantial part of this dissertation while living near the Bernauer Strasse subway 
station in Berlin, right by the Berlin Wall Memorial. I took photographs frequently of 
people who visited or passed the memorial. I recorded them as they found a way to relate 
to this place, to the many memories attached to each stone. Like them, I too had to figure 
out my connection to the material remains, and to the non-material memories, of the events 
I have researched. I was born decades after the 1956 Hungarian revolution and I have no 
personal memories of the fall of the Berlin Wall. I suppose that, as a ten-year-old, I was 
probably watching the newly introduced Music Television on November 9, 1989.  
I do not remember these events; I have learned to remember them. I lived in Berlin 
for a couple of months in 2012: almost every day, I looked at one photograph in a Berlin 
Wall photo album (figure 82). The photograph was taken on Bernauer Strasse in 1961, and 
it shows, presumably, a couple on the Western side, standing on a stepladder, waving at 
friends trapped in the East. When the Berlin Wall “fell” in 1989, the fall’s message of 
unity and freedom prevailed over the message conveyed by this photograph and the many 
photographs like it. But the fall of the Berlin Wall did not destroy or deny the many 







Often, while walking over to former West Berlin to do my grocery shopping, I 
would pass by the place where this couple had stood and waved at the painfully near and 
far East – and I would wonder: what message does their photograph send us today? Is there 
any? The photograph implies an inherent connection between East and West, both literally 
and metaphorically. The image suggests that we are all part of one family, that “wir sind 
ein Volk,” despite artificial divisions. Who knows, there may indeed be a lasting message 
in the story of the Berlin Wall. But is there any lasting message of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall? Since the individuals on the photograph had probably passed away when the wall 
came down, is this event still a success for them, and for many others who suffered from 
political divisions? Can we find a message in the fall of the Berlin Wall that encompasses 
more than inviting an ageing Jon Bon Jovi, David Hasselhoff or the Scorpions to sing 
some songs at the Brandenburg Gate? Or is it in fact a good thing that the global memory 
of the event is, in some ways, so banal and obvious?  
In this dissertation I have argued that while the East German border opening was 
unintentional, confusing and messy, its global message is not about “luck” or “accident” in 
history. Incarnated as a global iconic event, the fall of the Berlin Wall has come to 
communicate the momentary power that the otherwise hopelessly vulnerable individual 
can have. The event’s elevated and interpretative story, condensed into a simple phrase, a 
short narrative and a recognizable visual scene, provides global civil society with a 
contemporary social myth. Through recycling, reenactment, possession and 
memorialization, the event’s simple and universal story continues to travel successfully 





 While formulating these claims, I became increasingly convinced that the idea that 
there are “events” that the media gets to “cover” – ideally in an objective and factual way – 
betrays a limited understanding of both media and social life. As John Durham Peters has 
noted, our way of thinking about the media is still constrained by a Habermasian protestant 
view of the public sphere – a view that renders us somewhat inattentive to the performative 
character and playfulness of our subject (and, I would add, to its seriousness) (Peters, 
1993). As I worked on this project, I became interested in the making of events; and I hope 
to have shown that media coverage is constitutive of events in highly sophisticated ways. 
The media alone do not “produce” historic occurrences in social life, but they do strip 
particular occurrences from their larger contexts, and may shape them into simple and 
universal stories. It is certainly possible to regard this process as “media distortion” – and 
much work within cultural studies has focused on precisely that. But I hoped to suggest a 
different way of thinking, one based on a positive understanding of “myth.” In journalism 
research, “facts” and “context” are often (let me say mythically) admired; but if you want 
to construct an international social myth, “facts” and “context” are the enemy. They are 
particular and local rather than universal and global. Facts and context might convince a 
few minds; myths, on the other hand, have a chance of occupying many and diverse hearts. 
 In my attempt to understand the making of contemporary global social myths 
through media narration, I developed a theoretical concept of the formation of global 
iconic events, suggesting five narrative aspects to consider in connection with them: (1) 
their narrative prerequisites; (2) their elevated and interpretative story; (3) their 





their competing stories; and (5) their ability to travel across multiple media platforms and 
changing social and political contexts. I developed this concept by building on and 
criticizing Daniel Dayan’s and Elihu Katz’s canonical Media Events. I tried to extend their 
“media events” concept with a diachronic and transnational perspective, while also being 
attentive to issues of media convergence. Thus, I examined how news stories travel 
through time and media in highly fragmented interpretative spaces.  
 In order to understand each narrative aspect, I picked a global iconic event that is 
the least disputable – one that is, without a doubt, a “success story:” the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. First, I analyzed the event’s narrative prerequisites, focusing on the stories of the 
Berlin Wall and the specific social and economic conditions of East Germany in 1989. 
Then I traced how the elevated and interpretative language of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
was developed in West German broadcast media, pointing out the way in which this 
language helped precipitate the Berlin Wall’s fall. Third, I examined how the confusing 
developments of November 9, 1989 were gradually condensed into a simple phrase, a short 
narrative and a recognizable visual scene. In order to highlight that the fall of the Berlin 
Wall entered a fragmented interpretative space, I also traced the event’s East German 
coverage. I showed how East German journalists, by being objective and narrowly factual, 
under-narrated the event, downgrading it to a simple news event. Finally, I analyzed how, 
through practices of recycling, reenacting, possessing, and memorializing, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall’s story travels through time, space and media, becoming a lasting global social 
myth.  





advantages and challenges of decontextualized stories. On the one hand, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall is an inspiring global social myth for freedom fighters and activists around the 
world. On the other hand, its current simplified version allows it to be applied to contexts 
to which it has little or no relation (of course, the latter is not always a problem). In a 
demonstration of the story’s unique portability, the fall of the Berlin Wall is often used as a 
reference point for contemporary revolutions, social conflicts and practices of separation. 
The event is evoked in such diverse contexts as the North-South Korean conflict, China’s 
Internet policy, the European Union’s Nobel Peace Prize, and the Arab Spring. Practices of 
decontextualization help to make stories universal, but they can also render them close to 
banal. In every case of recycling, the balance between the two is a delicate one.  
 The story of the fall of the Berlin Wall, to take a prominent example, has become a 
particularly popular reference point for contemporary separation barriers. Separation 
barriers might seem archaic in a “globalizing” world, but their construction is on the rise 
worldwide: since the fall of the Berlin Wall, at least twenty-two countries have built new 
separation barriers. Recent separation barriers include Egypt’s barrier around Sharm El-
Sheikh against the infiltration of terrorists; Brunei’s border fence against illegal 
immigrants at the Limbang border; the Kazakh-Uzbekistan barrier against drug trafficking 
and illegal immigration; India’s fence across part of the border with Bangladesh in order to 
bar terrorists, illegal immigrants and drugs; Israel’s separation barrier on the West Bank, 
also against terrorists; and the United States’ separation barrier at the Mexican border 
against illegal immigrants and drug trafficking. New separation barriers often function as 





event’s visual scenes.  
 The loaded memory of the Berlin Wall often inspires contemporary political 
leaders to frame their countries’ separation barriers as “fences”: temporary and permeable. 
In contrast, the activists opposing those separation barriers, recalling the Berlin Wall, tend 
to frame them as “walls”: permanent and impermeable. Both naming practices take history 
seriously; at the same time, they are also somewhat ahistorical. As this dissertation has 
shown, “the” Berlin Wall went through four distinct phases of design during its twenty-
eight-year existence, including the initial moment when it comprised “only” a few strands 
of barbed wire. Nonetheless, we still apply the term “wall” to all its four phases. Moreover, 
the Berlin Wall was a product of a unique historic situation in which one community was 
divided in two. Contemporary separation barriers often reflect deeply felt symbolic and 
social boundaries: just imagine what would happen if, on a cold November night, the 
Israeli West Bank separation barrier suddenly came down – it would hardly result in a 
frenzy of Israeli-Palestinian hugs, let alone in “reunification.” This is what I mean by the 
delicate balance between the universal and the banal: the Berlin Wall is an adequate 
reference point for some separation barriers, while for others it is trite and out of place.  
 After examining an example of a successful process of turning a news event into a 
global iconic event, and that event’s travel through time, space, and media, I set out to 
analyze a failed process of iconization. Although I used the “most similar systems design,” 
picking a revolutionary event from the Cold War context to eliminate variation, I had no 
pretensions of providing a perfect comparative case study to the dissertation’s German 





sociological practices of comparison and typification.  
 There were other special challenges to the second case study. Failure and absence 
pose certain obstacles to media research – obstacles I was not fully able to overcome (nor 
did I really intend to). Although I have abandoned (or postponed?) my original plan of 
writing a dissertation on “images we do not remember,” in a way the Hungarian part is still 
about things we do not remember. Because of this, it inevitably runs into a methodological 
blind spot – but as such it also presents an opportunity for innovation. One can show the 
narrative prerequisites of a forgotten event. One might even analyze how the event’s 
elevated and interpretative language did not develop fully – although here one already 
faces the question: compared to what? Since I had started the dissertation with a success 
story – the social construction of the fall of the Berlin Wall as global iconic event – there 
was at least something with which to compare it. But tracking failed condensation into a 
simple phrase, a short narrative and a recognizable visual scene is a tricky business: what 
you are dealing with, after all, is a not fully developed elevated and interpretative story’s 
not fully developed condensation. That is why, in the second part of the dissertation, the 
order of the chapters is reversed: I first analyzed the outcome, the “condensation,” and then 
I went back to see how fully it represented the elevated and interpretative story of the 
event.  
 The issue of counter-narration or under-narration may come as a relief after these 
methodological and theoretical challenges. If the event you are analyzing had a strong 
counter- or under-narrative to it, then that is relatively easy to track. The Hungarian case in 





German under-narrative of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Finally, when it comes to the story’s 
travel through space, time and media, one can point to factors that get in the way of such 
travels. With the Hungarian case study, I hoped to show at least some conditions that can 
limit the global portability of events – with a special focus on the marginality of the 
event’s location, incoherent and contextual international representation, forgetting, and 
local counter-narration. 
 Some readers of this dissertation might wonder if it is not a bit late to enter the 
globalization discourse. Have I not realized that we have moved forward, that globalization 
literature is so nineties? We are after all in the post-nineties today – in the post-9/11 world 
of disillusionment. Have I completely missed that? I do not think so. Let me illustrate what 
is at stake in understanding the social construction of global iconic events with the help of 
two New York Times articles, both of which were published while I was writing this 
conclusion in March 2013. The first article looked at how certain concentration camps 
have come to represent the entire, widespread, and complex “killing machine” of Nazi 
Germany, and argued that “these sites, infamous though they are, represent only a 
minuscule fraction of the entire German network.” As an example, the article describes the 
experiences of Henry Greenbaum, an 84-year-old Holocaust survivor:  
When Mr. Greenbaum, a volunteer at the Holocaust museum, tells visitors today 
about his wartime odyssey, listeners inevitably focus on his confinement of months 
at Auschwitz, the most notorious of all the camps. But the images of the other 
camps where the Nazis imprisoned him are ingrained in his memory as deeply as 
the concentration camp number — A188991 — tattooed on his left forearm. In an 
interview, he ticked off the locations in rapid fire, the details still vivid. First came 
the Starachowice ghetto in his hometown in Poland, where the Germans herded his 
family and other local Jews in 1940, when he was just 12. Next came a slave labor 
camp with six-foot-high fences outside the town, where he and a sister were moved 





at a factory, the Germans would force him and other prisoners to dig trenches that 
were used for dumping the bodies of victims. He was sent to Auschwitz, then 
removed to work at a chemical manufacturing plant in Poland known as Buna 
Monowitz, where he and some 50 other prisoners who had been held at the main 
camp at Auschwitz were taken to manufacture rubber and synthetic oil. And last 
was another slave labor camp at Flossenbürg, near the Czech border, where food 
was so scarce that the weight on his 5-foot-8-inch frame fell away to less than 100 
pounds. (…) “Nobody even knows about these places,” Mr. Greenbaum said 
(Lichtblau, 2013, p. SR3). 
 
 The article showed that our knowledge and memory of the Holocaust are narrow 
and limited: in our fixation on a few key sites, we simplify and condense the extensive 
genocide we have come to call the “Holocaust.” At the same time, it is precisely this 
simplification that helps us communicate the event through time, space and media. A story 
that focuses only on Auschwitz may not resemble the event, but it does represent it. It also 
allows Mr. Greenbaum’s international (and often young) visitors, for whom imagining 
Auschwitz is already a massive task, to connect to him relatively quickly. What if, even 
after the Holocaust’s history has been extended, “Auschwitz” continues to function as a 
global narrative device for Mr. Greenbaum to tell about Starachowice, Treblinka, Buna 
Monowitz, and Flossenbürg? It might help rather than hinder him to convey his 
experience. 
 The second article, titled “Are there any Europeans left?,” contemplated the future 
of the European Union. In particular, it asked how emotional ties to Europe could be 
established among Europeans. After analyzing how economic solidarity and a common 
fear of war had failed to function as binding forces, the author argued: 
Perhaps the answer is to conceive of a Europe in the flesh, with colors, smells, 
folklore, poetic force. And variety. The goal is not one formed on familiar 
principles — common language or history or bloodlines — but the very opposite: 





point. (…) Promote the Continent’s spiritual unity, organized around its diversity 
(Guez, 2013, p. SR4). 
 
 Is there a link between these articles? I believe there is. While they seem radically 
different, both articles deal with the issue of “myth-making” – “myth” being understood 
here as a strong story that resonates over time and across space and media. The article on 
the Holocaust may remind us of the importance of simplification in making an event 
accessible, both internationally and over time. The article on the future of the European 
Union highlights the significance of stories in binding societies together. It also makes the 
case that binding myths, in this particular case “diversity,” are more powerful than any 
economic or military alliances.  
 Both articles show the need for common stories that resonate internationally. In a 
way they both ask the same question: What makes it to international consciousness, and 
why? Or, to translate these questions to my project: What binds the global society 
together? The current European struggle makes it clear that societies cannot be built on 
“hard facts” alone. Societies need common stories that function as dramatic or uplifting 
cultural reference points. Since the international community tells and sustains these stories 
through media, a sophisticated understanding of how media turn – or fail to turn – events 
into global social myths may help us as we face contemporary global challenges. Of 
course, social events always enter highly fragmented interpretative spaces, meeting with 
contrasting interpretations and quite a lot of ignorance. But some stories still manage to 
enter, remain in, and influence international memory, even if they come in multiple 
versions.  





are high. Instead of an obscure cultural studies project, this project turned out, to my own 
surprise, to be about something significant for international relations. I hope that this piece 
of academic writing, even if it is still somewhat obscure, will help us understand how 
powerful stories of events might shape the lives of those generations who come after us all 
over in the world. 
 Because in the end, after common currencies, military alliances, and international 






Research Design: My Travel Through Time, Space, and Media 
	  
	  
I think of the journalistic coverage of international news events as a discursive surface on 
which one can track the process of their social construction. Therefore, the central method 
I employed in this dissertation was textual analysis. Textual analysis deals with a given 
text as well as with the ways in which that text interacts with culture (Potter, 1996); I have 
tried to situate the analyzed representations within their larger social, cultural, and political 
context(s). In order to provide a diachronic perspective to my analysis, I have examined the 
media coverage of both the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
during the first two months of coverage, as well as at the first, tenth, and twentieth 
anniversaries. As I will specify below, in each case the time frame of my analysis was 
further shaped by significant events. 
 For the German case, my period of analysis for the event’s media coverage ran 
from November 9, 1989 to January 9, 1990. I focused especially on the period between 
November 9, 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall) and December 22, 1989 (the opening of the 
Brandenburg Gate). With regard to the media remembrance of fall of the Berlin Wall, I 
analyzed its journalistic commemoration on November 9, 1990, 1999, and 2009.  
 My sources for the textual analysis were the following West German [after 1990: 
German] news publications: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, Die Zeit, Berliner 
Morgenpost, Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Berliner Illustrierte. I also performed textual 
analysis on all episodes of the West German [after 1990: German] evening television news 





well as on November 9, 1990, 1999, and 2009.  
 In order to examine, also through textual analysis, the East German press 
representation of the event, I analyzed the leading Communist newspapers Neues 
Deutschland and Berliner Zeitung during the first two months of coverage (November 9, 
1989 – January 9, 1990), and at the first, tenth, and twentieth anniversaries (November 9, 
1990, 1999, and 2009). In terms of the initial coverage, I again focused on the period 
between November 9, 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall) and December 22, 1989 (the 
opening of the Brandenburg Gate). Although East Germany had ceased to exist by the first 
anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, these news publications survived those political 
rumblings: therefore I was able to examine their anniversary coverage at the first, tenth and 
twentieth anniversaries. With regard to the East German television coverage, I performed 
textual analysis on the most important evening television news program, Aktuelle Kamera, 
in the first two months of coverage (November 9, 1989 – January 9, 1989), and also at the 
first anniversary, November 9, 1990.  
 The Hungarian part consisted of two separate parts: while the first dealt with the 
American coverage and memory of the event, the second focused on the event’s Hungarian 
counter-narrative. For the American coverage I first applied a close textual analysis to the 
event’s coverage during the first two months (October 23 – January 4, 1957) and at the 
first, tenth and twentieth anniversaries (October 23 - November 4, 1957, 1966, 1976). 
Then, in order to see how the American coverage evolved up until Time magazine’s Man 
of the Year (MOY) issue, I extended my period of analysis from October 23, 1956 to the 





account an additional anniversary beyond the first, tenth, and twentieth anniversaries: the 
inclusion of the thirtieth anniversary (1986) was necessary to see how the political changes 
of the 1980s had altered the media memory of the event.  
 My sources were the following U.S. news publications: The New York Times, Time, 
Life, and Newsweek. I examined the print versions of all issues of these news publications 
between October 23, 1956 and January 7, 1957 in order to see the event’s coverage in its 
larger media context. To make sure I had not missed any relevant articles, I also searched 
Proquest for the term “Hungary” during the revolution (October 23, 1956 – November 4, 
1956), assuming that the newspaper probably did not yet call the event a revolution in this 
period. Using textual analysis, I perused all 407 articles that came up. After the revolution, 
a combined search for “Hungary” and “freedom fighters” between November 5, 1956 and 
January 7, 1957 (the publication date of Time’s MOY cover) resulted in 40 articles. Using 
the same method, I systematically examined all 40 articles and also the three articles that 
mentioned “freedom fighter” in the singular during the same period. I also analyzed the 
220 articles that included “Hungary” and “revolution” between November 5, 1956 and 
January 7, 1957. For Time magazine, an Academic Search Complete search for the term 
“Hungary” between October 23, 1956 and January 7, 1957 resulted in 55 articles that I also 
examined. 
 The process of writing about the Hungarian communist press coverage of the 1956 
Hungarian revolution was a bit like imagining a full picture based on only a few pieces of 
the puzzle. There exists no comprehensive history of Népszabadság, and reliable literature 





2004; Hegedűs, 2001; Murányi, 1994; Takács, 2005, 2008, 2009). The primary research 
was conducted in the Open Society Archives in Budapest, which holds the archives of the 
Hungarian Unit of Radio Free Europe’s Radio Liberty Research Institute (Unit). It was the 
Unit’s task to prepare materials for radio editors so as to provide them with up-to-date and 
comprehensive background information on Hungarian affairs. Among other things, the 
Unit collected press clippings, news agency releases, samizdat and émigré publications, 
posters, leaflets, photo negatives, photo prints, and audiotapes about all aspects of 
everyday life in Hungary. A special collection of the Unit was dedicated to the Hungarian 
communist press representation of the 1956 revolution, including continuously updated 
press clippings from multiple newspapers.  
  The research population for Chapter 11 was defined as all press clippings between 
November 11, 1956 and November 11, 1986 from the central party daily Népszabadság in 
the 1956 collection of the Unit. Again I decided to add an additional ten years of analysis 
in this case in order to consider the relevance of the political transition in the eighties: the 
entire research period therefore ran from 1956 until 1986. The reason that the first article 
dated from November 11, 1956 had to do with the limitations of the collection 
(Népszabadság was founded on November 2, 1956; its first available article was from 
November 11, 1956). In any case, my task here was to trace the development of a strong 
and lasting counter-narrative: that narrative was not developed until after the revolution 
was crushed. Using textual analysis, I systematically examined all 417 Népszabadság 





needed to track the development of the counter-narrative, I looked at all available articles 
in the research period for this case – not just the coverage on the event’s anniversaries. 
 While the 1956 collection of the Unit provides invaluable research material, it has 
one limitation: the press clippings do not include page numbers. Therefore, the page 
numbers as listed in my dissertation reflect the careful and dedicated work of reference 
librarians in the Hungarian National Library [Országos Széchényi Könyvtár]. 
 In my selection of case studies, I applied the “most similar systems design” 
(MSSD) (Lijphart, 1971). This method of comparative analysis starts from strongly similar 
cases that share many circumstances, thus keeping constant as many extraneous variables 
as possible. There are two main ways to apply the method: a strict application requires the 
selection of case studies where the cases are similar in all variables, except for the 
independent variable that is in the center of analysis. In contrast, “[a] looser application of 
a MSSD would be when we choose to study countries that appear to be similar in as many 
background characteristics as possible, but where the researcher never systematically 
matches the cases on all the relevant control variables” (Anckar, 2008, p. 390). Not 
believing it possible to control all variables of my cases except for the independent one, I 
chose the looser application of MSSD. The method has one inevitable shortcoming: it 
deals with only a few case studies, while the variables are numerous.  
 Inspired by cultural sociology and my training in aesthetics, I have tried to provide 
a Geertzian “thick description” of myth making in journalism (Alexander & Smith, 2001). 
In my construction of the theory, I have adopted a grounded theory approach, letting the 





dissertation I have used “frames” as Goffman defined them: as “schemata of 
interpretation” that help individuals “locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences both 
within their life spaces and the world at large (Goffman, 1974; Snow et al., 1986).  
 I also came across a number of unique challenges beyond those standard puzzles of 
methodology and selection. Like the stories I have examined, I too had to travel through 
time, space, and media while researching this dissertation. In what follows I will offer a 
detailed analysis of my own “travels” – of how I tried to overcome temporal, geographic, 
and (media) cultural boundaries in my research.   
 
Travel Through Time 
For me, the challenge of time mainly involved figuring out to what extent the things I do 
belong to the discipline of history. How, in particular, could I write a dissertation (and then 
a book) that is accessible to contemporary and international audiences, while also paying 
respect to historical analysis? In a way my writing faced the same challenges as the stories 
I analyze: either I produce something simple and universal that can travel through time, 
space, and media, or my writing becomes an obscure artifact of the past. 
 In order to confront this directly, I designed and taught an undergraduate course on 
Icons of Revolution at Freie Universität in the spring term of 2012 in Berlin (figure 83). 
The course examined the media coverage of four revolutionary events from the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries: the 1956 Hungarian revolution, the 1989 Chinese protests, the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, and the 2011 Egyptian revolution. My undergraduate students came 





discussions were in English, which enabled us to discuss the case studies in a relatively 
language-neutral and cosmopolitan setting. To my delight, almost all of my students were 
born after the Berlin Wall fell, providing me with fresh insights about this event’s travel 
through time.  
 
Figure 83: Icons of Revolution seminar participants at Freie Universität Berlin (June 2012).  
 
Travel Through Space 
With regard to space, the case study of the fall of the Berlin Wall confronted me with more 
complexities than I expected. I assumed there must be some sort of central digital archive 
on the media coverage of this pivotal event of recent German history. But to my surprise 
(and, initially, disappointment), the archives were neither digital nor housed in a single 





Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, in Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv in Potsdam 
and in the NDR Archiv in Hamburg. In the Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek zu 
Berlin I researched the West German and East German newspaper coverage and 
remembrance of the event. Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv in Potsdam was my archival site for 
the East German television news show Aktuelle Kamera. In the NDR Archiv in Hamburg I 
examined the West German television news programs Tagesschau and Tagesthemen.  
Experiencing, sensing, and “feeling” these archival sites of memory strongly 
shaped my way of thinking about the case study. The press archive of Staatsbibliothek zu 
Berlin is located in a former granary in a highly industrial neighborhood: around there, 
even finding a hotdog stand was a major task (figure 86). In contrast, the Deutsches 
Rundfunkarchiv in Potsdam and the NDR Archiv in Hamburg are both part of the larger 
building complexes of still functioning broadcasters. Here, during breaks from my eight-
hour-a-day television watching, I emerged from a dark room filled with piles of videotapes 
and other old media, delighted (and stunned) to meet contemporary German television and 
radio stars in shiny cafeterias. At all these institutions I found a professional and 
welcoming staff, eager to help me find my way in their archival labyrinths. Finally, a two-
hour, recorded conversation with former SFB director Günther von Lojewski helped me 
better locate and understand the relevant material of the initial coverage of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.  
 Another important aide for my travel through space was photography. I took 
around 1500 photographs in Germany between April 10 and July 24, 2012. In particular, I 





the Checkpoint Charlie Museum in Berlin. I took photographs of their exhibitions and of 
people’s reactions to these memorial sites. I also continuously photographed the memory 
of the Berlin Wall as it materialized on streets and in souvenir shops, hoping to record both 
intentional and ad-hoc memorials of the Berlin Wall and its fall.  
 Travel through space also involved travel through language and culture. Without 
my command of English, German and Hungarian, locating and navigating the archival 
sites would have been entirely impossible – as would the textual analysis. Before I 
embarked on my research I had no idea of the extent to which access to these materials 
would be influenced by culture. It was challenging, for example, to strike the appropriate 
tone with some librarians in German, with my complex background of a Hungarian 
passport and a Columbia University ID card. If being an American researcher from New 
York seemed to be a “cool” and reliable identity, one that was often welcomed, my East 
European passport sometimes caused visible disappointment. In that sense, navigating 










Figure 84: The newspaper archive division of the State Library of Berlin [Zeitungsabteilung, 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin] where I researched the West and East German press coverage and 
remembrance of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The division is the library’s youngest; it was founded 
after the unification of the East and West parts of the library in 1993. The building is a former 






Travel Through Media 
 
Finally, in addition to time and space, I also traveled through media. Researching the two 
case studies, I had to make sense of paper clippings in the Open Society Archives in 
Budapest, microfilmed news articles in Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, videotapes of television 
coverage in the DRA and NDR archives in Potsdam and Hamburg, respectively, and digital 
archives for the 1956 Hungarian revolution’s American press coverage. 
 While using distinctively different technologies, I had to look for the same 
practices of meaning-making. Although I had initially been convinced that digital archives 
would be my most desired forms of archives, I realized over time that I was the happiest in 
the Open Society Archives in Budapest, where I covered the entire floor of a large room 
with paper clippings from the central party daily Népszabadság. As I walked around the 
room trying to make sense of the coverage, as if I were part of the “space” in which 
journalistic meaning-making occurred. In contrast, the highly professional digital databases 
containing the American coverage did not enable me to see the articles’ relation to each 
other, nor their context. Disenchanted by the digital archives, I therefore decided to look at 
the print versions of the American news publications as well, in order to situate every 
article in its broader journalistic space. I also thoroughly enjoyed my work with the giant 
and ancient microfilm machines in the newspaper archive division of Staatsbibliothek zu 
Berlin, where I looked at the German press coverage and remembrance of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall as it unfolded, incoherently, over time. 
 Finally, in researching the West German and East German television coverage of 





permitted to watch video recordings of the fall of the Berlin Wall’s television coverage and 
remembrance in the archives, but any DVD copies I wanted to make cost approximately 30 
euros for every 10 minutes of recorded material. There were other archives that did not 
allow a free viewing at all: here, both the research in the material and copies would have 
been unaffordable. Therefore, I limited my attention to the three news broadcasts to which 
I was able to get viewing access in the archives’ buildings. Throughout this process, my 
international legal training, especially at the Information Society Project at Yale Law 
School, has helped me navigate complex copyright agreements. 
  In sum, while I tracked my events’ travel through time, space, and media, I also 
travelled through temporal, geographical and legal-cultural boundaries myself. In my 
search for meaning, I had to translate and communicate – most often, though, I found 
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